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Security Council

Fifty-fifth year

Provisional

4164th meeting

Friday, 23 June 2000, 10 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Levitte	(France)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Listre
	Bangladesh	Mr. Chowdhury
	Canada	Mr. Fowler
	China	Mr. Shen Guofang
	Jamaica	Mr. Ward
	Malaysia	Mr. Hasmy
	Mali	Mr. Ouane
	Namibia	Mr. Theron
	Netherlands	Mr. van Walsum
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Tunisia	Mr. Ben Mustapha
	Ukraine	Mr. Yel'chenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Jeremy Greenstock
	United States of America	Mr. Holbrooke

Agenda

Briefing by Mr. Carl Bildt, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans

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00-49721 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Briefing by Mr. Carl Bildt, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans

The President (*spoke in French*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Iraq, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, requesting to be invited to participate in the debate on the item on the Council's agenda under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

The Council is also called upon to decide on the invitation to Mr. Carl Bildt, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans, and on the request, transmitted by the Permanent Representative of Portugal, representing the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, to authorize Mr. Javier Solana, Secretary-General of that Council and High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, to participate in the meeting under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, document S/2000/615.

Finally, I have received a letter from Mr. Jovanović in which he requests to be invited to participate in the debate on the agenda item. No reference is made to either rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council in this request.

Prior consultations with the members of the Council have not made it possible to reach an understanding on how to respond to these requests. I therefore propose that the Council decide successively, first on the requests for participation under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, next on those referring to rule 39 and, finally, on Mr. Jovanović's request, which refers to neither rule 37 nor rule 39.

I shall thus proceed in three stages. During the first stage, I shall ask if there are any objections to giving a favourable response to the requests referring to rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure — namely, those submitted by the representatives of Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey.

During the second stage, I shall ask if there are any objections to inviting Mr. Carl Bildt and Mr. Javier Solana to participate in the debate on the agenda item under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

During the third stage, I shall ask if there are any objections to giving a positive response to Mr. Jovanović's request, which refers to neither rule 37 nor rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

If there is an objection to any of the requests to be invited to participate, I shall submit the request to a vote of the members of the Council.

May I take it that the Council agrees to proceed in this manner?

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) *(spoke in Russian)*: You will recall, Mr. President, that when we discussed this matter yesterday in the consultations, I proposed that we take a positive view of all requests that we have received for participation in today's meeting. That was the first proposal, and I would be grateful if we could take a decision on it.

The President *(spoke in French)*: I note that the procedure I have proposed to follow is not acceptable to the delegation of the Russian Federation.

I have proposed that the Council should not take a decision, whether positive or negative, on all the requests as a whole.

Bearing in mind that disagreements arose during the prior consultations on one of the requests, I have proposed that the Council should decide, successively and separately, on the requests under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, next on those referring to rule 39 and, finally, on Mr. Jovanović's request.

The delegation of the Russian Federation has proposed another method, which consists of taking a single decision on all the requests, considered as a whole. Under this method, the Council would be called

upon either to accept all the requests or to reject all of them.

In the present circumstances, I feel it is necessary to put the proposal of the Russian Federation to the vote.

I therefore request the Council to determine whether it wishes, as proposed by the Russian Federation, to take a single decision on all the requests, considered as a whole, which would mean that the Council would either accept all the requests or reject them all. If the Russian Federation's proposal does not receive the required number of votes, I will follow the procedure that I myself have proposed.

If no member wishes to take the floor, I shall take it that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the proposal of the Russian Federation.

It was so decided.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

China, Namibia, Russian Federation, Ukraine

Against:

Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, France, Malaysia, Mali, Netherlands, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Jamaica

The President *(spoke in French)*: The result of the voting is as follows: 4 in favour, 10 against and 1 abstention. The proposal of the Russian Federation has not been adopted because it has failed to obtain the required number of votes.

As I announced before the voting, I shall now invite the Council to consider successively the requests under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, next those referring to rule 39 and, finally, that of Mr. Jovanović.

First, do I hear any objection to giving a positive response to the requests to be invited to participate submitted by the representatives of Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council?

There being no objection, I invite the representatives of Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey to take the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nesho (Albania), Mr. Pfanzelter (Austria), Mr. Sychov (Belarus), Mr. Sacirbey (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Mr. Sotirov (Bulgaria), Mr. Gournaris (Greece), Mr. Kobayashi (Japan), Mr. Johansen (Norway), Mr. Ahmad (Pakistan), Mr. Monteiro (Portugal), Mr. Petrič (Slovenia), Mr. Čalovski (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Mr. Vural (Turkey) took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President *(spoke in French)*: Secondly, do I hear any objection to extending an invitation to Mr. Carl Bildt and Mr. Javier Solana under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure?

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Carl Bildt to take a seat at the Council table.

I now invite Mr. Javier Solana to take the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

Do I hear any objection to our giving a favourable response to the request for participation submitted by Mr. Jovanović?

Mr. Holbrooke (United States of America): My delegation must object to the proposal to allow Mr. Jovanović, or anyone else purporting to represent his Government, to address the Council. We would like to request a vote on this invitation.

He represents a Government whose senior leadership has been indicted for war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law. The Tribunal that indicted their leaders was established by the Council itself, with the full support and participation of every member of the Council — including those supporting his participation today. Allowing any representative of that leadership to participate in this or any other meeting of the Council flouts the indictments, undermines the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and sets us on a dangerous moral and legal course that sends the

wrong message to the world about what this great body is doing here today and eliminates and undermines the seriousness of this gathering, at which I am particularly grateful to see Mr. Bildt, Mr. Solana and other major representatives of the world community.

There is no room in this debate for a representative of this regime, which continues its repressive tactics at home and its policies of nationalist extremism abroad and which helped fuel four Balkan wars over the last decade. It would be inappropriate to allow a representative of that Government to use the Council, in a discussion about where we stand on Kosovo and Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), to support the very policies that forced the United Nations to intervene.

We recommend that the Council state clearly and unequivocally that it rejects the policies of hatred and war espoused by the Belgrade regime; that it does not tolerate abuses of human rights; and that it fully supports the efforts of the International war crime Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to prosecute all — I repeat, all — those who have been indicted.

For this reason, my delegation requests that the proposed invitation be put to the vote. Of course, our country will vote no.

The President (*spoke in French*): We shall now proceed to the vote. Does any delegation wish to speak before the vote?

Mr. Yel'chenko (Ukraine): Since the beginning of this year, we have witnessed quite a number of important new developments in the Council's working methods and procedures, the most important of which is the tendency towards the increased participation of non-members of the Council in the discussions of this body. Let me recall one of the latest events in support of this assertion: the meetings of the Council with the participation of the members of the Political Committee of the Lusaka Agreement, held on 15 and 16 June. I would like to emphasize that this was the first time in the history of the United Nations that the Security Council had at its table representatives of rebel movements, who participated in the Council's discussions.

As a non-permanent member of the Security Council, Ukraine attaches particular significance to this important tendency. I am deeply convinced that the Security Council as a whole derives considerable benefits from this tendency, which enhances its actual influence on the situation on the ground. In this regard, my delegation sees an inconsistency between this tendency and the request for a vote on the participation in the Council's meeting of the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

First of all, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remains a participant in the peace process in the Balkans. It is a signatory to the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement. It is a host country of the international presence in Kosovo. It is a party to the settlement of the Prevlaka dispute. We believe this provides sufficient grounds to allow this country to participate in the discussion of the Security Council on the situation in the Balkans as a whole.

Furthermore, I must recall the important provisions of Article 32 of the Charter of the United Nations, under which any State that is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council has to be invited to participate in the discussion relating to the dispute. It is impossible to deny that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia de facto remains a party to every track of the peace process in the Balkans.

Since September 1992, the Security Council has adopted a special form of invitation when faced with a request for participation from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. According to that formula, the President of the Council — in response to a written request from the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — invites that representative by name to address the Council in the course of the discussion of the item before it. At the current stage, we do not see any grounds to abandon this practice, which has been in existence for nearly eight years.

These are the reasons why my delegation will vote in favour of the participation of Mr. Jovanović in today's open meeting of the Security Council.

Finally, I would like to place on the record that this position of Ukraine is without any prejudice to the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The President (*spoke in French*): If no other member of the Council wishes to speak before the voting, I shall take it that the Council is now prepared to vote on the request submitted by Mr. Jovanović.

It was so decided.

A vote was taken by a show of hands.

In favour:

China, Namibia, Russian Federation, Ukraine

Against:

Bangladesh, Canada, France, Malaysia, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Argentina, Jamaica, Mali, Tunisia

The President (*spoke in French*): The result of the voting is as follows: 4 in favour, 7 against and 4 abstentions.

The request made by Mr. Jovanović has not been approved because it failed to obtain the required number of votes.

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Shen Guofang (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation expresses its deep regret with regard to the decision just made by the Security Council. The Chinese delegation is of the view that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an important country of the Balkan region. It is also a State that is directly concerned and a party to the Dayton Agreement. It does not matter whether or not we agree with the policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; excluding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the Security Council and not allowing it to speak will not contribute to resolving the Balkan problem.

The Security Council should not deprive a sovereign State of its right to state its position when it wants to do so. This kind of action runs counter to the spirit of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, we would like again to express our deep regret with regard to the decision just made by the Security Council.

Mr. Listre (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): Argentina's abstention is based on my delegation's serious doubts regarding the underlying reasons for denying participation in this debate to Mr. Jovanović, particularly bearing in mind previous instances in the Council in recent months especially during the month of December.

I wish to fully clarify that this vote in no way implies support for, endorsement of or sympathy for the Belgrade regime, in respect of which my delegation agrees with everything, or nearly everything, just said by the Permanent Representative of the United States.

The President (*spoke in French*): I will now make a statement in my capacity as Permanent Representative of France.

France voted against the request presented by Mr. Jovanović, to participate in this Security Council meeting. We believe that Mr. Jovanović's participation in this meeting is inappropriate. We do not dispute the general principle of Mr. Jovanović's having an opportunity to participate in a Security Council meeting. This vote is unrelated and has no effect on the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations, which is a matter of substance governed by the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): It is with great regret that I assess what has just happened in the Council — the direct application of the policy of certain countries to exclude the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from participation not only in today's meeting, but generally, in the settlement process for the Balkans. This goes against the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter and its purposes and principles, and hinders the Security Council and the international community in the performance of their tasks.

It is awkward for me even to recall in this Chamber that, according to Article 31 of the United Nations Charter, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has the right to participate in this discussion on an equal footing with other United Nations Member States that have made such requests. It is embarrassing for me to have to note that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a country whose interests are directly affected by the item under discussion in today's meeting. If this is not sufficient reason for anyone here, members can recall that, according to Article 32 of the Charter, even a State that is not a Member of the United Nations has the right to participate in the discussion by the Security Council of a situation in which that country is involved as a party.

To discuss the Balkan problem without the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is nonsense. We are concerned with the fact that the International Tribunal

for the Former Yugoslavia continues to be used as a political instrument, which was recently demonstrated once again when the Prosecutor of the Tribunal, Ms. Carla Del Ponte, refused to consider the flagrant use of force and violations of international humanitarian law by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia cannot support this destructive attempt to isolate the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, both from the standpoint of a political settlement in the Balkans and of the damage such attempts do to the United Nations as a universal Organization.

A very dangerous precedent is thus being created when States that are unpalatable for political reasons are excluded from participation in the work of the United Nations. Gagging people's mouths is not the best way to discuss acute international problems. Even a defendant has the right to defend his or her position.

The Security Council meeting on the Balkans, without the full participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, loses its practical meaning, since one of the key parties is being eliminated from the discussion of the problem of a settlement, which could have a real impact on the development of events in that region.

The President (*spoke in French*): If there is no objection, the Permanent Representative of Portugal and Mr. Solana will speak immediately after Mr. Bildt and before the members of the Council.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

The Security Council will now consider the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a statement by Mr. Carl Bildt, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans. I now call on Mr. Bildt.

Mr. Bildt: Let me start by expressing my appreciation for this opportunity to come back to the Council on the important issue of the search for self-sustaining stability in the Balkans. Let me also express my appreciation for the opportunity to do this when the High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana, will also be addressing the Council on these same issues. In very many ways, the efforts of the United Nations and the European Union in that region are complementary, and this discussion here today demonstrates this.

The search for self-sustaining stability in that part of Europe is certainly not a new one. When I spoke in this Chamber in late February, I noted the high priority that has been given to this by the international community ever since the start of the dissolution of the old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. I also then noted that we are far from the goals that we have set. Looking only at the United Nations, we now have no fewer than three peacekeeping operations in the area. There have previously been four other large United Nations missions. The wider international community has approximately a quarter of a million young men and women in uniform either serving in peace operations, just having come out of such operations or actively preparing to go into them. And we know that if these troops were to be withdrawn today there would, in all probability, be war tomorrow.

This is the reality of the situation in the region today. Self-sustaining stability can be achieved only when a firm political framework has been established for the region as a whole. This will be the case only when the different national and other communities in the area have accepted such a political framework and when it has also been fully recognized by the international community at the end of the day under the auspices of this Council.

Historical experience shows that when such a firm framework is in place the peoples and the nations of the region can live peacefully together in the same way as in other parts of Europe or, indeed, the world. But historical experience equally shows that whenever the political framework of the region is, or is seen as, unclear, fragile or open, there tends to develop a cycle of fears on the one hand and expectations on the other, often driven by extremists, nearly always resulting in conflict, in war and in massive violations of human rights.

This was the case during the slow collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Again it was the case during the inter-ethnic and national carnage in the area during the Second World War and, once again, this has been the case over and over again since the early 1990s.

Today, most of our attention is focussed on Bosnia, where we are making slow but steady progress with the implementation of the 1995 Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement, and Kosovo, where the United Nations, in the absence of a proper peace agreement, is

engaged in one of its most demanding and difficult missions ever.

But the region is larger than this. It can be argued the Bosnia and Kosovo are just the most acute fracture zones where the different national agendas of the regions most clearly meet. I am stressing this in order to underline that we will never succeed in either Kosovo or Bosnia if we fail in the wider region south of Slovenia and north of Greece.

Stability in Kosovo and in Bosnia is obviously vital for the region. Such stability is hardly achievable in the long run if there is not a stable structure for the region as a whole — and I would add, without a firm place for the region in the wider process and the wider structures of European integration. Only thus will a self-sustaining stability be possible.

In Kosovo, the Council has been recently informed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kouchner, of the efforts under way to move towards the setting up of structures of self-government and substantial autonomy. I consider this to be of critical importance for wider stability in the region also. But these efforts are undertaken — let us be clear on this — in a climate that is far from satisfactory in a number of respects.

There is a climate of terror against minorities in Kosovo, primarily the Serb one, and this is repulsive. There is still far more of the rule of thugs than the rule of law. Although the local Kosovo Albanian leadership has condemned acts of violence, there is still a climate of tolerance of terror that we must never accept.

This can never be an argument for giving up or postponing our efforts to develop the structures of self-government and autonomy. On the contrary, in the long run — and it might indeed be a long one — there is no other way. The elected representatives of Kosovo will soon learn that neither Europe nor the rest of the international community will accept a political system that does not clearly address issues of human rights and the protection of minorities.

In Bosnia, the international efforts are now focused on the three priorities of the High Representative: accelerated minority returns, functioning common institutions and the necessity of economic reforms. Let me also note the particular importance of the latter.

For far too long, far too little has been done in Bosnia in this respect. We are now faced with an aid-dependent economy in a situation where aid is starting to decline, with the result that a severe economic and social crisis might be unavoidable. This will threaten the future of the country.

We will press on with minority returns. But in the absence of a functioning economy there is a risk that Bosnia could become a country where the old return to end their days where they were born, but the young leave because they do not see prospects for the future. The elected leaders of Bosnia must take action on this.

If we broaden our horizon from Kosovo and Bosnia, I believe that the most pressing issue in the region is the question of the future of the present Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We cannot have self-sustaining stability in the region if we do not have self-sustaining stability in its different parts. In this respect, the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gives cause for concern. In my opinion, the present structures of the present Yugoslavia are unsustainable.

This is primarily due to the acute constitutional crisis between the Republic of Montenegro and the Federal authorities in Belgrade, where the federal institutions of Yugoslavia have been grossly misused in order also to exclude the representatives of the elected authorities of Montenegro. They are today on a slow but steady course towards a collision. This might not be imminent, but the trends are very clearly there. I believe that it is of key importance that we all give support to the elected authorities in Montenegro in their efforts to pave the way for the new deal which they are seeking.

Added to this acute constitutional crisis, there is, of course, also the unresolved issue of the future status of Kosovo. Although on paper still an integral part of the Republic of Serbia, the reality is different. I fail to see any circumstances under which a peace agreement will not have to include a clear constitutional separation between the two.

Thus, we have a situation where the present structures of the present Yugoslavia are unsustainable. If we do not recognize this and try to pave the way for sustainable solutions, there is an obvious risk of further conflict and disintegration with potentially grave consequences for the region as a whole.

When I go around the region, I note that most of its leaders see the continued territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as important both for wider regional stability and for the internal stability of the different countries. They are alarmed by the present situation in Yugoslavia, but they do not favour a further disintegration of the region.

We are undoubtedly handicapped in our search for peace by the fact that key persons in key public positions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are refusing to respect indictments that have been issued by the International Tribunal, thus creating a situation where we cannot deal with them.

This situation is dangerous primarily for the Federal Republic itself, but also, of course, for the wider region. I believe it is important to recall that in the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia subscribed to the position that persons indicted by the Tribunal and not cooperating with it cannot hold public office.

What we are demanding of them today is thus no more than what they themselves have previously agreed to demand of others as part of the search for peace in the region. And the sooner the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its entire political system see the logic of this, the sooner we can all work together to create self-sustaining structures — within its borders as well — as part of the search for self-sustaining stability in the region as a whole.

We cannot wait too long. We know from bitter experience that as long as there is a feeling that arrangements are not final and that core issues remain open, tensions are likely to persist and there will be the ever-present risk that the forces of nationalism, of revanchism and of revolt will surface again with devastating consequences. That is the situation we are in today.

There are certainly positive as well as negative trends in the region. We are trying to strengthen the former — and let me note the positive political changes in Croatia — and to dampen the latter: let me note the rise of organized crime in large parts of the region. But as long as the core issues of the core conflicts are open, the danger of the forces of disintegration driving the region into new conflict will always be there.

And there are numerous open political issues apart from those connected with the unsustainability of the present Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The issue of the Prevlaka peninsula is small but significant. The succession negotiations have been ongoing for nearly 10 years without any result whatsoever. And there are issues connected with the establishment of full, normal relations among all States in the region that have not yet been solved.

I see all of these issues coming together at some point in time in a comprehensive regional settlement of the outstanding political issues. Such a settlement will not only pave the way for the full and speedy reintegration of a Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the region; it will also be even more important for the entry of the region into the process of integration with the rest of Europe and with the international community. Such a comprehensive political settlement will not be possible if we do not have a consensus in the international community, reflected in the Security Council, on what we are trying to assist the region to achieve. And it will not be possible if there is not a recognition that a true deal for true peace must meet the minimum demands of everyone but is unlikely to meet the maximum demands of anyone.

The dialogue with, and within, the Council is thus an essential part of creating that consensus that will make us ready to move towards a comprehensive political settlement when the conditions for it are in place.

This is a year of important elections in the region. The Croatian parliamentary and presidential elections are behind us; so are the Bosnian local elections and the local elections in part of Montenegro. Ahead of us are further important elections. We are moving, as I mentioned, towards local elections in Kosovo, and there will also be local — and fiercely contested — elections in adjoining Albania and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. There will later on be parliamentary elections in Bosnia. And there will have to be local elections in Serbia as well as federal elections in Yugoslavia; although it is difficult to see that these will be free and fair, they could nevertheless represent an opportunity for the people of Serbia and Yugoslavia to make their voices heard. Their choice is between isolation and integration.

There are possibilities for positive change, but also for disruptive conflicts, in several of these elections. I believe that the message that the international community sends will be important for all

of them. Here, the position of the European Union is obviously of particular importance. I firmly believe that it is in paving the way for integration into Europe that we must seek the long-term solutions to the issues of the region. The forces of disintegration in the region will finally be overcome only on the day when the full conditions exist for them to be subject to the forces of integration in Europe as a whole. Then we can achieve not only self-sustaining stability, but also the conditions for self-sustaining economic growth in the region, without which we will not overcome the horrible legacy of the many years of war, of destruction, of sanctions and of isolation.

With the exception of the Middle East, there has been no other region of the world, throughout the history of the United Nations, where so many peace operations have been deemed necessary as the region south of Slovenia and north of Greece. We thus not only have an interest in creating the conditions for the success of the present United Nations missions in Kosovo and in Bosnia; we have a strong interest in assisting a region where the peace is kept by others to become a region where the peace is kept by the region itself. But we must all recognize that we have a long way to go.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker is the representative of Portugal. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Monteiro (Portugal) (*spoke in French*): Please permit me, Sir, to express my pleasure at seeing you presiding over the work of the Security Council this month and to congratulate you on having organized this historic debate.

(*spoke in English*)

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia — and the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the European Free Trade Association countries members of the European Economic Area — Iceland and Liechtenstein — align themselves with this statement.

The European Union listened with great appreciation to the briefing that Mr. Carl Bildt, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans, gave the Security Council today. We welcome this opportunity to take stock of the situation in the area from a regional perspective. It is a given that for peace and security to be restored in the region and for democracy and respect for human rights to flourish, they must do so in every part of the Balkans.

The European Union is, by far, the largest contributor to the international efforts to help bring peace and stability to the region. Between 1991 and 1999, the European Union has contributed more than 17 billion euros in development, budgetary and humanitarian assistance to South-eastern Europe. The European Union is offering stabilization and association agreements to five South-eastern European countries with the prospect of eventual membership of the European Union. Allow me to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to a paper prepared by the European Commission that has been made available; it provides greater detail on the European Union contributions to the Western Balkans region.

There can be no doubt that the European Union is committed — heavily committed — to efforts to bring about a peaceful and prosperous Western Balkans. The European Union considers the recent ethnically motivated violence in Kosovo to be intolerable and that it must be stopped. All Kosovars, irrespective of their ethnic origin, must be able to stay in or return to Kosovo, and to live there in peace without harassment or intimidation of any kind. The leaders of all ethnic communities, in particular the Kosovo Albanian community, must take responsibility for achieving this and must act vigorously and urgently to promote tolerance and mutual respect in Kosovo.

This week, the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was extended for another year, demonstrating clearly the commitment of the international community to making the Paris-Dayton Peace Agreement work. Five years later, much has been accomplished, but much still remains to be done, as was made clear to the Council by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Jacques Paul Klein, only last week.

The recent Peace Implementation Council meeting set priorities for a new, accelerated phase of peace implementation in three key strategic areas: economic reform, accelerated return of displaced

persons and functional and democratically accountable common institutions.

A crucial aspect of the process of national reconciliation in Bosnia, and in the Balkans as a whole, is a sense among all communities that justice has been served and, in this context, the work of the International Criminal Tribunal (ICTY) for the Former Yugoslavia must continue to be pursued vigorously. The European Union urges that persons accused of war crimes who are still at large be brought to justice. The Bosnian authorities and all other relevant Governments of the region must cooperate with the ICTY fully and unambiguously to this end.

The peace process in Bosnia, and the prospects for peace and security in the region as a whole, depend very much on whether democracy will be allowed to breathe in Serbia. The European Union is deeply concerned at the continuing deterioration of the political situation in Serbia and condemns the escalating repression of the democratic opposition and independent media by the Belgrade regime. The European Union's policy is not directed against the Serbian people, but against President Milosević's regime, which is violating basic human rights in the most flagrant manner. The European Union is committed to strengthening its dialogue with Serbian civil society and to supporting democracy and freedom of expression in Serbia; to continuing its support for the democratically elected Government of Montenegro, and to helping re-establish peaceful coexistence in Kosovo.

The way forward has been shown by the people of Croatia. The election in February of a Croatian Government committed to comprehensive reforms marked the beginning of a new era for the country, and the European Union is committed to working very closely with the Croatian authorities in their quest for making Croatia a full-fledged member of the Euro-Atlantic community. This surely is the ultimate goal for all the countries of the western Balkans — to be participating members of free and democratic Europe. The peace, prosperity and stability of South-Eastern Europe are a strategic priority for the European Union, and its overall objective remains the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe.

After this brief look at the European Union's positions on the current developments in the western Balkans region, allow me now to pass the baton to Mr. Javier Solana, High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. He will elaborate further on the leading role of the European Union in replacing the Balkans' past of war and destruction with a future of peace, prosperity, democracy and human rights.

The President *(spoke in French)*: I thank the Permanent Representative of Portugal for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker on my list is the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table, and I welcome him very warmly to speak for the first time before the Security Council.

Mr. Solana *(spoke in French)*: As you can imagine, it is an honour for me and a great pleasure to be here in the Council today to discuss a topic to which the European Union attaches particular importance.

I would like to thank the French presidency of the Security Council and you, in particular, Mr. President, for the efforts you have made to organize this important meeting.

(*spoke in Spanish*)

Allow me also to recall a very moving moment that occurred in this very same Chamber in September 1994, when, the Security Council met to discuss Haiti. I, in my capacity as Foreign Minister of my country, had the tremendous honour and pleasure to preside over that important meeting, which, I believe, had some significant impact on the destiny of our beloved Haiti.

(*spoke in English*)

I would like first of all to thank all the members of the Security Council for giving me the opportunity to address the Council. I would like especially to thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans, Mr. Carl Bildt, for his opening remarks, which have set the scene for this morning's discussion. I would also like to thank my good friend Ambassador Monteiro for his statement as representative of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

The European Union has for many, many years been an important voice in many areas of United Nations work, in particular in fields such as human rights, social and economic issues and development. Increasingly, this is also the case on security issues. The European Union is developing faster than ever before into an organization with access to the full range of external policy instruments, from economic relations to crisis management. This makes our relationship with the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, even more important. The principles that underlie the European Union's common foreign and security policy reflect the objectives of the United Nations as set out in the Charter. It is therefore not only an immense honour for me to address the Security Council, it is also a historic step in the development of the European Union's foreign policy.

This morning's debate is not a response to a specific crisis in the Balkans. Such crises in the past have been an inevitable part of the evolution of the Balkans. There is no guarantee that we will not face further crises in the future. But I have no doubt that, as in the past, such crises will be overcome.

My intervention this morning is by way of explanation as to why I remain optimistic over the future of the Balkans despite the many, many problems and difficulties which we continue to face. It is not by chance that I have been called upon to spend much of my time, in the nine months since I took up my current post, focusing on the Balkans and, of course, on the situation in Kosovo in particular. It is, rather, a reflection of the importance that the European Union attaches to a region with which it shares common borders and with which it has so much in common.

The European Union, which was founded with the very objective of avoiding future conflict, cannot, and has not been prepared to, sit back in the face of conflicts on its doorstep and do nothing. This is not simply a matter of sentiment. Long-term stability in the Balkans will bring greater security and greater prosperity for Europe as a whole. This is why the European Union has made a long-term commitment to the region. It is a commitment in which the member States, and of course the European Commission, have a vital role to play. And, it led to me being asked specifically by the European Union's heads of Government to address the issue of the coordination of the policies of the European Union in the Balkans and to give greater visibility to its efforts.

Our objective is the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of Europe. This is already happening as a result of the historic decision taken by the European Union at the end of last year to extend its existing process of enlargement. Enlargement is our most important tool for guaranteeing the continued stability of the whole of the continent of Europe. The process itself is already binding countries such as Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania into the mainstream of Europe, with positive spillover for the whole region. Enlargement is proving to be a catalyst for greater regional cooperation. It is, for example, encouraging the countries of the region to address in a positive manner the sensitive issue of minorities.

The enlargement process is a key element of the comprehensive regional approach that lies at the heart of the European Union's policy towards the region. But it is not the only one. We have established a stabilization and association process that aims at integrating the countries of the region into European structures. This process encourages internal reform, as well as the development of relations between countries in the region.

The Stability Pact is another key tool for supporting economic development throughout the region. It also encourages internal reform and provides support for the integration process. But one of its most important elements is the promotion of regional cooperation. For the European Union, this is one of the most important challenges for the Stability Pact.

We have of course been the main provider of the financial support that is necessary to underpin this policy. The figures speak for themselves. Since 1991, the European Union and its member States have contributed to the Balkans as a whole over €17 billion, which makes it by far the biggest donor. In Kosovo alone, we have spent more than €3 billion on non-military programmes. This is in addition to our substantial military commitment, which includes the provision of 28,000 troops for the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The European Union has also deployed 1,430 policemen, with a further 270 set to arrive before the summer.

These figures testify to our engagement in the Balkans. They are the instruments of an inclusive policy encompassing the whole region. Of course, there are specific situations that call for quite specific

responses. Kosovo is the obvious example. But we have to maintain an overall comprehensive approach to the region if we are to hold out any hope of achieving our objective of bringing the Balkans into the European family of nations. The alternative would merely reinforce the divisions and the tensions that lie at the heart of the problems that have already caused so much suffering.

There is one major obstacle to pursuing a genuinely comprehensive approach to the whole Balkan region. That obstacle is the resistance to political change in Belgrade. Our hope for the region is that it achieve lasting stability. But stability is not an isolated ideal. It depends also on democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and the prosperity that comes from openness and engagement with one's neighbours. These values are being systematically violated by the actions and policies of President Milosević. The European Union is not prepared to stand idly by in the face of continuing repression. This is why we are actively supporting democracy and freedom of expression in Serbia and developing links with representatives of Serbian civil society. We are ready to extend our economic assistance programme to Serbia once it has embraced those same values that underpin the European Union. We want to help the Serbian people, but for the moment the current regime in Serbia remains an obstacle to that objective.

Elsewhere in the region, Croatia in particular has, through its recent successful democratic transition, given cause for optimism and has helped increase the potential for widening regional cooperation. In parallel to this, we are committed to continuing our support for the democratically elected Government of Montenegro. We shall also continue to support Bosnia, both politically and economically, in its own transition process, in which the forthcoming elections will play a key role. Much still remains to be done, and this process will continue to require sustained commitment by the international community and Bosnia itself.

My firm conviction is that the best chance for realizing long-term stability in the Balkans is through the steady integration of the region into the European mainstream. This will not happen overnight; it is a long-term process. But it is very important. The Irish politician John Hume once described the European Union as the best example of conflict resolution in the history of the world. The European Union has successfully maintained peace and stability in Western Europe for half a century. It is now inconceivable that member States of the European Union would settle their differences by anything other than peaceful means. The European Union offers a model for regional integration as a guarantee for peace. It is a powerful and effective symbol of reconciliation. It also provides protection for minorities within an overarching regional framework. No other solution offers such hope for the Balkans.

In order to achieve this long-term objective, we have set ourselves a number of priorities for the months ahead.

First, we shall concentrate our energies on the various elections taking place in the region in the autumn — as has already been mentioned by Mr. Carl Bildt — in Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, hopefully, also in Serbia. They present a major opportunity to strengthen democracy and the rule of law in the region. We will support as full a participation as possible in these elections, and we shall unambiguously stand by those who genuinely stand for democratic reform. Indeed, we shall lend our support only to those parties and individuals that are uncompromising in their commitment to ethnic tolerance, democracy and the rule of law.

Secondly, we shall continue to support civil society. This is of particular relevance with regard to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but it is also important throughout the region. A vibrant and strong civil society is the key both to economic and political development and to bringing these countries closer to the European Union. We are placing particular emphasis on working with local authorities, the media and non-governmental organizations to help them in their contacts with counterparts in the region and the European Union.

Thirdly, we shall pursue our policy of bringing the countries of the region closer to the European Union. We shall concentrate on developing the stabilization and association process, which is the foundation of our policy towards the region. Negotiations are currently underway with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and are expected to begin soon with Croatia. We are also working closely with Albania and Bosnia to ensure that the conditions for beginning such negotiations are met as soon as possible. For the moment, the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia remains outside this important process. I look forward to the day when it will join its neighbours on the same path to European integration.

Finally, we shall remain committed to promoting regional cooperation. This is still much less developed in the region than in many other parts of Europe. It is the key to the economic success of the region and will accelerate its integration into the European Union. Progress in this area is one of the key objectives of the Stability Pact. I have just received a mandate from the European Council to press for better cooperation in combating organized crime and illegal immigration in the region. I am also sure that the summit meeting to be held this autumn between the European Union and the countries of the western Balkans proposed by President Chirac will give a strong impetus to reform and cooperation in the region.

I would like to close by looking specifically at our priorities in Kosovo. The full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) remains our key objective. The overall positive development of the situation over the past month has been overshadowed recently by the flare-up of inter-ethnic violence and the subsequent decision of the Serb National Council to suspend its participation in the interim institutions. Together with United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and with the Member States I have been working very hard in the last few days to address the legitimate concerns of the Serbs and to encourage them to return to interim institutions.

The municipal elections to be held in autumn this year are intended to lay the foundations of democratic development and political consolidation in Kosovo. The registration process is advancing, and a multi-party structure is gradually taking shape. We shall, however, need to work very hard to ensure a positive environment for the elections.

Successful municipal elections will, in turn, pave the way for the establishment of an interim administration structure, in conformity with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). These structures need to be prepared under the authority of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in an open and inclusive process, with the active involvement of all the major groups of Kosovo's population. UNMIK will be able to properly fulfil its mandate during this critical period only if we give it the necessary resources. The shortages of high-quality police officers, notwithstanding recent improvements, and of judges and prosecutors, as well as the overall shortfall in staffing, continue to hamper UNMIK's work in key areas. Today the European Union is already bearing carrying the lion's share of the international community's efforts in Kosovo. We will continue to do our utmost to make this Mission a success.

Let me close by recalling the commitment of the European Union to the region. The experience of the Balkans has been a sobering one, but it has also provided us with an opportunity. We have dedicated ourselves to the region, to a wider Europe and to a more outward and mature common foreign security policy. We all stand to gain from that.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Solana for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. Holbrooke (United States of America): I want to thank you, Mr. President, for calling this very important meeting. You have had a very intensive presidency this month, as did Ambassador Wang of China last month. I wish to point out that at this time last week you said there would be a five-minute meeting on Saturday, and it was 11 hours. I hope you have a better weekend than you had last week. I congratulate you on your stewardship.

I particularly want to thank you for inviting today statements by the European Union, as given by Ambassador Monteiro, and presentations by my friends and colleagues and our esteemed visitors, Carl Bildt and Javier Solana. I have had the pleasure of working with both of them now for many years. They have both played seminal roles in the history of the Balkans and in European matters. Their statements are extremely important, and although I was unable to hear Carl Bildt's, I am very familiar with it. I have read it. I talked to Carl in advance, and I endorse everything that both men said.

Before I turn to my own remarks, I would like to make one additional comment about the procedural vote that just took place. The outcome was correct from every standpoint — legal, political and moral. In addition to my remarks preceding the vote, I need to make one additional point, and I hope that the countries that voted in favour of Mr. Jovanović's speaking would please note what I am about to say.

I wish to remind everyone that in Security Council resolutions 777 (1992) and 821 (1993), it was decided that the State known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had ceased to exist and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should apply for membership. Therefore, I do not understand, leaving aside the specifics which led to the vote today, how this situation exists. Tito's old flag is still flying on First Avenue, despite these two resolutions. I consider that a travesty of the United Nations spirit; a flag that represents a nation that the United Nations itself decided did not exist. Yugoslavia is not a member of the General Assembly. We have long urged Belgrade to apply as one of the successor States to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Four others — Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina — did apply. They were accepted. The reason for this — and I have spent many hours talking with the leadership in Belgrade about this, as has Carl Bildt — is that the Belgrade authorities assert that they are the sole legitimate successor State to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the United Nations has rejected that claim. So the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should — and this has nothing to do with the war crimes issue — follow the request of the Security Council, and they should not be invited to speak when they purport to speak for a successor regime that does not exist. That was the unanimous view of the Dayton signatories, even though Belgrade did sign the Agreement, because they had to make it work. That was the view of the Security Council. That was the view of the European Union, under the Badinter Commission. I would just reaffirm that today.

I consider this discussion a continuation of one of the most important events in recent European and world history, and I think it is a solemn obligation of the Security Council to continue to discuss the Balkans.

On the positive side of the ledger, we have recent events in Croatia, where a new democratic Government, headed by people fully dedicated to democratic principles, is moving Croatia rapidly into the community of nations, oriented towards openness and democratic principles. Their commitment to transparency with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and their dealings with the Croatian Democratic Union in Bosnia and their support for dealing with refugee returns have all made a tremendous and positive difference in the region. I wish again today to use this occasion to express our Government's high respect and admiration for the Government in Zagreb. I will be visiting Zagreb next month, and I look forward to having these discussions directly with the Croatian authorities.

Let me turn briefly to Bosnia, where we have recently heard in this Chamber reports from the Special Representative, Jacques Klein, and the High Representative, Carl Bildt's successor plus one, Wolfgang Petritsch. I think we need to recognize that in the midst of difficulties progress can be made, and as Javier Solana just said in a characteristically upbeat and positive manner, we are making progress.

The world's press has long since turned away from Bosnia, so the world does not realize how much progress is being made. But let us recognize that the press turned away from Bosnia because good news is old news, and that is why they are not giving it as much attention as they should. I think all of us should take every occasion to point out that refugee returns to minority areas are up 400 per cent this year and movement is being made.

Nonetheless, the forces of darkness still exist in Bosnia. Mostar is still a tragically torn city. Karadzic is still at large — one of the most dangerous men in the world — and he needs to be brought to justice, as do all the other indicted war criminals. The criminal element is threatening the social fabric of all of Bosnia. So I do not wish to say that progress is undiluted, but I think we should acknowledge it.

In Kosovo we face a much more complicated situation as we have heard from our speakers. Now, as we mark the one-year anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), UNMIK, under the brilliant leadership of Bernard Kouchner, has made impressive progress in building an administrative structure responsive to the needs of the people to replace a repressive state structure dominated by the Belgrade authorities.

But I do not wish to gloss over the serious security problems which we discussed in our last meeting with Mr. Kouchner present. I am deeply distressed, more than anything else, at any attempt by either ethnic group to impose its will through intimidation and force on the other. I need to repeat, as I said here last time we met on this subject, that, while we condemn unreservedly the Albanian attacks on the Serb minorities now in Kosovo and while we recognize

fully what the purpose of this is — a reprehensible purpose — it is not a one-sided story. We must have a full accounting of the 4,000 Albanians who are missing, many of whom I assume are no longer alive, and we must have a resolution of these problems.

Those who resort to violence on either side of the ethnic line in Kosovo must be forced to stop. We have the means to do it if we have the will. A lot of what is happening in this Chamber undermines that will by diversionary discussions, such as an attempt to reinterpret resolution 1244 (1999) or the hour that we spent on the procedural discussion just resolved.

I support Mr. Kouchner's repeated calls for progress on the missing and detainees. We also need to establish a more representative set of structures of government. The critical step is to give the people more authority over their own destiny. I therefore warmly support the statements of Javier Solana and Carl Bildt that the municipal elections should stay on schedule for October. If they are delayed, it jeopardizes the rest of the structure in Kosovo and we will lock ourselves into a worse situation. The people arguing for delay are arguing it for no reason related to the needs of the people of Kosovo, but solely to argue the question of international sovereignty. That is not what municipal elections are about. That is not what they are about, and I hope we can move forward in that regard.

I regret that the Serb community has not participated in the registration process, but we cannot allow that process to be held hostage by one group or by people in Belgrade. All the people of Kosovo — there are many ethnic groups there — will have representatives in their administrative governmental structure. If they do not choose to participate, seats will be set aside to protect their interests until they are ready to return as full partners in the political process. I underscore the importance of these events.

Let me conclude with some comments about Serbia and Montenegro. My delegation continues to believe that the issue of Kosovo's security will never be truly solved and long-term peace and stability not be possible until the current regime in Belgrade is replaced by one that is more open and more representative. Meanwhile, Belgrade continues to threaten democracy in its sister Republic of Montenegro. These efforts are unacceptable and, in that regard, I am delighted that the Foreign Minister of Montenegro, Minister Lukovac, is here with us today. I met with him this morning and I urge all those who have time to meet with him. He has important ideas and thoughts which all of us should hear. I salute the courage of President Djukanovic's Government and I recommit the United States to our support of Montenegro's efforts to build a peaceful democratic society.

In regard to the war crimes issue, we should remember that the Tribunal for Yugoslavia, like that for Rwanda, is not some arbitrary institutional creation. I repeat again here today our Government's view that the umbrella of that process should be extended over Foday Sankoh and his henchmen in the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. These Tribunals and their possible extension to Sierra Leone are created by decisions of this body in this very Chamber. They are vested with the enormous authority of the United Nations. We have a profound responsibility to ourselves, to this institution and to innocent victims everywhere to support them and give them the power they need. I am distressed that countries that supported their establishment now attack them.

The combination of justice with political freedom, expressed through free and fair elections, is the key to stability and peace in the Balkans. Justice with freedom: these principles make up the foundation of all democratic societies. They are principles that we are committed to upholding.

I want to stress in closing that the Council's efforts in the Balkans have relied heavily on the strength and support of other organizations, including the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Peace Implementation Council — which Carl Bildt was so deeply involved and helped to establish — and the military contribution made by the Stabilization Force and the Kosovo Force. The EU has played and will continue to play a particularly crucial role. I hope that High Representative Solana will convey to the European Union our deep appreciation of their efforts.

As all know, I have been critical frequently about the operational structures in Kosovo, and I continue to be critical because I do not think they are efficient enough and I think the system was not adequately conceived and structured from the outset. However, those criticisms, which I make openly, are the criticisms of somebody who is deeply grateful to the EU and to the United Nations for their efforts; who is

mindful of the fact, as Carl Bildt pointed out, that the bulk of the money has come from the European Union and not from our own Government; and who deeply appreciates these efforts and makes these comments in a spirit of total commitment to their goals. Thus, I hope that Mr. Solana will convey to Brussels our Government's high appreciation for his being here today and for the efforts of the European Union.

With that, Mr. President, I want to thank you again for holding this very important meeting. I hope that we can revitalize the effort, in addition to simply hearing these important reports today.

Mr. Shen Guofang (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): At the outset, the Chinese delegation wishes to express its dissatisfaction and deep regret over the fact that the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cannot attend today's meeting. Allowing him to make a statement would not impair any country's position, while, by not allowing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia a voice, the Security Council has deprived a sovereign country of its right to express its views.

This contravenes the spirit of the Charter and we find it very difficult to understand. If we wish to settle the problems in the Balkans, we must maintain dialogue with all sides. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an important country in the Balkan region. When we discuss the Balkan issue, isolating and excluding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is narrow-minded, short-sighted and a denial of reality. It does not help the search for a solution to the Balkan problem. We deeply regret this discriminatory decision, which is wrong.

We thank Mr. Bildt for his briefing, but, regrettably, we have not read his report, as expected. We commend Mr. Bildt for his tireless efforts to find a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Balkan question. The Chinese delegation will continue to support Mr. Bildt in his endeavours.

We thank you, Mr. President, for arranging today's open debate. I take this opportunity to express some of the principal positions of the Chinese delegation.

Since ancient times, the Balkan region has experienced very complex ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts, which are interconnected. Some important recent events have made the situation more precarious yet. China is deeply concerned by the development of the situation in the Balkans, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

With regard to the question of Kosovo, I would stress that the grave situation there is the result of various factors. Ethnic conflicts are domestic concerns, while the wilful interference of foreign forces is an external factor that has exacerbated the conflict. Last year, on March 24, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia indiscriminately and set a bad precedent of using force against a sovereign country with the excuse of humanitarian questions. It undermined the basic norms of international law and the principles and purposes of the Charter and the credibility of the United Nations and the Security Council.

NATO's bombing of civilian facilities and a foreign diplomatic establishment also violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as well as the Fourth Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocol. China has expressed its strong opposition to this. China has made a tremendous effort to bring NATO's ceasefire and to bring the Kosovo question back to the Security Council.

NATO's use of force has caused a greater humanitarian crisis. As a result ethnic disputes have become ethnic hatred. This wound will need a very long time to heal. Historical lessons must be learned. The tragedy of NATO's military intervention into Kosovo cannot be repeated.

The evolution of the Kosovo situation as well as the entire Balkan situation, deserves our in-depth reflection. The majority of the countries in the world, especially the countries in the Balkans, are multi-ethnic and multi-religious. Differences among different religions and ethnic groups should be settled through peaceful means, rather than deepening their differences.

There have always been two forces in the Balkan region, one for unity and one for separation. The international community should suppress the separatist forces and extremists. Only in this way can the Balkans achieve long-term stability and development. Otherwise, if separatist forces and extremists are condoned and encouraged, conflicts and wars will erupt again and the Balkans will be deprived permanently of peace.

Furthermore, I would like to emphasize that the United Nations should not encourage and support any activity of changing a Government of a country through foreign interference.

We always advocate equality, unity, harmonious co-existence and common development for the people of countries with a multi-national character. We are against any prejudice, oppression and killing based on ethnicity. We are also opposed to any effort to create ethnic division or to sabotage national unity.

Fundamentally speaking, the Kosovo problem can be resolved only within the framework of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, through substantial autonomy and a good ethnic policy that guarantees the rights and interests of all ethnic groups and protects and promotes the human rights of all ethnic groups. Achieving autonomy should be done by way of negotiations and solutions acceptable to both sides. The Chinese delegation believes that only by restoring the national harmony that the Balkan region once enjoyed can genuine and lasting peace and prosperity be achieved. Other than this there is no way out.

Mr. Ward (Jamaica): My delegation thanks Mr. Bildt for his briefing of the Security Council on the positive developments in the Balkans and on the difficult issues still faced by the region.

We take note of these positive developments in the region, which we believe auger well for the achievement of sustainable peace. There are ongoing regional initiatives aimed at reconciliation and reintegration, and these are commendable. It is for this reason that my delegation attaches great importance to the Stability Pact process, to the Central European initiative and the working community of the Danube regions. The relations between States continue to evolve, and we encourage and support attempts at regional cooperation, integration and development.

We have seen the induction of new leaders in Croatia following elections, and the continuation of policies that foster stability, not only in Croatia but in the entire region. Their recent accession to the partnership for peace at the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) meeting in Florence is a positive step forward. We also note the recent signing of an agreement between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on financial assistance to the federal Ministry of Defense. The holding of local elections recently in Montenegro is also a positive development for the region.

In light of these positive developments, my delegation regrets the necessity for the procedures the Council was forced to employ today in determining participation in our discussions of the Balkans region. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continues to be further isolated from full participation in the progress being made in the region, for reasons which have been stated here today. This dilemma remains, and it is difficult to move forward without a solution. Our decision here this morning provides glaring proof of the magnitude of this problem. This exclusion affects stability in the region, and we are hopeful that a solution will be found soon.

The United Nations continues to work diligently in Kosovo to bring stability to that territory as quickly as possible on par with the countries of the region, both economically and politically. Ongoing efforts to reduce the level of violence and the discrimination against minorities are crucial to this process. The recent discovery of a cache of arms in Kosovo is a major concern.

We have noted reports in the media that Mr. Kouchner intends to establish a hybrid court in Kosovo to try cases related to war crimes and other related crimes in Kosovo.

While we recognize this to be in response to the climate of criminality prevailing in Kosovo and the admitted failure to establish an impartial judiciary in Kosovo, it is not clear to us the extent of jurisdiction that is contemplated. The reach of that jurisdiction will require careful consideration. The concurrent jurisdiction with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) over certain criminal acts must be appropriately defined so as to avoid duplication and conflict. This takes on added significance in the context of expansion of the ICTY that is currently being considered by the Security Council.

My delegation views this decision by Mr. Kouchner as very significant for the region. Because this decision is imminent, we have to assume that this matter has been under consideration for some time. However, the Council has not been briefed on this issue in recent reports. I also note that Mr. Bildt made no mention of this, and my delegation would welcome his comments.

The progress made recently in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly to ensure the full implementation of the Dayton accords and to ensure membership in the Council of Europe, also constitutes a positive development. We are concerned, however, that, for all those positive developments, the refugee situation throughout the region remains to be solved. We hope that this matter will retain priority status in regional talks aimed at reconciliation.

Mr. Hasmy (Malaysia): Let me express my delegation's appreciation to you, Mr. President, for convening this important meeting. We cannot fail to observe that the procedural problem we had to face this morning had to do with an uneasiness — indeed, a reluctance — on the part of many members of the international community to deal with the regime in Belgrade. We trust that the procedural decision we took this morning has settled this issue once and for all. We hope also that the procedural question will not deflect us from discussing the substantive aspects of the issue before us today.

We are grateful for the very useful briefing by Mr. Carl Bildt, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans. We would also like to welcome to the Council Mr. Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, and to thank him for his statement, which has certainly contributed to enriching our discussion.

My delegation is aware that discussions of this issue have not been limited to the Security Council but have also taken place in various other forums, in particular the European Union, as Mr. Solana just described. We, however, believe that the Council has an important role to play, given its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter; indeed, as Mr. Bildt has stressed many a time, continued international consensus and support are crucial to the overall efforts to promote peace in the Balkans.

At the meeting the Council had with Mr. Bildt last February, my delegation emphasized four core areas that are vital to the success of the international efforts to achieve self-sustaining peace and stability, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. Those areas relate to, first, the return of refugees and displaced persons; secondly, the reconciliation process and the important role of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in contributing to the process; thirdly, the need for unstinted international support for and active engagement in the current peace process; and last but not least, the role of the leadership of countries of the region.

We have paid particular attention to what Mr. Bildt has said on these areas, because we believe that progress on these issues will have a positive impact on the peace process and on the overall stabilization of the Balkan region. In addition to these core areas, the success of the international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo must be based on a long-term comprehensive approach encompassing many other aspects of the problem. We have taken careful note of Mr. Bildt's analysis and assessment, as well as of the proposed framework for a comprehensive peace, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and in the Balkan region as a whole. We were also gratified to hear from Mr. Solana the perspective and priorities of the European Union relating to these critical issues.

Clearly, the strengthening of democratic institutions and economic and social rehabilitation are crucial factors for self-sustaining peace in all post-conflict situations. That is where the international community's efforts must be matched by a strong commitment and a constructive attitude on the part of local leaders. At the same time, good-neighbourly relations, close cooperation and integration between and among all the Balkan countries through appropriate regional frameworks and structures are also important ingredients in the consolidation of peace and sustainable development. The early resolution of the issue of succession of the countries of the former Yugoslavia will certainly contribute to the attainment of that goal. We share the views expressed this morning by Ambassador Holbrooke of the United States on the issue of the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the context of the United Nations, which predicated our position in the procedural vote taken this morning.

Any meaningful discussion of the future of the Balkans cannot but address the issue of the Belgrade regime and how to deal with it. Indeed, the procedural problem faced by the Council at the beginning of this morning's meeting was symptomatic of that problem and brought into sharp focus the uneasiness — indeed, as I said, the reluctance — of the larger part of the international community to deal with the regime in

Belgrade and its representatives. This conundrum of how to deal with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cannot be resolved so long as its Government continues to be led by people who have been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. We entirely agree with what Mr. Jacques Paul Klein said when he addressed the Council last week:

> "The Milosević regime in Serbia remains the fundamental obstacle to improved regional peace and stability and a better life not only for Serbs but for all people there". (*S/PV.4154, p. 7*)

We also share the views expressed by Mr. Bildt, who directly addressed the issue this morning.

The return of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to a mainstream regional and international life will clearly be facilitated by the trial of those indictees, by the proper readmission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the United Nations and by the settlement of the outstanding issue of successor States to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In that regard, my delegation commends the position taken by Ms. Carla Del Ponte, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, opposing any move towards an accommodation with Mr. Milosević with respect to his indictment by the Tribunal. Such a deal would make a mockery of the entire international tribunal process and would be a travesty of justice for those on trial and those already sentenced by the court. Only the meting out of justice to those indicted by the Tribunal and those to be indicted in the future, representing the forces of extremism and disintegration as Mr. Bildt has so eloquently called them, would strengthen the process of tolerance and integration around which the search for self-sustaining stability in the region as a whole will revolve. It is the forces involved in that process which should be embraced and strongly supported by the international community, including the Council, not those negative forces of obstructionism.

Mr. Chowdhury (Bangladesh): We welcome once again Mr. Carl Bildt, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans. We thank him for his thorough and engaging statement. We commend his efforts and his initiatives for self-sustaining peace and stability in the Balkans. We are aware of the vastness of the task ahead of him and of the complexity of the issues in the region.

The statement by Mr. Javier Solana, High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, was very enriching to our consideration of the item on the agenda.

The Balkans is a region where disintegrative forces are still dominant and where the international political equation is not always fully supportive of cohesion or of the implementation of peace objectives. The issues there are different in different areas, but some common threads run through all of them. While we need to take individual approaches to deal with specific problems, there is also a need to view them from a regional macro-perspective. There have been some such initiatives, the most important being the Stability Pact initiative of last year, sponsored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

We note that its efforts range from economic reconstruction to political reform and closer regional integration. However, further regional efforts, with firm support from the Security Council, could contribute much to settling the long-term issues of achieving peace in the Balkans.

The United Nations should continue to focus on a number of areas in this region. First, the general security situation needs improvement. The region has been involved in war and inter-ethnic conflict for too long. Human rights have been grossly violated, and justice has been denied. There has been too much violence from attacks and counter-attacks on minorities. The situation is particularly disturbing where there is a minority presence.

The international community has been putting up its best efforts, and considerable progress has also been achieved, but much more remains to be done.

Secondly, the issue of missing persons and detainees is important, particularly in Kosovo. There should be an early settlement of the fate of people who remain lost or held captive. Protracting this problem will work against attempts to build trust and confidence between and among the different communities.

Thirdly, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons is one of the chief concerns in the region. In Kosovo, a large number of refugees have returned; displaced persons are also settling into their own places. But this is also accompanied by an outflow

of Serbs from many areas. Although large-scale return has taken place, the refugee problem is still one of the main concerns of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The lack of adequate security assurance, compounded by painful memories of the recent past, are problems to overcome. We need to invest further in confidence-building measures.

Finally, speeding up economic development and reconstruction in the region is a key factor which can rekindle hope among people. It will be a natural deterrent to violence. The international community has made a good deal of investment, but it still remains inadequate. A massive plan of post-war economic recovery and reconstruction is needed to give the region a thriving economy.

We must actively seek change in the region, and we are very encouraged by the recent initiation of the democratic process in a number of countries in the region. We believe it is important to seize that democratic energy and build on it to create a region of peace and development. Any attempts without an all-out commitment on the part of the international community or international political consensus will be detrimental to the region, where peace can be achieved and should be achieved.

We should concentrate on rising above political differences in order to achieve peace in a region which has long been in the grip of conflicting forces, at a tremendous cost to the broader interests of the people of the region.

Mr. Fowler (Canada): Mr. President, thank you for organizing this open debate on a matter of enormous importance to all Members of the Organization. I would also like to warmly welcome both Mr. Bildt and Mr. Solana to our meeting this morning. Their presence and their remarks make a vitally important contribution to the Security Council's consideration of this difficult and complex matter.

This morning I would like to comment on a few of the points which Mr. Bildt highlighted in his briefing. We agree with his observation that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remains a key to sustainable peace in the Balkans. It is a point which may sound trite, but we believe it bears repeating. We have seen time and time again that any possibility of constructive engagement is blocked by the current regime in Belgrade. We have seen no glimmer of recognition from Belgrade of the need to re-examine the policies that have created such hardship, instability and abuse of people throughout the region over the last decade.

If anything, recent events in Yugoslavia provide ample evidence that Belgrade has no intention of putting an end to its repression of independent media, political opposition and non-governmental organizations, and that it has no intention of putting an end to its systematic use of violence in pursuing its political objectives.

It is crucial for the international community to monitor Belgrade's performance closely and to act in a coordinated fashion to promote broad democratic development. The international community has a role to play, despite the obstructionism in Belgrade. For example, we should examine regionally based measures to encourage Montenegro to continue to pursue a prudent process of democratic and economic reform. We can also take measures to support independent, reform-minded voices in Serbia. We would be interested in Mr. Bildt's thoughts on how best to achieve these goals in the interest of stability throughout the region.

A great part of that stability depends, in our view, on the effective management of the situation in Kosovo. However, Kosovo's final status cannot be resolved until there are viable prospects for a genuine and productive negotiation between a responsible Government in Belgrade and democratically accountable representatives in Pristina. It is important for the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to proceed with the interim development of Kosovo's political institutions, as foreseen in resolution 1244 (1999), including early, free and fair elections at the municipal level, in which we should be encouraging all parties to participate.

In order to implement resolution 1244 (1999) fully, and to establish a climate conducive to reconciliation, it is up to Belgrade to make constructive gestures on such matters as war crimes prosecution, facilitating the preparation for elections, including allowing the participation of Kosovar Serbs in the upcoming municipal elections in Kosovo, and addressing the issue of missing and detained Kosovars. We welcome UNMIK's lead in bringing these issues to the forefront.

Turning to other parts of the region, Canada strongly supports the three priorities — strengthening common institutions, refugee returns and economic

development — set out by High Representative Petritsch at the recent Bosnia Peace Implementation Council ministerial meeting in Brussels. These areas remain critical for accelerated implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and for self-sustaining peace to take root in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Further south, Canada is encouraged by the efforts undertaken by the Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to reform its economy and political structures and to maintain its ethnic balance. In this regard, we are happy that negotiations between the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the European Union on its future status as an associate member are progressing smoothly.

We welcome the recent granting of access to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Partnership for Peace to Croatia. It is a clear recognition of the recent responsive attitude Croatia has adopted towards its international obligations. The new Croatian authorities are now making a real contribution to the peace-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to stability throughout the region, by reducing and making more transparent its assistance to Bosnian Croats and by undertaking initiatives aimed at fostering refugee returns. This should be fully supported by the Council for the important impetus it provides to peace implementation elsewhere in the Balkans.

Lastly, we agree with Mr. Bildt that lasting peace in the region can best be achieved by the integration of the Balkans into European structures and through continuing the cooperation and achieving the consensus of the international community. In the latter task, the Security Council has an important role to play. Fortunately, there is wide, if not unanimous, agreement within the Council that repression and obstructionism must not be tolerated in the search for stability in the Balkans.

Mr. Yel'chenko (Ukraine): I would like to warmly welcome both Mr. Bildt and Mr. Solana, and to thank Mr. Bildt for his comprehensive briefing.

Mindful of the concept to hold today's meeting in the form of an interactive dialogue with the Special Envoy, I would like to limit my remarks to the following several points.

After decade-long efforts to bring about lasting peace and reconciliation to the Balkans, the situation in this part of Europe still requires constant international attention and involvement. In responding to different conflicts in the Balkans over the years, the international community — with the United Nations at the forefront — has acquired a long record of both successes and failures. What we have just heard from Mr. Bildt reinforces my delegation's conviction that the establishment of a lasting and self-sustaining peace in the Balkans can be achieved only by addressing all the existing problems of a regional dimension, and with the participation of all the countries of the region. We totally agree with Mr. Bildt's view on the need for a political framework that provides stability for the entire region, since to contain or to solve the tensions in one part of the region will not suffice.

Today it seems that all of us are largely satisfied with the remarkable progress achieved by the post-conflict peace-building efforts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the absence of inter-ethnic violence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. At the same time, the dangerous developments in the situation in Kosovo remain a source of grave concern to us, and are a constant threat to international achievements towards peace in the whole region. My country is deeply disturbed by the increasing upsurge of ethnically related violence against non-Albanians. This must be stopped by any means.

We cannot be satisfied with Kosovo's steady movement towards independence.

We were pleased to take note of Mr. Bildt's remark made at the South-East Europe high-level conference held in Tokyo last May. We can affirm the similarity of our assessments that a regional political framework for Kosovo is possible only if there is an international consensus on what we are trying to achieve there. It is difficult to disagree with Mr. Bildt that the future of Kosovo should one day be settled through an arrangement and agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, thus making peace in the region possible. This is the only viable scenario.

At the same time, we are not convinced that there cannot be any dialogue to that end with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under its current leadership. Such a dialogue should be sought for the sake of peace in the region and for the future of this country. In our view, the increasing tendency to exclude and isolate the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the regional framework is counter-productive, because this country

remains a key player in a final settlement of any existing problems and disputes in the Balkans.

We agree with the point that the future structure of the entire region can be substantially affected by the future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What we should therefore avoid now is putting this country in such a position that will impede it from becoming democratic and integrated into the European family of nations.

I would also like to reiterate our support for Mr. Bildt's view that any long-term strategy for stability and peace in the region is based on the successful pursuit of the comprehensive reform of all societies devastated by conflict, the reintegration of the region into the European and global infrastructure, and reconciliation between all the States and nations of the region.

Undoubtedly, the issues of refugee returns and economic reconstruction remain central to the entire process of ensuring regional stability. In this context, factual accounts of increased returns of refugees and displaced persons to Bosnia are encouraging. The commitment of the new leadership of Croatia to solving the existing problem of refugee returns to that country should also be acknowledged. At the same time, we believe that much more has to be done to create the conditions for solving the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and for reversing the continued mass exodus of national minorities from Kosovo as a result of systematic acts of violence against them.

My delegation again emphasizes the significance of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe as a basic document that provides a solid regional framework for the economic reconstruction of the Balkans as a whole, and reiterates Ukraine's interest in becoming closely associated with this process.

I must now raise another point that seems to be of the utmost importance. That point is the lack of established dialogue between the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General and the Security Council. Unfortunately, the Council does not have at its disposal sufficient information about Mr. Bildt's activities in the Balkans and his regional approaches. We are grateful to Mr. Bildt for his presentation today, but even an excellent briefing cannot substitute for a written document containing concrete recommendations for the Council's consideration. We are disappointed by the fact that in the last three months the Secretariat has failed to prepare and to submit a report to the Council on Mr. Bildt's activities and regional approaches for the Balkans. In our view, such a document is indispensable. We also see the merit of defining the time-frame for submitting such reports to the Council on a regular basis, say every six months.

My delegation is of the view that Mr. Bildt's broad mandate can allow him to address some Balkan issues that for different reasons are outside the focus of the Security Council. We also deem it important for Mr. Bildt to play a more active role in the coordination of efforts between the international actors on the ground, including all the United Nations missions in the Balkans. Therefore the establishment of the usual practice of such briefings in the form of an interactive dialogue between the Council and the Special Envoy — such as the one we are having today — along with the submission of the Secretary-General's report on a regular basis, will be quite beneficial. It will obviously enable the Council to have a better grasp of Mr. Bildt's activities and, when necessary, to extend its political support to him or use his good offices.

Back in February, my delegation also asked the Secretariat to provide additional information about the activities of the second Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans, Mr. Kukan. Unfortunately, no briefing has been delivered. I would therefore like to repeat that request again.

Finally, let me reiterate the readiness of my country to continue its contribution to our joint endeavours to restore peace and security in the Balkans from the regional perspective advocated by Mr. Bildt. We look forward to positively considering his new ideas presented to the Council today.

In conclusion, I wish Mr. Bildt every success in his activities in the Balkans.

Mr. Listre (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to begin my statement by welcoming the presence here of Mr. Carl Bildt, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, and Mr. Javier Solana, High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. I would also like to thank them for their messages.

Because of its past — but also because of its present — the Balkan region seems to be synonymous

with war and inter-ethnic conflict. However, we do not believe that this situation is irreversible. Although it may sometimes appear very difficult or even impossible to do, we think it will be possible to achieve a stable and peaceful region if the members of the region share the principles of pluralism, respect for human rights and the rule of law — in a short, an attachment to the institutions and values considered to be indispensable for representative democracy. In our opinion, it would also be necessary for the States of the region to achieve a level of economic and social development that they do not have today, and for their peoples to have the hope of achieving it.

A quick glance at the current situation in the Balkans demonstrates that positive changes are taking place in Croatia, while there is still a long way to go in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is unknown. There are encouraging signs in Kosovo, thanks to the efforts of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Stabilization Force, although those signs are sometimes clouded by the behaviour of those who continue to encourage division and extreme nationalism.

In this connection, allow me to recall that a few days ago, when discussing Kosovo, my delegation pointed out that when Argentina voted in favour of resolution 1244 (1999), it did so to protect a people who were being victimized by ethnic cleansing, in violation of the most basic human values. But this was in no way meant to permit or encourage those who were victims of violence at the time to become the victimizers of another minority on which they were called on to protect.

Montenegro is in a difficult situation, and its relationship with Serbia is extremely worrisome. So far we have seen a totalitarian regime in Serbia that does not respect human rights. These situations are not isolated from each other; rather, there is a natural interrelationship at work between them. The international community must try to enable the positive changes we are seeing in Croatia, for example, to have a positive influence on the other countries of the region in which there are conflicts, and try to promote a collective awareness that the peoples and the countries of the Balkans share a common destiny that transcends immediate, individual short-term interests.

The transition from authoritarianism to democracy and a market economy, from being gagged to freedom of expression, from discrimination to equal opportunity and from taking justice into one's own hands to the rule of law can be achieved only through great effort and sacrifice. These efforts and sacrifices are not the sole responsibility of the international community, which gives human and material resources. They are also the fundamental responsibility of the Balkan people themselves; the desire for reconciliation must come from them. Reconciliation can be encouraged, but it cannot be imposed.

The goal of achieving a stable and peaceful Balkan region will become a reality when the idea of that common destiny prevails over ethnic and religious differences, when corruption and crime cease to be a way of life, when respect for one's neighbour becomes more important than hatred and violence and when the justice of judges becomes more important than the justice of revenge. We have hope that the countries and peoples of the Balkans will be able to achieve coexistence in the framework of the democratic values that prevail today in Europe, a region to which the Balkans belong because of geography, culture and history.

To this end, the totalitarian obstacles that still exist will have to be eliminated. This seems to be a sine qua non for the beginning of the process of reconciliation and tolerance.

Before concluding, I wish to reaffirm the support for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that we expressed when Judge Jorda and Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte were here with us.

Mr. Jerandi (Tunisia) (*spoke in French*): I wish to congratulate you, Mr. President, on having convened this meeting to consider the situation in the Balkan region. I also wish to address thanks to Mr. Carl Bildt, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans, for his full and informative briefing. I wish to express to Mr. Solana my Government's appreciation for the commitment shown by the European Union in that part of the world and in many other regions in order to restore peace and stability.

Aware of the specific characteristics of each country of the region, we think that a joint, comprehensive and targeted initiative is the way to move towards the restoration and consolidation of peace in the Balkan region. Indeed, the problems in the Balkan region are to a certain extent similar and are closely linked. Any solution advocated here can

succeed only if we take into consideration the general environment, and it would run the risk of practical difficulties of implementation. Geographical unity, the human component and the common past of the Balkans militate in favour of a comprehensive approach. The fragile yet stable situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the passing of the urgency phase in Kosovo, are positive signs that give hope for the future prosperity of the entire region.

There are several problems seriously affecting peace and stability in the region that could be resolved by taking a joint approach. I refer in particular to the question of refugees and displaced persons, which, because of its transnational nature, requires the cooperation of all the parties concerned.

The same goes for economic matters. We think that increasing economic contacts between the Balkan countries is not only a factor for prosperity and stability, but it is also a way to strengthen confidence among the peoples of the region. Interregional cooperation could also be extended in order to combat illegal activities in the region that imperil the security and well-being of citizens.

In order to obtain the cooperation of all parties concerned, we think it is necessary to offer all the countries in the Balkans a grand plan in a regional context. That is why we think the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, proposed by the European Union, is an opportunity for the Balkan region to promote peace and security. This is an appropriate framework that should be implemented promptly so that it can be manifested in real terms through the promotion of political and economic reform and the strengthening of regional security. The adoption of the Charter on good neighbourly relations, stability, security and cooperation in South-East Europe, adopted by the summit of South-East European countries on 12 February 2000, as well as the new regional integration process, the Adriatic-Ionian initiative, launched recently in Italy, are actions that attest to the commitment of the parties to respond positively to the international community's efforts to restore confidence to the region.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom): It is a real pleasure to have Carl Bildt with us this morning and to hear his important analysis of the overall scene in the Balkans and what we need to do in the stage ahead. It is also a marvellous occasion to have with us today the High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana. He has made a powerful statement of the European Union's input into Balkans policy. It was, after all, time that the European Union's role in the Balkans should be comprehensively stated in the Security Council, and it is good to see the representative of the United States acknowledging that.

I have nothing whatsoever to add to what Mr. Javier Solana has said. The United Kingdom obviously supports his statement 100 per cent. But, Mr. President, you asked us to be interactive this morning, and I want to pick up one or two things from statements and events from earlier in the day.

First of all, the fuss about the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: it was a train wreck waiting to happen. The current position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in this Organization is wrong and unsustainable. It is no good their continuing to ask to speak at events like this, when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be seeking to establish its status in this Organization. I hope that many of us will try to make that happen. The United Kingdom is for universality in this Organization. It is not just a matter of the unacceptable policies of Belgrade at this stage. There is a status problem here that needs to be sorted out.

Second is a point about security. Carl Bildt's statement to us this morning amounts in some its aspects to an early warning on Montenegro, on the unsustainability of security in the Balkans while Belgrade takes its present approach to regional matters and on the persistence of tensions there anyway.

Not many people have referred this morning to the important role of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo. Like Jamaica, we welcome the recent seizure by KFOR of a large cache of weapons in the Drenica valley. KFOR is leading the ongoing task of finding and confiscating illegal weapons with increasing success. These actions are actually fundamental to undermining extremist minorities that prefer violence and intimidation to tolerance and cooperation, and we must keep them going.

There are times when the judicious use of force is necessary to set the limits of brutal behaviour. That includes last year and this in Kosovo.

Then there is the action of the Tribunal, which this morning has been called "politicized". Well, when political leaderships are involved in the brutality that we see in the Balkans, of course there are going to be political aspects, but when there is such substantial evidence that those political leaderships have been involved in crimes against humanity, difficult decisions have to be made and those decisions should be supported by this Council, which created the Tribunals in question.

Thirdly, I just want to mention Bosnia. General elections are coming up in Bosnia in November and it is time — and I think Carl Bildt pointed to this by expressing concern about the aid dependence of Bosnia — for political leadership there to begin to take a responsibility for the future of the people of Bosnia. It would be wonderful if Bosnia could show an example to Kosovo in this respect and take up again the responsibility of political leadership that has been so sadly lacking in this particular region.

I return again to the important role of the European Union (EU) in this whole question. I think that, with the greater regional cooperation that we are seeing now in the Balkans and the dynamic engagement of the EU, we can encourage all the people of the Balkans to resolve their differences pragmatically and peacefully. That is the way to go and I hope this Council can support it.

Mr. van Walsum (Netherlands): We, too, are grateful to Special Envoy Carl Bildt for his comprehensive statement. In response, we will be brief, as the European Union has spoken on our behalf.

It is appropriate that the European Union as such should participate in this debate on the Balkans, for we should once and for all be finished with the notion that the countries which constitute the European Union are naturally blessed with peace, whereas those which lie in the Balkan peninsula are predestined for trials and tribulations. Let us not forget that the concept of the European Coal and Steel Community, the forerunner of today's European Union, was based on the belief that a new economic and political framework was needed if future Franco-German conflict was to be avoided. That was a totally self-evident fear when Robert Schuman launched his plan exactly half a century ago. We believe that what has been possible in Western Europe should also be achievable in the Balkans.

In 1991, the Netherlands assumed the presidency of the European Union — which was not yet called "Union" at the time — less than a week after the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia. This may explain why my delegation feels so deeply involved in everything that has happened in the region since. Throughout our presidency, until the end of 1991, our attempts to develop a common Balkans policy were repeatedly hindered by fanciful stories in the media about hidden historical ties between France and Serbia or between Germany and Croatia, or about Britain's insular lack of interest in either of them. At the time these stories were written, they were already a bit of a caricature, but today all these special ties are completely a thing of the past. The European Union has really succeeded in forging a common Balkan policy.

That is why it is my pleasure to stop here and subscribe to everything that has been said by the Permanent Representative of Portugal and by Mr. Solana as the High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Mr. Theron (Namibia): We, too, would like to thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Carl Bildt, for his informative briefing this morning. We should also like to thank and acknowledge the positive statements made by Mr. Solana and Mr. Monteiro of the European Union.

Namibia remains concerned about the unsettled political situation in the Balkans, in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina and the province of Kosovo. However, for today, we think it worthwhile to reflect on reasons for optimism over the future of the Balkans, despite the many problems and difficulties that face the region.

In this regard, the Stability Pact programme put forward by States members of the European Union and others outside Europe is an important programme for reviving the socio-economic situation in the Balkans. However, we would like to see the programme applied to cover the entire region. Namibia believes that the idea behind the Stability Pact was and remains an excellent concept to bring stability to the region and to allow these regional States to join the rest of the European family.

With regard to some of the specific areas of concern, my delegation supports the forthcoming municipal elections in Kosovo and commends the work of the United Nations Interim Administration in

Kosovo command, under the leadership of Mr. Kouchner.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we agree with Mr. Bildt that the road ahead is still long and precarious. Therefore, the role of the international community is essential because refugees, *inter alia*, must be given the opportunity to return to their homes and internally displaced persons must be afforded the dignity and freedom to reclaim their right to citizenship.

In order to provide momentum for peace and stability efforts in the Balkans, my delegation still believes that it is incumbent upon the international community to invest in the possibility of organizing a conference for dialogue and reconciliation to complement the elements of regional cooperation very well articulated today in the Stability Pact programme. This indaba must bring members of the political leadership, civil society and the private sector together to deliberate on their region and devise appropriate solutions to the problems that have bedevilled the region for decades, if not centuries. This, in our view, will consolidate the situation and provide appropriate strategies for the way forward, and might prevent further crises in the future.

In conclusion, I once again wish to express our appreciation for the briefing by the Special Envoy and my delegation wishes to encourage him to continue the good work of engaging the leaders of the region.

The President (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of France.

I shall confine myself to making four brief remarks. First of all, this meeting of the Security Council was necessary and is taking place at the right time. In the course of this month of June, the Council has been able to address in some depth the situations in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has also heard the President and the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, thereby demonstrating its commitment to international justice.

It is good that the Security Council now has an overall vision for the future of the Balkan region, the very subject of the consistently clear and precise statement made by Mr. Bildt, for which we thank him once again.

My second point is that this meeting of the Security Council is an unprecedented one. For the first time, and I welcome this wholeheartedly, the Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Solana, as well as the Presidency of the European Union, spoke in this Chamber. This reflects the institutional evolution of the European Union being brought into the work of this Council. France about to take over from Portugal at the head of the European Union, is pleased that an agreement was able to emerge so that Mr. Solana could speak today, in accordance with our wishes.

My third point is that these statements were particularly important and necessary, in that the European Union is very strongly involved in the Balkans in restoring what has been destroyed, in bandaging the wounds that are still open and, above all, in giving a vision of the future to the States of the region.

My last point is that in this spirit, France has proposed the holding of a summit between the European Union and the countries of the western Balkans, which, although they are at different stages, are the furthest along in their democratic evolution. The European Council, meeting on 19 and 20 June in Santa Maria da Fera welcomed this idea. The Council of Europe recognized that such a summit would provide an opportunity for the countries of the region to receive further assurances of the solidarity of Europe and would provide an opportunity to study with them ways of speeding up the process of democratic and economic reform. The meeting could be held in Zagreb and would provide the European Union with an opportunity to bring even more influence to bear in encouraging the recent democratic developments. This would also help create new momentum.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

The next speaker on my list is the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Mr. Raymond Johansen. I welcome him and I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Johansen (Norway): Norway would like to express its appreciation for the briefing made by the United Nations Special Envoy Carl Bildt as well as its concurrence with the assessment made by the European Union and Mr. Javier Solana.

Developments in South-East Europe are of vital importance to the stability of Europe and the integration process on the European continent. As a partner in this process, Norway has been engaged all over the Balkans, as a major donor to the efforts to promote lasting peace and development in the region, providing peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel and financial support.

Norway remains firmly committed and engaged. Assisting the people and the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the peace implementation process has naturally been a primary focus of our efforts. Important progress has been achieved since Dayton, and we encourage the Bosnian authorities to continue to pursue the priorities set by the Peace Implementation Council with determination.

Developments in Serbia and Montenegro are of vital importance to stability and security in the region. Norway has strongly condemned the Serbian Government's recent action against independent media and the systematic campaign of repression against the democratic opposition. These actions only serve to further isolate Serbia from the rest of Europe. The Milosević regime is becoming increasingly totalitarian. It is moving to effectively block assistance to opposition forces.

Norway has developed close cooperation with several opposition-led municipalities and will continue to provide assistance to them, as well as to independent media and civil society.

The continued violence in Kosovo is cause for great concern. The upsurge in ethnically motivated violence is totally unacceptable and must be stopped. The recent killings of Kosovo Serbs seem to be aimed at forcing remaining Kosovo Serbs to flee, as well as at preventing the return to Serbia of those already displaced. Improved security for all citizens of Kosovo is, in our view, a prerequisite for sustainable development in Kosovo.

Norway welcomes the commitment to far-reaching reforms shown by the Croatian Government. We believe it is important to ensure that the Račan Government succeeds. A democratic Croatia will be a catalyst for reform throughout the region.

Norway has become a full-fledged participant in the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. This reflects Norway's commitment to continue to participate in and contribute to the processes of bringing peace and stability to the region. We have set aside $15 million for specific Stability Pact projects. Our total assistance to the region will reach approximately $100 million this year.

In addition, Norway offers improved trading conditions for the countries of the region, either through free trade agreements, together with our European Free Trade Association partners, or unilaterally by granting General System of Preferences treatment.

In the view of the Norwegian Government, Macedonia deserves special attention and increased support from the international community. In a region otherwise marked by turbulence and violence, Macedonian leaders have skilfully and peacefully managed the transition to an independent State, now seeking integration in Euro-Atlantic structures.

It is now our duty to support the Macedonian people and the Government in their efforts. This will be an important contribution to stability for and peaceful coexistence between the nations of South-East Europe.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Japan. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Kobayashi (Japan): I would like to express my delegation's gratitude to you, Mr. President, for convening this very timely meeting on the Balkan region. I also appreciate the Council's decision to enable Japan to express its views on this issue of critical importance for international peace. As Mr. Carl Bildt, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Balkans, has stated on various occasions, in addition to responding to problems specific to the situation in various parts of the Balkan region, it is important to consider the region as a whole, in a comprehensive manner.

Sharing this perception, Japan has sought to develop the discussion on how the stability of the entire Balkan region might best be realized. This past

May, for example, it convened in Tokyo a high-level conference on South-East Europe, which was attended by representatives of countries in the region and by many other dignitaries, including Mr. Carl Bildt and Mr. Bodo Hombach, Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe. At that meeting, Japan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Yohei Kono, stressed the importance of building a community where different ethnic groups can live in harmony and the importance of developing a peace-oriented society. The ensuing discussion focused on how to promote reconciliation among diverse ethnic communities through cultural activities, education, independent media, environmental protection and a market-based economy.

As we survey the Balkan region, positive developments are clearly discernible in certain areas. As to Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the ministerial meeting of the Peace Implementation Council that was held at Brussels in May, the importance of economic reform, the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and the establishment and strengthening of common institutions was reaffirmed. In that connection, I wish to express my delegation's support for the active efforts which Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch, High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, has made in each of these important areas.

Although there continues to be an international military and civilian presence in the region, as again authorized by the Security Council on 21 June, it cannot remain there indefinitely. Japan shares with Mr. Petritsch the view that it is important for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves to make greater efforts to assume "ownership" of the peace process. Only in that way can lasting peace and security be achieved.

In Kosovo, although Japan appreciates the progress which the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo has so far achieved, several problems still remain. Japan cannot condone the acts of intolerance by nationalistic extremists against other ethnic groups. Japan attaches great importance to the municipal election planned for this autumn in order to establish a democratic, multi-ethnic society in Kosovo, and it calls upon the Serb community to cooperate. We also call upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cooperate in registering the Serbian population to enable them to participate in the election.

Finally, concerning the situation in Croatia, we welcome the victory in the recent election by political parties that emphasized cooperation with the international community, and we earnestly hope that this development will have ramifications in the neighbouring countries.

Japan has contributed to the stability and development of the Balkan region through its financial assistance. In 1996, Japan pledged about $500 million for economic rehabilitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and has been working steadily to implement that assistance. In addition, Japan has already disbursed a total of approximately $177 million for assistance to Kosovo and has also pledged $60 million to neighbouring countries. We intend to continue to remain actively engaged in international efforts to enhance peace and stability throughout the Balkan region.

I cannot conclude my remarks without commenting on the situation in the Republic of Serbia. Despite the progress that has been made in various parts of the Balkan region, it must be recognized that the further development of those areas cannot be attained without the democratization of Serbia. I believe, therefore, that it is incumbent upon the international community to cooperate in fostering democracy in Serbia; only then will lasting peace and stability prevail throughout the Balkan region.

The President (*spoke in French*): Ten speakers remain to be heard, which is evidence of the importance of this debate. I propose to suspend the meeting now, and to resume our consideration of the item on the agenda at 2.30 p.m. sharp.

The meeting was suspended at 1.30 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.4164 (Resumption 1)

Security Council

Fifty-fifth year

Provisional

4164th meeting

Friday, 23 June 2000, 2.30 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Levitte	(France)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Listre
	Bangladesh	Mr. Chowdhury
	Canada	Mr. Fowler
	China	Mr. Shen Guofang
	Jamaica	Mr. Ward
	Malaysia	Mr. Hasmy
	Mali	Mr. Ouane
	Namibia	Mr. Theron
	Netherlands	Mr. van Walsum
	Russian Federation	Mr. Lavrov
	Tunisia	Mr. Ben Mustapha
	Ukraine	Mr. Yel'chenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Jeremy Greenstock
	United States of America	Mr. Holbrooke

Agenda

Briefing by Mr. Carl Bildt, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans.

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

00-49885 (E)

The meeting was resumed at 2.55 p.m.

The President (*spoke in French*): I invite the representative of Bulgaria to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Sotirov (Bulgaria): Since my delegation is addressing the Security Council for the first time this month, may I start by congratulating you, Mr. President, for the intensive programme of work of the Council for the month of June and by expressing my gratitude for organizing this important open debate on the situation in the Balkans. My thanks go also to Mr. Carl Bildt, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans, for his comprehensive briefing on this issue.

We would like to express our deep appreciation for the valuable contribution to today's debate by Mr. Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union and High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Bulgaria has already aligned itself with the statement of the European Union on the situation in the western Balkans Therefore, I would like to make only some additional comments and express our position on issues of specific concern to Bulgaria as a country bordering that turbulent region.

Bulgaria is deeply committed to normalization of the situation in the western Balkans and in the improvement of good neighbourliness and cooperation. The four wars waged in the western Balkans during the last decade had a very negative impact on the whole region.

Therefore, the Bulgarian Government launched several regional initiatives in order to find durable solutions to the persisting problems. The most important and ongoing one is perhaps the regular convening of informal meetings of the Prime Ministers of the countries bordering the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to deal with the problems in South-eastern Europe. The first meeting of this kind, initiated by my Government, was organized in the Bulgarian town of Hissar on 21-22 January 2000. It contributed to the more active involvement of the countries neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the decision-making process on the future of the region and in tackling the core issues of security and stability.

The second meeting was held in March this year in Budapest and the third is scheduled for this weekend in Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia. Another initiative demonstrating the active Bulgarian foreign policy in the region is the Joint Declaration of the Presidents of Macedonia and Bulgaria on the situation in the Balkans, which was adopted in May this year. We consider these efforts to be part of the international community's quest for stability in south-eastern Europe.

Recent events in Kosovo have proven once again that the establishment of peace in a society torn by prolonged ethnic conflict is an enormously complex and time consuming process. To date, some progress has been achieved in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), but very little has yet to be accomplished regarding peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence in Kosovo. Some of the obstacles which hinder the establishment of peace are the ongoing violence, the unresolved issues of the missing and detained, the return of refugees and economic and social insecurity.

We are particularly concerned by the incidence of attacks on the peacekeeping forces. Public opinion in my country is sensitive to the issue, since Bulgaria has representatives in the Kosovo Force, the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. We appeal to the leaders of all communities in Kosovo to take decisive action towards putting an immediate end to all violence. Bulgaria also urges the leaders of Kosovo to encourage cooperation and tolerance in the spirit of the declarations they have adopted. In order to facilitate the reconciliation process, the Bulgarian Government has established active contacts with the leaders of the two main ethnic communities in Kosovo.

It is of particular importance that the international community adhere strictly to the objectives of a unified, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo. Since there are no civil structures in Kosovo, the delay of reforms could lead to the establishment of undemocratic institutions. It is crucial that the population become politically mature, which will make possible the establishment of a civil society free of criminal structures.

The acceleration of the political process in Kosovo has key importance for the success of the international community's efforts to create conditions for lasting peace in the region. In this context, we

express our regret regarding the decision of the Kosovo Serbs to end their participation in the joint administrative structures. Bulgaria commends UNMIK's determination to pursue its preparations for local elections in Kosovo, to be held in the fall. These elections would give legitimacy to the political actors and create conditions for the participation of the population in the political process and Government of Kosovo. However, the participation of all refugees and displaced persons, irrespective of their ethnic origins, is of critical significance to the success of the elections. Otherwise, the elections will be instrumental in legalizing ethnic cleansing in the region.

The success of the peace process depends also on the economic reconstruction and development of Kosovo and on establishing effective mechanisms, including those for restricting the black market economy. Bulgaria has repeatedly declared its readiness to participate actively in the process of economic reconstruction and has proposed different ways to ensure the greater involvement of the private sector. We consider that such an approach to the problem by the international community would definitely confirm that the countries of the region are part of the solution for Kosovo.

Regarding another key issue in the western Balkans, Bulgaria is fully committed to the completion of the peace process and the strengthening of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent, sovereign and democratic State. Peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina are closely related to the security of south-eastern Europe and the prospects for its integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Holding pluralistic elections is a key element of the successful functioning of democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Local elections held on 8 April this year proved that the democratic parties have the potential to win the trust of society.

There is a danger, however, that the economic challenges Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing could undermine the achievements that have been made so far. The international community should not give up its commitment to a region where peace is so fragile. Lasting solutions to the problems can be achieved on the basis of democratization in the whole region. We support the policy of reforms in Montenegro carried out by President Djukanovic. His Government is making a sustained effort to establish civil society institutions and a market economy. In foreign policy terms, Montenegro is aiming at opening and incorporating the Republic into the ongoing processes of cooperation and integration in the region and in Europe, which must be appreciated. The recent municipal elections held in the capital Podgorica and in Herceg-Novi are of crucial importance for enhancing the positive processes in Montenegro and thus will contribute to the enlargement of the democratic space in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Bulgaria is alarmed by the deterioration of the political situation in Serbia, caused by the escalation of the repressive measures of the regime against the opposition, independent mass media, civil organizations and academic institutions. We call on the authorities in Serbia to stop these negative trends and developments. Democratization requires the effective integration of the different ethnic groups into the political process in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We believe that this is closely related to preserving the unity and territorial integrity of that country.

Our position of principle is that a lasting settlement of the unsolved problems on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, cannot be achieved on the basis of the impunity of the organizers and implementers of the policy of ethnic cleansing and of other serious violations of international humanitarian law. Therefore, the support of Bulgaria for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is unconditional. My country renders active assistance to the Tribunal and shares the view that its work should become more effective and speedy.

Last but not least, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe proves that the joint efforts of the international community in tackling the challenges in the region can succeed only if they are based on a comprehensive approach. In this regard, the Stability Pact plays an important and constructive role. We, as a country that has suffered huge economic losses, amounting to $6.2 billion, from the recent conflicts in the Balkans, are extremely interested in its prompt implementation. The Stability Pact, in our view, should not turn into another bureaucratic structure; it must be a political driving force in the reconstruction of the whole region. We are expecting a pragmatic approach, practical results and the implementation of concrete Stability Pact projects.

In conclusion, let me assure the Council that the lasting commitment of the international community to the Balkans gives us a reason to be optimistic about the future sustainable development of our region.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Slovenia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Petrič (Slovenia): Let me first say that Slovenia fully associates itself with the statement made earlier by the Permanent Representative of Portugal on behalf of the European Union.

I would like to thank Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans, Mr. Carl Bildt, for his briefing. I would also like to extend a warm welcome to the High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union (EU), Mr. Javier Solana, and to thank him for his contribution to today's debate. We consider his appearance today to be symbolic confirmation of the strengthened commitment of the EU to the region. Above all we thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this open debate.

South-eastern Europe, the Balkans, is a region in which the international community has made a series of mistakes, but has also had successes. The international community enabled the smooth transition of Eastern Slavonia, prevented the spillover of conflicts and tensions into the Republic of Macedonia and averted a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. The necessary action of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the year-long efforts of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo and the Kosovo Force, represent a success, in spite of the problems that Kosovo is still facing. Bosnia and Herzegovina has every prospect of taking its place in Europe as a multi-ethnic and democratic country with an urgent need for economic revival. Numerous lessons were learned in the past 10 years and we are optimistic that, in the future, the international community will be able to relate to the whole region as a model of successful international involvement that brought it from the midst of conflict to democratic and multi-ethnic societies, economic prosperity and integration with the rest of Europe.

We strongly support your approach to consider South-East Europe comprehensively and in the regional prospective, since all the problems there are related and interconnected. Much too often the specific problems of the region have been approached separately, individually, as they popped up. It is true that the region was, and still is, loaded with religious, national and ethnic antagonisms and conflicts. However, it is also true that nations in the former Yugoslavia lived, coexisted and cooperated in peace.

The fall of the Berlin Wall created an opportunity for nations in South-East Europe too to join the process of democratization and transformation. Unfortunately, however, the extreme nationalistic and basically still Communist regime in Belgrade provoked the crisis in order to try to stop these processes.

This policy of inequality and superiority is, by the way, still pursued by the Belgrade Government, even here in the United Nations, by denying four successor States their equal rights regarding succession to the predecessor State and by not complying with Security Council resolution 777 (1992) and General Assembly resolution 47/1. The Council in its resolution considered that "the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist" and the Assembly decided that "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ... should apply for membership in the United Nations". It seems that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia pretends to be the only State to enjoy the rights of United Nations membership without ever applying for membership.

The indictment of the highest leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is the border that separates the regime in Belgrade from the rest of the world. Full legitimacy of leaders indicted by the International Tribunal established with the authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII and composed of the distinguished international judges elected in the General Assembly is questionable, to say the least.

Individual responsibility for the war crimes must be established in order to prevent the unjustified notion of the collective guilt of the whole nation. The only way for the international community to proceed is to extend full support for the work of the Tribunal so that it will be able to quickly conclude its proceedings.

We are aware that there will be no self-sustaining peace and stability in the region without the full cooperation and integration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the region as well. For reasons explained above, this cannot be the current regime in Belgrade. The international community must cooperate with, support and encourage the forces within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that are striving for democracy, peace, reconciliation, economic recovery and a return to simple normalcy of life.

We share the hopes of seeing the new, democratic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia soon being part of a stable and prosperous South-East Europe. Serbian people have suffered a lot and long during last decade, and they have the right to a normal and decent life, free of despair, intimidation, fear and isolation.

I am glad that Branco Lukovat, the Foreign Minister of Montenegro is attending today's session. By denying equal rights to the constituent Montenegrin nation, and by constant pressure on and threats against the democratically elected Government of Montenegro, Belgrade is as well losing its legitimacy to speak for Montenegro.

In this context I would like to draw attention of the Council to document S/2000/611. Tensions between Belgrade and Podgorica is a type of dispute the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. It therefore deserves closer attention of the Security Council.

We would like to recall the statement by the President of the Council on the role of the Security Council in the prevention of armed conflicts, of 30 November 1999 (S/PRST/1999/34). In this statement the Council emphasized its continuing commitment to addressing the prevention of armed conflicts and recognized the importance of its early consideration of situations which might deteriorate into armed conflicts. The Council expressed its readiness to consider appropriate preventive action in response to the matters brought to its attention by States or the Secretary-General and which it deems likely to threaten international peace and security. We want to stress that the situation of Montenegro requires appropriate attention and action of this Council, better early than too late.

A specific characteristic of the current efforts for peace in the region is the creation and functioning of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. The Stability Pact offers a unique opportunity for further stabilization and strengthening of peace in the region, primarily through recognition that full democratization and respect for the rule of law, economic revival and reintegration, return of refugees, reconciliation and larger security are conditions for the full normalization of the relations in the region. Furthermore, the Stability Pact gives specific meaning to the notion that South-East Europe is part of Europe and that the long-term solutions for its future clearly lie within the process of European integration.

Slovenia has successfully developed friendly relations with all nations in the region of South-East Europe and is determined to continue to strengthen them in the future. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is the only country in the region with which we have no diplomatic or consular relations. This is due to the preconditions posed by the Government in Belgrade, that Slovenia recognize the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a continuing legal personality of the former State and thus accept inequality among the successor States of former Yugoslavia.

Slovenia is determined to contribute to the revitalization of the region with all its efforts. In the past few years we proved ourselves capable of contributing constructively to the strivings of the countries of the region to become a democratic and prosperous part of Europe.

I would just like to mention that the International Trust Fund for Demining collected $28 million for demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina and is today the most active demining programme in the country, expanding its activities to Kosovo. We are also engaging in activities to revitalize the economic processes in the region, and more than 200 Slovenian investments are presently engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone.

Economic development and cooperation among the countries in the region, based on their own independent will, on an equal basis and with mutual interest is the only way to normalize the relations in the region as a part of a democratic, stable and united Europe. The role of the international community and especially the European Union thus is crucial, not simply because of the continuing need for donor resources for the programmes to revitalize the economic processes, but more importantly, in providing

the prospect of a future for the region and its peoples to be integrated in a free, democratic and prosperous Europe.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Austria. I invite to take a seat at the Council table and make his statement.

Mr. Pfanzelter (Austria): I have the honour to speak in Austria's capacity as Chair-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Permit me at the outset to thank Mr. Carl Bildt for his excellent presentation this morning. His analysis of the regional problems enables us to see the issues in a larger context. We fully share his view that only a broad regional approach can enable us to achieve the establishment of lasting peace and stability in the region. The overriding goal of self-sustaining stability based on a firm regional framework can be achieved only through active commitment and active participation of the local population and local politicians.

In that context, Wolfgang Petritsch developed the concept of "ownership", which calls on the local population to become fully involved in the rebuilding of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Like previous speakers, I am pleased to hail recent positive developments in the region. The elections and the new Government in Croatia have demonstrated that people and politicians are taking responsible positions on their future.

We have also seen promising developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There has been a significant rise in the return of refugees; the security situation has improved; the military budget has declined; and the Brcko district has been established. However, many of these positive developments occurred only after the High Representative had made use of his powers. Genuine cooperation among the Bosnian ethnic groups is, unfortunately, still the exception.

Members of the Council are fully aware of the various projects of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the region, especially in the fields of free media, refugee return, human rights and police training. Let me therefore only briefly address the main current project of the OSCE in the western Balkans: the local elections in Kosovo in October and the general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in November. I would like to concentrate on this issue because it is central to the question at hand: how to involve the local population and get them to accept active responsibility for their own political future. There is no better instrument than free and fair elections. Clearly, not everyone chooses to participate in that process, but everybody should have the opportunity to do so.

For that reason, the OSCE and its chairperson-in-office, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, will continue to support all efforts to create an environment which enables the participation of all citizens in this process. Democracy is the cornerstone of a peaceful future in the Balkans, but there must also be an end to ethnic tension; there must also be sustainable economic recovery; there must also be the safe return of refugees; and above all, there must be a regional solution with a clear European perspective.

In conclusion, let me express the appreciation of the chairperson-in-office of the OSCE for the excellent cooperation between the United Nations and the OSCE, both at Headquarters and in the field. Considering the complexity of the tasks and the differences in mandates and structures of the missions, it is not surprising that initial difficulties arose. Today, however, the common achievements demonstrate that sound cooperation can benefit both organizations, alleviating the burdens and responsibilities of each organization.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker is the representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Čalovski (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia): When I am referred to in the way that you, Mr. President, just referred to me, it is my duty to state that I am the Permanent Representative of the present Macedonia, not the "former" Macedonia.

Let me at the outset express my satisfaction at seeing you, Sir, the Permanent Representative of France, presiding over this very important meeting of the Security Council on the Balkans, a subject of crucial importance to my country, the Republic of Macedonia, and to our region, South-eastern Europe. The position of the Republic of Macedonia coincides with that expressed by the representative of Portugal speaking on behalf of the European Union and by the High Representative for the European Union Common

Foreign and Security Policy, His Excellency Mr. Javier Solana.

The history of the Balkans, of South-eastern Europe, or of the countries situated in the Balkan peninsula is, as members know, full of examples of armed conflict. The First World War started there; the Second World War lasted the longest; since the end of the cold war there have been four armed conflicts, the most recent of them in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That is too many, and I hope there will be no more.

Many books have been written and many analyses made with the aim of answering a number of questions. Why has all this happened? Who or what generates the problems, difficulties and armed conflicts in the region? How much of this is the result of the pursuit by local forces of regional, continental or global interests?

The simple answer is that they have all played a role; they have all contributed. The victims have been the ordinary people of the region, who have been struggling all along for a better life, for peace and development, and for their inalienable human rights.

Further wars or conflicts must therefore be prevented. In that endeavour, the United Nations and, of course, this body, the Security Council, have a responsibility and a duty to discharge. They have an important role to play, but, of course, not alone. The responsibility of the regional organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as other initiatives and organizations, is extremely important.

Also of crucial importance are the responsibilities and duties of all States of the region, and of course the activities and the behaviour of local actors: the political parties, the non-governmental organizations and the cultural, religious, business and other civil-society associations. In short, the mobilization of all forces in favour of peace and development in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations should be the basis, the foundation, of a new chapter in the history of the Balkans and of South-eastern Europe.

The best mechanism for that endeavour is the integration of all States of the region into the Euro-Atlantic structures, in the first place into the European Union and NATO. In that regard, I would like to note the importance of the presidency conclusions endorsed at the meeting of the European Council held on 19 and 20 June 2000, conclusions to which Mr. Solana made reference.

Here in the United Nations and elsewhere, the Republic of Macedonia has continuously emphasized several positions that are of crucial importance for the future development of the Balkans and of South-eastern Europe: the development of good-neighbourly relations among all States; the integration of all States into the European Union and NATO; the prevention of conflicts and the peaceful resolution of disputes; and full observance of international law.

Since 1993, as a result of the initiative of the Republic of Macedonia, the General Assembly has adopted resolutions on the situation in the Balkans and South-Eastern Europe. It has adopted resolutions 53/71, 48/84B, 50/80B, 51/55, 52/48 and 54/62.

I would like to take this opportunity to stress something that is common to all those resolutions and that should be taken into account by the Security Council. These General Assembly resolutions require that all States of the region should strictly observe the United Nations Charter and the provisions of international law; that there should be full normalization of relations among all States of the region; that the inviolability of international borders should be observed by all States; that relations among all States should be based on mutual respect; and that the needs of these States be speedily integrated into the European Union and that NATO should be fully supported.

The fifty-fifth regular session of the General Assembly, in accordance with these resolutions, will discuss the Balkans under provisional agenda items 67 and 68. The present discussion in the Security Council could be an important contribution to the one that will take place in the autumn.

The Republic of Macedonia is developing fruitful cooperation with all Balkan States; we have established diplomatic relations with all of them. We are constantly endeavouring to enrich our good-neighbourly relations with all of them and to make a positive contribution to the situation in our region.

The Balkans, the countries of South-Eastern Europe, should not be seen only as a geographical part of Europe, but also as an indivisible part of the political, economic, social and cultural development of

Europe. The essence of their orientation is truly European. It is true that these countries are at present going through a difficult period of transition, but one should not forget their contribution to European civilization. The potential of the region, both human and material, is such that one cannot doubt the great future of all countries of the region.

After the Kosovo war, the international community adopted two crucial decisions for the present and the future of the region. One was adopted by this body, the Security Council, resolution 1244 (1999), under which the war ended; the other was adopted by the European countries, the United States, Canada and Japan — the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, which is designed to help the transition of the region into a region free of violence and instability, an area of peace, stability, development, democracy and cooperation.

The implementation of these two decisions is of key importance for the future of South-Eastern Europe. The Security Council recently examined the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999). Regrettably, that debate was restricted. It is, however, gratifying to note that the Security Council was unanimous in its demand for that resolution's full implementation. The implementation of the Stability Pact is under way, and we hope to see the result of this process soon.

Many other activities are also under way. I would like to mention the importance of the South-East European Cooperation Process, the Central European Initiative and other initiatives. However, the role of the United Nations and of its Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, of NATO and its Kosovo Force, of the European Union and of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as far as Kosovo is concerned, remains of paramount importance.

The countries of the region are extremely eager to see concrete results of the implementation of all these endeavours. In Macedonia, the expectations are high, particularly taking into account our positive contribution during the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and recently during the Kosovo war. The delays and hesitation in the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999), of the Stability Pact, of the General Assembly resolutions and of other initiatives will only help the negative forces in the region, which, regrettably, are still active.

The region of South-Eastern Europe is not preoccupied with the consequences of the wars in the former Yugoslavia only. The economic development of all countries of the region is of the highest priority. The transition of the economies into market economies and their integration into the European and global economies are a daily preoccupation of all Governments in the region. This is a very difficult process, in particular since it creates numerous social problems which should be properly tackled so that the political and economic transition can go forward. Wars, crises, embargoes, United Nations sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and so forth, have hardly affected the Balkan economies in transition. My country, the Republic of Macedonia, is a very illustrative example. According to the latest assessments of our Ministry for Development, the damages are estimated at over $1.5 billion. The damages on the ground due to the cancellation of already concluded contracts amount to about $60 million — not to mention how much we have spent due to the acceptance of nearly 400,000 refugees from Kosovo who stayed in Macedonia for months. The most heavily affected industries were our metallurgy, civil engineering, basic chemical, metal processing, textile and leather processing industries. It is not difficult to see the effect of this on our otherwise small economy.

If the Security Council would like to shoulder fully its responsibility under the Charter, it should address the implementation of Article 50 of the Charter. The present preoccupation of the Security Council, mainly with the provisions of its own resolutions, should be addressed. The Security Council should struggle not only for the implementation of its own resolutions, but also for the implementation of the resolutions of other principal organs of our Organization, the implementation of the United Nations Charter and the implementation of international law. Of course, in that endeavour it should cooperate closely with the other principal organs of our Organization and with other organizations of the United Nations system, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

So we know what is going on in all parts of our region. We also know very well what the peoples of the region want. There is no need for new studies or new declarations. What is needed — what is expected — as I mentioned, are results of the commitments undertaken

by the international community and Member States. We need full support for the process of integration of our region into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

We should not be discouraged or held hostage by the behaviour of the destructive forces in the region. It is true that these destructive forces are too loud, but their strength is weak and they will not matter in the period to come. There will be no more armed conflicts in our region. I am sure about that.

The Security Council should send a clear message from this meeting that the time for all destructive forces has ended; that the Balkans and South-Eastern Europe have entered a period of cooperation and integration; and that this process is irreversible. The United Nations missions in Kosovo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia must succeed. The process of the integration of the Balkan States into the Euro-Atlantic structures must proceed speedily, resolutely and without hesitation, and it, too, must succeed.

Before concluding, I would like to express my great appreciation for the endeavours of Mr. Carl Bildt, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans, in particular for his untiring efforts to influence — and even to push — the positive developments in the region and, of course, for his informative and very useful briefing.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Belarus. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Sychov (Belarus) (*spoke in Russian*): At the outset, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting and for giving us the opportunity to make a statement on the situation in the Balkans.

For almost 10 years now, the Balkans have been the focus of priority attention on the part of the world community. In that time, the Security Council has been making efforts to achieve a settlement and stability in that part of the world. My country's Government believes that today's discussion, which is being followed very carefully by all Member States of the United Nations, should not focus on resolving disputes and contradictions. It is our belief that the Security Council can and must become aware of the whole extent of its responsibility and determine the right strategy for United Nations action in the region over the coming years.

Over a year ago, Belarus joined other countries in welcoming Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), which put an end to the military confrontation in Kosovo. Today, we would solemnly declare that it is the United Nations and the Security Council that must remain the guarantors of the political dialogue among all States in the region. Any actions circumventing the Security Council must be regarded as inadmissible and contrary to the norms of international law.

Belarus believes that the basic element of a Balkan settlement must remain the principle of the territorial integrity of all Balkan States, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All the necessary legal instruments for this exist. The members of the Security Council and the Member States of the United Nations have those instruments available to them. They are, primarily, the Charter of the United Nations, the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement and the resolutions and decisions of the Security Council.

We cannot fail today to recognize that efforts by the United Nations have averted the worst: an escalation of the armed conflict in the Balkans. However, we cannot yet say that the crisis has passed. There are still many problems that constantly threaten the fragile stability in the region. We believe the most important and substantive of those to be the fact that there are not yet equal guarantees of security for the peoples and ethnic groups in a number of areas of the Balkans. We believe that security of person must apply equally to all. However, as in the past, we are still witnessing many incidents of cruelty and violence against representatives of ethnic and religious minorities.

A second important factor that must remain on the agenda of the Security Council and the world community is the establishment of legal frameworks for talks among all parties involved in the conflict. Obviously, it is only by respecting this condition that it will be possible to have a productive dialogue and arrive at a compromise.

Many difficult issues in Kosovo and the Balkans remain unresolved. In implementing the provisions of Security Council resolutions on the Balkans, many essentially new issues have arisen that are in fact unprecedented in the entire history of the United Nations. The most important in this regard was the

establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and a mechanism whereby it could operate in the province.

Belarus welcomes the regular briefings by leaders of the Mission and the reports of the Secretary-General. But we believe that the experience of a body with such broad powers should be the subject of an exchange of views among all Members of the United Nations, possibly involving a broader circle of academics and political analysts. We believe that the Secretary-General's idea of a wide-ranging discussion within the Organizations about Kosovo's future — which has not taken place so far — rightly points us towards a fully transparent consideration of the problems of Kosovo and the Balkans as a whole.

The conclusion that the crisis in the Balkans began in Kosovo, and that it will end in that part of the Balkans, seems more true today than ever before. The Security Council, and all Members of the United Nations, have no more an important task to carry out than to untangle this web of contradictions. Belarus is willing to participate actively in that work.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Pakistan. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Ahmad (Pakistan): I would like to begin by expressing our appreciation to you, Mr. President, for convening today's open meeting to review the situation in the Balkans.

The Balkans remain high on the international community's agenda as one of our most pressing issues. This is particularly so because the memories are still fresh of the events of recent years, when we witnessed the most brutal genocide and ethnic cleansing at the heart of Europe in over half a century. The wars are over now, but it is now time to work to consolidate peace through reconciliation and reconstruction processes and to minimize the prospects of the recurrence of violence.

In the context of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords was a landmark achievement, as the parties took a historic decision at Dayton to embrace peace by rejecting the path of war, destruction and devastation. The journey ahead was arduous, considering the deep fissures and cleavages caused to the very fabric of that society by the fratricidal war. The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina deserve commendation for their courage and determination to accept peace and reconciliation as their collective goal.

During the last five years, the progress along the path of peace has been substantial, though it still remains fragile. The international community has been playing a pivotal rote in supporting the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the rebuilding of their country. It is a recognized fact that there cannot be a durable peace unless it is consciously and carefully nurtured by the people. Being the main beneficiaries of peace, they have to consolidate and strengthen peace.

Pakistan has always emphasized that faithful implementation of the Dayton Accords is central to durable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a united, sovereign and independent State. While the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has fulfilled its obligations to a large extent, the Republika Srpska is lagging behind in vital areas. We are particularly concerned at the lack of progress on the return of refugees and displaced persons, cooperation with the International Tribunal for war crimes, freedom of movement across the inter-entity boundary lines, the establishment of common State institutions, judicial and police reform and sustainable economic development.

The three communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina need to recognize the benefit of mutual cooperation in the nation- building process.

It is unfortunate that, despite concerns expressed by the international community, the war criminals still remain at large, mostly in the territories of the Republika Srpska and Serbia. The parties must implement the solemn commitments made at Dayton to pursue and apprehend war criminals. Pakistan believes that those who participated in mass killings must not go unpunished anywhere in the world, be it in Srebrenica, in Rwanda, in Kosovo or in Kashmir.

While some progress has been achieved in making the common State institutions effective and operational, a lot still needs to be done in this respect. Progress is relatively slow in the revival of Bosnia's economic and social structure. A comprehensive approach to economic reform would facilitate a homogeneous development of economic and trade between the two entities and across inter-entity boundary lines. On their part, the donor countries and

agencies must continue to provide the required financial and technical support.

Pakistan extended unequivocal moral, political, financial and material support to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in defence of international law and morality and as proof of our solidarity with them. Our support was and continues to be the manifestation of our conviction that no nation should be victimized because of its weakness and vulnerability, no people should be brutalized because of ethno-religious origin and no nation or people should be denied their inherent right to self-determination and right to wage a legitimate struggle for freedom.

I will now turn to the developments concerning Kosovo. The massive human tragedy which unfolded in Kosovo over a year ago was a source of deep distress and anxiety for the people of Pakistan, as it was for people all over the world. It was particularly shocking that, soon after Bosnia and Herzegovina, we witnessed yet another campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans by the same regime. The Belgrade authorities pursued systematic and deliberate policies of hatred and intolerance, aimed at decimating and uprooting a whole community because of its ethnic origin and beliefs. It is a matter of satisfaction that the international community responded to this grave challenge and prevented the brutalization of a whole community.

In the aftermath of the conflict, the international community has shouldered a robust challenge and a programme of augmenting the healing process in Kosovo —indeed, a daunting task. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo has made a difference. It has played a vital role in restoring peace and encouraging a process of reconciliation and reconstruction. There is a continuing need to provide support to the efforts to establish a harmonious inter-ethnic relationship, bring about economic reconstruction and build the institutions of pluralistic society. We hope these tasks, which need resilience and dedication, will be accomplished.

Pakistan closely followed the developments in Kosovo during the humanitarian crisis and contributed to the peace process through bilateral contacts and in international forums. Once the United Nations Mission was established, we contributed personnel to all segments of its operations.

In conclusion, I would like to reaffirm Pakistan's commitment to and support for efforts to achieve peace, reconciliation and prosperity for the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and, indeed, the entire Balkan region.

The President (*spoke in French*): I invite the representative of Albania to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Nesho (Albania): Allow me to thank you, Mr. President, for your excellent work in leading the Security Council and for the opportunity today to speak on a very important issue: peace, security and development in the Balkans.

We would like to warmly welcome the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Balkans, Mr. Carl Bildt, and the High Representative for the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana. They delivered important statements, full of ideas for the present situation and the future of the Balkans. Furthermore, I would like to express my Government's gratitude to Mr. Solana for his great contribution during the conflict in Kosovo.

From the outset, I should like strongly to support and thank the United States of America and its representative, Ambassador Holbrooke, for their principled and far-sighted position. We believe that the United States statement contributed towards preserving the importance of the Security Council by not turning it into a forum for endless rhetoric in which the perpetrators of war and massacres can give lectures on morality.

The issues raised this morning by Carl Bildt are part of a profound analysis that explains the conflict situation in the Balkans, a situation that is first and foremost a consequence of a traditional Balkan policy depending on outmoded *étatiste* concepts, with a mentality and philosophy influenced by the lengthy Byzantine and Ottoman dominations, and encouraged by undefined and irresolute action on the part of the international community in the early 1990s to find a long-term solution in favour of international peace and security. It can be said that, in some instances, the ambivalence, lack of commitment and inaction of the international community and Europe have been influenced by the European tradition of the balance of power and old preferences that often result in half-hearted and temporary solutions to Balkan problems.

It was the Dayton Peace Agreement, and later the intervention of the international community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States and Western European countries that prevented the spillover of the conflict throughout the Balkans and led to liberation, victory and hope for a lasting solution.

The continuation of the international community's commitment in the Balkans — not only for security reasons, but also for the region's economic and social development, as defined in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe — is the key to the success and future progress of the Balkan region. We are grateful for the assistance given by the European Union to the Balkans and for its leading role in the Stability Pact. The Stability Pact will create the conditions needed by the people of the Balkan region to overcome hatred, and becoming involved in the building of their common future will help them to understand that their interests lie in unity and not in division.

Success in achieving the goals of the Stability Pact will depend on many factors: the flow of investment and development projects, the commitment of the Balkan States and their cooperation in joint projects. The greater the help of the international community, the faster the positive changes will appear. The faster the aid of the international community, the fewer problems will be present in the Balkans.

Unfortunately, today, an obstacle to achieving the objectives of the Stability Pact is the criminal regime of Milosevic, who not only is the generator of tension and instability in the region, but also prevents uniformity of development in the region. Albania is of the view that the present isolation and the sanctions placed against the Belgrade regime should continue and be strengthened by all ways and means, a process that will surely bring the desired solution.

Albania, as a Balkan country, sees its future within the Balkan integrated community, with the goal of integration into the structures of the European Union and NATO. Working for the future, it is far from holding positions that generate instability or create conflicts. It is working to fulfil a great idea. It will contribute and commit itself to successfully implementing Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the mission of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo towards the creation of a multi-ethnic society and the democratic institutions necessary to govern the country.

We believe that the forthcoming municipal elections in Kosovo represent a further step towards achieving stability in the region. These elections will, for sure, increase the responsibility of the Kosovar Albanian community towards the objectives put forward by the international community. We think that the best solution for the region is that Kosovo, as an independent entity, be integrated directly into the European Union, thus eradicating the source of conflict and ignoring the nationalistic positions of the interested parties. This is the most just and best solution imposed by today's realities, and will at the same time ensure better respect for the great contribution of the international community towards peace, security and justice in the Balkan region. Any other solution would be artificial and temporary.

In closing, let me say that the international community will find a partner in Albania to work with for the achievement of peace and security in the Balkan region. We believe that Albania should be seen by the international community as an important and needed player in the process of the integration of the Balkans.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker is the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Sacirbey (Bosnia and Herzegovina): It is most positive to see you, Mr. President, in this position of leadership — such a trusted face and such confident words from a leader from our part of the world.

I should also like to welcome the words of Mr. Solana and Mr. Bildt. I believe they have made a very good contribution.

For over eight years now, I have spoken before this Council of the plight of Bosnia and Herzegovina and our confidence, despite everything, in the future of coexistence, tolerance and pluralism. Maybe some of have come to doubt my sincerity; others may have questioned my sanity. Unfortunately, generalizations about ethnic hatreds and age-old religious animosities still plague debates about our region within this Council. Again, we reject the notion that ethnicity and religion are the cause of war and instability in our region. Rather, ethnicity and religion are used as

weapons of war by the forces of political darkness that, unfortunately, still exist.

That is why we supported the vote rejecting the participation of the current regime in Belgrade in this debate and we further endorse the comments of Ambassador Holbrooke, Ambassador Greenstock and others on the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the United Nations.

But now I move on to an equally important matter. It is our opinion that much can be done between people of goodwill given the opportunity to work together. Where institutions may be sadly inadequate — and that certainly is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina — goodwill can overcome such structural deficiencies. Mr. Milos Prica at one time may have been considered my enemy. Suspicion and animosity were rife. Today, we are compatriots in the same progressive endeavours in the service of our one common country. He is my Deputy now; he sits behind me. I have full confidence in his commitment as well as in his words.

I would therefore like to pass on to Milos Prica the opportunity to continue and make the statement on behalf of our delegation. It is important that now the Council also hear his words — our words; feel his commitment and our commitment; and understand the common goodwill and vision of our one future.

With your permission, Sir, I would like to cede the floor to Mr. Prica.

The President (*spoke in French*): As I hear no objection from the members of the Council, I readily give the floor to Mr. Prica. It is indeed the finest symbol of the national reconciliation that has emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. Prica (Bosnia and Herzegovina): Allow me first to express my gratitude for this opportunity to address the Council in the name of the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as for the great interest and concern you are expressing for the situation in our region. We would also like to reiterate our confidence and pleasure in your initiatives and leadership.

Before I explain our position and our concerns regarding the situation in the Balkans, let me once again underline what a great benefit we have enjoyed since the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed, due to the joint effort of the whole international community. Because of these commitments, we are now far from where we were just four years ago. Of course, we are fully aware that much more has to be done to reach the point at which Bosnia and Herzegovina may be proclaimed as a self-sustained State not dependent on foreign assistance.

Nevertheless, we are sure that things are moving in the right direction. I would especially like to emphasize how important the help being provided is in regard to the reform of our economic and judiciary system, which we desperately needed to overcome and replace the old, stiff and non-productive former structure.

Finally, it is our firm understanding that the Dayton Peace Agreement has no alternative and must be completely implemented.

It is not even necessary to mention how interested we are in the situation in the region where we belong, and how the situation and especially the instabilities have a huge negative impact on our country. We are watching very carefully the situation in Serbia, the Kosovo crisis which is far from being resolved, and the uncertainties in Montenegro. In that regard, we may express our deep concerns about the non-democratic regime in Belgrade, led by Mr. Milosevic. We see the changes as inevitable and hope they are carried out as soon as possible for the sake of stability in the region as well as for the benefit of the people of Serbia, who deserve a place in modern Europe, and the modern world.

At the same time, we strongly support the democratic changes in Montenegro. We see the cooperation with healthy, prominent Serbian figures, working together and redoubling the efforts to democratize the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as in their and our vital interest.

The Kosovo situation is still far from being resolved. We fully support and respect resolution 1244 (1999) in all that it means and expect it to be fully implemented. We expect that the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), with the help of the whole international community, will be able to provide security for all ethnic groups and start the process of reconciliation.

Finally, we would like to make several points. After all the things we have experienced in the

twentieth century, our thought is that any attempt at changing borders in the Balkans will lead to another war. Internationally recognized borders have to be fully respected by all.

Nonetheless, the solutions for long-term stability in our region lie within us — but also within you, the international community, and in particular the European family. Even though so many issues in our region have been internationalized, longer-term solutions depend on our people's ability to commit to democratic and free market reforms, and at the same time, the European Union's willingness to recognize us as equal partners.

Therefore, we see the long-term, definitive and the only satisfactory solution for the whole region in the full integration into the European Union. That is the only way the full and final reconciliation can be reached and the whole region can become prosperous.

After all, the precedent of Western Europe in the post-Second-World-War period, after centuries of nationalist wars, is relevant for the people of our region as well. We appeal to the European States, members of the European Union, to help the whole region to reach European standards, to prepare ourselves for becoming a part of a united Europe, and to encourage all Balkan States to move in that direction.

Of course, we are really delighted to hear from you, Mr. President, regarding the initiative for a summit of the European Union and western Balkan leaders, and we appreciate that very much. We see that as a preparation for us to join Europe. At the same time, I would like to thank Mr. Javier Solana. I do not want to miss this opportunity to thank Mr. Carl Bildt, our old friend. We have a great memory of him when he was High Representative of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker on my list is the representative of Iraq. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and make his statement.

Mr. Hasan (Iraq) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like at the outset to extend my sincere thanks for organizing this open debate meeting today.

We had hoped that this meeting would be really open to all those who are interested in participating. However, and unfortunately, we were surprised by a practice that is very difficult to explain — namely, preventing the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Jovanovic, from taking part. This practice does not allow this open debate to realize its objective, because a major viewpoint is already absent from this debate.

Raising the issue of the succession of Yugoslavia as an excuse to deprive the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the opportunity to take part in this meeting is an illogical excuse and is not in harmony with the Charter of the United Nations. Articles 31 and 32 permit a Member State of the United Nations, as well as a non-member, to take part in discussing any issue that is before the Security Council and which particularly affects its own interests.

On the other hand, preventing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from taking part in this meeting happened at a time when there is a proliferation of hearing sessions and open meetings held by the Council. Whoever is interested in taking part in these meetings is allowed to, ranging from the representatives of the rebels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Senator Jesse Helms, who lectured the Council at length, disdaining the Charter of the United Nations. So why is the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, an independent State and a Member of the United Nations which is directly concerned with this particular matter, an exception here?

The current situation in the Balkans is characterized by fragile balances in all political, military and economic matters. The events of recent years have proved that any foreign intervention that has suspicious intent, and any violation of the Charter of the United Nations — particularly of the principles of respect for the sovereignty of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the inadmissibility of the use or the threat of the use of force in international relations — have further complicated the situation in the Balkans.

The NATO aggression led by the United States against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 24 March 1999 struck a hard blow for all the efforts by the international community to solve the crisis. It was also a hard blow for the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the rules of international law and the authority and prestige of the Security Council.

The Secretary-General was right to say that the use of force without Security Council authorization jeopardized the essence of the collective international

security system based on the Charter of the United Nations. In the wake of the military aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, we saw the persistent use of other forms of aggression: attempts to bring about isolation and exclusion; the imposition of sanctions; and interference in the internal affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including threats to its territorial integrity.

At this very meeting we heard the representative of the United States of America call upon members of the Council to meet with the representative of one of the entities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That amounted to a call for the partition of an independent State and blatant interference in its internal affairs. It also set another grave precedent in the work of the Security Council. It is a destructive policy whose real purpose is not to establish peace and stability in the Balkans, but rather to further the expansionist political interests of certain influential international parties at the expense of the peace and stability of the Balkans and of the territorial integrity of its States.

Peace in the Balkans will come about through respect for the United Nations and through serious-minded, direct dialogue among all parties in the region. What is required is a comprehensive outlook regarding all elements of the crisis, with a view to resolving it. Moreover, the international community must provide impartial and sincere assistance in bringing peace and stability to the Balkans.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker is the representative of Croatia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Šimonović (Croatia): It is my pleasure to thank the Permanent Representative of France, His Excellency Ambassador Jean-David Levitte, in his capacity as President of the Security Council, for organizing this open debate on a region that has been the object of so much attention in the past 10 years.

We also welcome the presence of Mr. Bildt and Mr. Solana, and appreciate their valuable contributions.

The protracted crisis in South-eastern Europe has challenged the international community in many respects. It has strained its collective security resources and has drawn on its humanitarian and economic resources. It has also tested its political resolve and its moral and legal consciousness alike. In spite of a substantial investment of energy and resources and some notable achievements, much work still remains ahead. The return of refugees and displaced persons throughout the region, demining, rebuilding, economic and social reconstruction and development, and healing and reconciliation remain standing objectives for the years to come. Most important, the countries in the region have yet to take charge of their own fate and to find their respective ways towards sustainable peace, the rule of law, protection of human rights and economic development.

There are some grounds for optimism in that respect. People in the region have strengthened their resolve to break out of the spiral of instability and face the challenges of full democratization. In that regard, we welcome the recognition of Croatia's efforts and appreciate the words of encouragement addressed to us today. Indeed, Croatia has managed to pull itself from the circle of crisis and has joined the circle of well-intentioned neighbouring countries willing to help those still in need.

Croatia's case serves as the best example that positive change in the region is possible. Moreover, it proves that such a change is welcomed and rewarded by the international community. Given the main priority of the Croatian Government – that is, to make up for time lost – the demonstrated willingness of the European Union to speed up the integration process for qualified newcomers, based on their own individual achievements, remains of extraordinary importance. It is a clear signal to other countries of the region that, if the conditions are met, Europe's door remains open.

In that context, we welcome the initiative of President Chirac to pay special attention during the French presidency of the European Union to ways to accelerate the integration of the region into a European mainstream, and we pledge Croatia's full support. In our opinion, the French initiative to convene a summit to serve that purpose should enlist support and participation of a broader range of neighbouring countries.

Over a short period of time following the elections held earlier this year, Croatia has made substantial progress in joining political, economic and security institutions and mechanisms and in developing good-neighbourly relations. The Croatian Government is also conducting an active regional policy aimed at establishing a sustainable peace. This includes

participation in the Stability Pact for South-East Europe and consistent implementation of the refugee return programme.

More precisely, our efforts are directed at the consolidation of cooperation in all fields, and particularly at extending political stability and economic revival in South-eastern Europe. In this regard, we are fully committed to the implementation of the Dayton accords, and supportive of the international efforts to achieve sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the situation in Croatia has improved and the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is improving, the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia raises serious concerns. After affecting other countries that emerged after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the crisis has now returned to its origin: to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The same ideology and the same regime that caused so much suffering during the aggression waged on Croatia and on Bosnia and Herzegovina now represents an obstacle to the democratic dialogue on how to resolve ethnic tensions in Kosovo and protect equality and the legitimate interests of citizens of Montenegro. It is in Croatia's interest to see the Normalization Agreement with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fully implemented. But prior to democratic developments in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this appears unrealistic. Meanwhile, we will continue to normalize relations with Montenegro, especially regarding the free movement of civilians throughout the Prevlaka area, towards which the Milosevic regime still harbours territorial pretensions.

Our cooperation with other successor States to the former Yugoslavia has been good and is constantly growing in both the bilateral and the multilateral spheres. Among other issues, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia, united by a common interest in developing good-neighbourly relations — and consequently, stability and prosperity in the region — have invested sustained joint efforts to resolve with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the issues of succession to their common predecessor State. Resolving the succession issue on the basis of the equality of all five successor States, a basis which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stubbornly rejects, is a prerequisite for sustainable peace and stability in the region.

Security Council resolution 777 (1992) and General Assembly resolution 47/1 affirmed the principle of equality of all successor States; however, they were never fully implemented. Some statements heard today are encouraging with regard to their full implementation in the foreseeable future.

Another issue which directly impinges on the prospects of sustainable peace in the region is that of criminal accountability for the tragic events that occurred during the conflict on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It is vital that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia reflect in its work the extent and the level of the involvement of the various sides and the war crimes committed. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's unwillingness to cooperate with this Tribunal remains a serious obstacle in this respect. As long as the indicted war criminals, such as Milošević, Mladić, Karadžić, Šljivančanin, Radić, Mrkšić, Martić and others remain at large, justice, healing and reconciliation cannot be achieved.

In order to prevent a distorted recollection of the tragic events that took place, and for the historical record, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have raised genocide claims against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before the International Court of Justice. These proceedings are not directed against Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but against the State authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which are to be held responsible. In a joint statement issued recently, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia expressed the belief that their cooperation in the proceedings of the International Court of Justice against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would ultimately contribute to democratization, reconciliation and the establishment of lasting peace and stability in the region.

Finally, Croatia firmly believes that the efforts of the international community will prove successful and self-sustained stability in South-East Europe will be ensured only when the countries of the region are able to assume responsibility for their future. For some of them, this might still be a long way off, but it remains worthwhile to further invest individual and collective efforts.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the Permanent Representative of Croatia for the kind words he addressed to me. I believe it is a very fine symbol that the last speaker in this important debate

should be the representative of a country that has witnessed particularly encouraging developments.

By way of conclusion to our discussion, I wish to give the floor to Mr. Carl Bildt to draw conclusions and respond to the comments and questions addressed to him.

Mr. Bildt: I think the main conclusion to be drawn after all these hours is that your initiative to organize this debate, Mr. President, has been not only highly valuable but also highly valued by all who have taken part and by all of us who have been able to benefit from listening to the different interventions that have highlighted both the problems that are there and the possibilities for moving forward that I think we see.

On a somewhat more personal note, let me start by expressing my appreciation for the intervention of the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because I know both Muhamed Sacirbey and Milos Prica as old friends of mine, but certainly not friends of each other. They were truly enemies on two sides of what was the bitterest war in Europe during the second part of the last century. The fact not only that they can sit together, but that they can also speak together in front of the United Nations Security Council — certainly not pretending that everything is over, or that there are not any problems — I think that, more than anything else, demonstrates, in spite of all the difficulties in the region, that there is a way forward — not an easy one, not a fast one, but there is a way forward. I also express my personal thanks for their respective contributions.

I think we have also been able to listen to constructive and forward-looking interventions by the representatives of Slovenia, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria in which they have all, from their respective points of view, highlighted both their respective problems in their respective parts of the region and the need for that regional approach, that search for a more comprehensive political solution within the framework of Europe. This was, indeed, the centrepiece of my intervention; and, if I may say so, it was indeed that of the intervention of Mr. Javier Solana on behalf of the European Union.

I have noted with satisfaction the strong support that has been expressed for the efforts and the approach of the United Nations, from Ambassador Holbrooke of the United States and from Ukraine, just to take two examples of nations that, on some of the other issues that have under discussion today, have taken somewhat divergent approaches. But the support both of them have expressed, as well as others, is, of course, something that we will carry forward in our work.

At this late hour I will not take up all of the different issues. A lot of them will be addressed in the course of the regular briefings that are given by the Secretariat to the Council on the different peacekeeping missions in the area. Let me just, in terms of Kosovo, stress one note regarding the concern that has been expressed by several members of the Council about the need to find out the fate of persons who are missing as a result of that conflict. A lot of them — most of them — are of Albanian origin, and there are also those of other origins — Serb or others. We must press forward to find out as much as we can about their fate.

But let me also take this occasion to recall that there are still thousands of people missing as a result of the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. We must not cease international efforts to find out as much as we can about the fate of those missing. That is important, not only for the families of those concerned, but also for the long-term efforts at reconciliation.

I also note the concerns that have been expressed about the human rights situation in Kosovo. I think all present are aware, and it has been expressed by most of the speakers, that both the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the international security presence in terms of the Kosovo Force are doing their utmost to safeguard the human rights of each and every person. The fact that they do not always succeed is not due to their not trying, and I think it is important to recognize this. This is continuing, and it is disturbing. I just read a report that came in a couple of hours ago about what happened very early yesterday morning when six mortar grenades landed within the premises of the very old Orthodox monastery of Dečani in southern Kosovo. That monastery, where the mortars are coming down close to the church and close to the monks, is a treasure of Orthodox culture in Europe. Of course, we must do everything we can to counter that sort of violence.

I have been asked by several speakers to comment further about the situation in and around and concerning Montenegro. Let me just repeat what I said in late February and again today: the federal authorities in Belgrade that have, in my opinion — and I think that

is very clear — been abusing their power and the elected representatives of the Republic of Montenegro are on a slow but steady collision course. Unless we or they or changes can alter these trends, that collision will occur, with negative consequences.

What we can do, of course, is to highlight the problems that are there from the side of the United Nations. I can only continue to urge that political, economic and other support be given to the elected representatives of Montenegro. That is important in order to increase the possibilities for them to pursue the not entirely easy balancing of different interests, which they have so far done successfully and which has made a contribution to stability and democracy that has been highly appreciated by the international community.

Finally, let me underline what I think is the absolutely crucial importance of a continued dialogue on these issues within the Council. The experience of the last 10 years is that if the international community — and the Council is the ultimate expression of the international community — is not united in some sort of way behind the consensus of what we area trying to achieve in the region in terms of stability and peace, then we are not likely to succeed. So the dialogue with and within the Council is absolutely essential as we prepare ourselves for that day when the conditions are there for the comprehensive regional settlement of the political issues, which will also pave the way for a resolution of all of the "minor" issues that we have been addressing today.

In that spirit, and as an old friend as well, let me thank you, Mr. President, for this initiative and for this debate. I can assure you that I will do our utmost to live up to the expectations expressed today.

The President (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank Mr. Carl Bildt for having so eloquently drawn the conclusions from a lengthy, high-quality and forward-looking debate.

I have noted a feeling of optimism in this debate. I have also taken note of the advice Mr. Bildt has just given us. There will have to be other debates of this nature because the international community as a whole will, for many years to come, have to pay attention to and assist the western Balkan region. The destiny of that region is linked with that of Europe and, first and foremost, with the European Union.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.4165

Security Council

Fifty-fifth year

Provisional

4165th meeting

Tuesday, 27 June 2000, 10.30 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Levitte	(France)
Members:	Argentina	Mr. Cappagli
	Bangladesh	Mr. Ahmed
	Canada	Mr. Fowler
	China	Mr. Shen Guofang
	Jamaica	Miss Durrant
	Malaysia	Mr. Hasmy
	Mali	Mr. Keita
	Namibia	Mr. Theron
	Netherlands	Mr. van Walsum
	Russian Federation	Mr. Sergeev
	Tunisia	Mr. Jerandi
	Ukraine	Mr. Krokhmal
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Jeremy Greenstock
	United States of America	Mr. Holbrooke

Agenda

The situation in East Timor

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178.

00-50315 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in East Timor

The President (*spoke in French*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal and the Republic of Korea, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Ms. Wensley (Australia), Mr. De Moura (Brazil), Mr. Widodo (Indonesia), Mr. Akasaka (Japan), Mr. Powles (New Zealand), Mr. Kolby (Norway), Mr. Monteiro (Portugal) and Mr. Sun (Republic of Korea) took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator for East Timor.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Vieira de Mello to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator for East Timor.

I warmly welcome Mr. Vieira de Mello and give him the floor.

Mr. Vieira de Mello (*spoke in French*): May I first of all, a bit belatedly, congratulate you, Mr. President, on your appointment to New York, and may I thank you for having been willing to give me this opportunity under your presidency to report on the situation in East Timor.

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the Timorese and the international community continue to make progress towards reconstructing East Timor. The summary sheet that I have distributed to the Council recapitulates some of the activities that we have been undertaking in certain key areas. It may be that the principal achievement thus far is that we are now much more aware than we were at first of the uniqueness, magnitude and complexity of UNTAET's mission, and of the fact that our long-term success will certainly depend on the extent to which the Timorese themselves will be able to participate in and take over the transition process. It seems to me that our main interlocutors understand better and better that, as far as they are concerned, the exercise of power does not mean simply influencing the decision-making or participating in it; it also means assuming responsibility for their choices. This is the general context in which we have recently been discussing the ways and means of making progress in the transition, a question that I would like to elaborate on today for the Council.

Before I enter into the heart of the subject, allow me a short digression. Many others before me have emphasized that resolution 1272 (1999) was innovative in its ambitiousness and in the breadth of the mandate given to UNTAET. Although this deserves to be emphasized, words can but weakly describe the challenges we have been facing every day in East Timor, and I must note that in many respects we are very poorly equipped to face those challenges. In fact, the United Nations has almost everything to learn at the same time as it is trying to build and manage a country — a task that we have never had to accomplish before. The experience that we are gaining in UNTAET shows that we are going to have to review both our thinking and our administrative mechanisms if we want the United Nations to be able to undertake any other operations of this type and scope in the future.

To review, UNTAET is entrusted with a governance operation without precedent in the history of the United Nations; preceding missions have only shared this responsibility or partially exercised it. UNTAET is starting from scratch, and quite rightly a great deal of rapid, appreciable progress is expected of it. This new type of mandate compels the United Nations to confront pressures never before faced in the field. The need for speed comes up against the need for consultation; the need for sound financial management comes up against demonstrations opposing increases in gasoline prices and unemployment; the need to recruit locals comes up against the reality that there is almost a complete dearth of qualified candidates; accusations that the United Nations staff is too comfortable comes up against the fact that more UNTAET staff have fallen ill than those of any other United Nations mission. We are beginning to confront the realities of governance, but I must admit that it has taken us a good deal of time to accomplish this.

If I may be frank, let me say that it is yet more striking how the scope of UNTAET's mandate has revealed weaknesses in our administrative rules and procedures that considerably reduce our ability to respond flexibly to the needs of the Timorese in the framework of resolution 1272 (1999). Something is clearly not right if UNTAET can cost $692 million, whereas the entire budget of East Timor comes to a bit over $59 million. Can it therefore come as a surprise that there is so much criticism of United Nations extravagances, while the Timorese continue to suffer? The criticism will continue as long as our administrative rules prevent United Nations engineers from dealing with public buildings that are not used by United Nations officials but rather by Timorese officials. Something is certainly not right in a budget that does not provide for border and customs services, nor for operating either the airport, prisons or courts. It is hard for us to accept that the budget does not allow for the purchase of a boat or two to fight contraband at a time when we are being asked to increase income.

Rather than going over grievances, my intention today is to draw the Council's attention to the real problems that we need to deal with every day on the ground. May I also emphasize that we need to be given the authorization to use the regular budget as flexibly and pragmatically as possible. The tasks that resolution 1299 (1999) assigns to UNTAET are not impossible, although they will require a great deal of effort, but we can carry them out effectively only if our administration procedures can be adapted so that we have the necessary resources.

Let us now take up the heart of the subject. In recent weeks UNTAET has endeavoured to take stock of the situation and determine the minimum criteria that we need to fulfil in order to move successfully to independence. It is not a question of drawing up an exhaustive list, but rather of pointing out the essential objectives to be attained before independence. These are ensuring security during the transition period and facilitating the establishment of the mechanism that will be needed to maintain security after independence; remedying the poverty of refugees in West Timor and helping them be repatriated in a free and orderly fashion; establishing a credible judiciary system that respects basic human rights and that can appropriately maintain law and order; ensuring sufficient reconstruction so that the public services can function; establishing a financially viable administration under the direction of the Timorese; and ensuring the political transition to independence, by the adoption of a Constitution and fully democratic elections.

The first four points, on which I will quickly provide the Council some information, are prerequisites for the last two.

As regards security, it is remarkable that so soon after last year's violence, East Timor is now a country at peace. The internal security situation is normal. While security conditions on the whole are improving, serious incidents are continuing to occur here and there, including a grenade attack that was launched against a border post at the end of May, in which an Australian soldier was wounded. I also regret to have to inform the Council that on the morning of 21 June six grenades were launched against quarters where seven Australian soldiers were being lodged. Light-weapon fire followed this attack. Fortunately, no one was wounded. I note that all these incidents occurred along the border.

Nonetheless, good relations have been established between our forces and the Indonesian armed forces — especially following the signing, on 11 April, of a memorandum of understanding between our Force Commander and General Syahnakri. In addition, talks aimed at improving cooperation in the framework of investigations of border incidents and of putting an end to infiltration are under way.

Taking into consideration the security situation on the ground and the capacity of our civilian police to establish law and order, the reduction of the military force has already begun, and proposals for further reductions have already been submitted to the Secretary-General. Nonetheless, these proposals concern only the infantry in the eastern sector. At the same time, we have identified a need for specialists and logistical experts. A range of proposals in this respect will be presented to the Council in the July report of the Secretary-General. In the meantime, we continue to review the composition of our military component, and additional proposals in keeping with the conditions on the ground will be presented on a regular basis. Furthermore, it should be possible to devote the savings that would result for the United Nations budget to concrete projects that would have tangible benefits for East Timor — for example, providing patrols to fight against contraband or repairing some of the road damage that has been done by the intensive circulation of heavy military vehicles.

As for future defence needs, we are awaiting the arrival of an assessment team from King's College in London, which I visited last week. We hope that their visit will make it possible for us better to determine the means of arranging for effective security after the transition. To do this, we need to begin to prepare as of now. While the Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor are remaining remarkably disciplined, it is nonetheless undeniable that they are showing signs of growing agitation and impatience, undoubtedly due to the fact that they are idle and uncertain about their future. We are considering provisional measures that could be taken to improve the situation in the short term.

On the diplomatic front, remarkable overall progress has been made to resolve pending questions with Indonesia. Jakarta has opened a diplomatic mission in Dili. President Wahid made an extremely fruitful visit to East Timor on 29 February last. Xanana Gusmão and I travelled to Indonesia on several occasions, and on 29 February, also in Dili, I signed a communiqué regarding a diverse range of questions jointly with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Shihab.

Nonetheless, a great deal does remain to be done, especially to follow up on the key provisions of this communiqué. Towards that end, I travelled to Jakarta at the end of last month to meet with President Wahid and Mr. Shihab. In particular, I encouraged them to move forward in creating a transit corridor between the Oecusse enclave and the rest of East Timor, and to seek ways of allowing those Timorese who were part of the Indonesian civil service to obtain their pensions and of creating favourable conditions for Timorese students in Indonesian universities.

It is important to resolve the question of pensions in order to encourage the return of remaining refugees. In this respect, we are continuing to encourage increased contacts between East and West Timor. Recently the Governor of West Timor went to Dili, and the Bishop of Baucau this month visited West Timor.

Furthermore, recently we had a visit from a former high official of the militia so that he could see for himself the situation in East Timor, and the head of my Office last week went to West Timor to meet with the Governor, the military commander and other Indonesian officials of that province, following the fruitful visit of the Governor to Dili.

I hope that these ongoing contacts will enable us to overcome the remaining obstacles and persuade the refugees and the remaining integrationist leaders in West Timor that their future lies in East Timor. The violence faced by officials of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees some days ago in a refugee camp in Kupang — the capital of West Timor — is intolerable, and once again we appeal to the Indonesian authorities to neutralize, once and for all, the extremist elements that remain in those camps.

Upon my return to Dili, it is my intention to examine, together with Xanana Gusmão and the National Consultative Council, the question of refugees in all of its aspects — political, security and humanitarian — in order to rethink it and to find the best ways of speedily resolving this problem. The international community will have to — and I said this in Luxembourg on the occasion of the most recent meeting of the General Affairs Council of the European Union — the international community will have to help Indonesia appropriately to resettle the refugees who wish to stay in Indonesia.

(*spoke in English*)

The broader humanitarian question is perhaps the area in which most progress has been made to date. Having completed the emergency phase of its work,

UNTAET's humanitarian pillar will merge with the governance pillar by the end of this year.

Moving now to the justice system, court hearings are beginning even as the courts themselves are being rebuilt. The recruitment and training of judges, prosecutors and defenders continues, and the Police Training College is proceeding with the moulding of an East Timorese police force. In April, together with Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman of Indonesia, I signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation on legal, judicial and human rights-related matters. This is a far-reaching document which will allow both East Timor and Indonesia to move forward in seeking legal redress for the crimes of the past. We are expecting a visit from the Attorney-General's office in early July in pursuit of this aim. Finally, efforts are under way to develop a national reconciliation commission to help heal the wounds of the recent past.

While the law and order situation remains relatively calm, I am concerned by attacks on minority communities, namely the Muslims, the ethnic Chinese and the Protestants. The targeting of these communities often appears to be less religious or racial than political or economic, and it focuses on perceptions that these minorities were unduly close to the Indonesian authorities. One Chinese woman my colleagues spoke to has been accused of supporting Indonesian military intelligence. She told us that many Chinese were caught in the middle under Indonesian rule and had to make regular contributions to both sides. This woman's dilemma was not unique, but rather was a product of the tumultuous times which East Timor has recently experienced. It highlights the need for mature thinking on how to deal with the wounds of the past. UNTAET is working with local communities, and, in fact, my Deputy for Governance, Mr. Jean Cady, met with all of the components of UNTAET yesterday and will be meeting soon with East Timor political and church leaders to ensure that the message of tolerance frequently expressed in public statements becomes more than a rhetorical refrain.

The area of reconstruction is the most exasperating one for us all. The process has begun, but I am as frustrated as the East Timorese are over its slow pace. More, much more, remains to be done in the raw task of physical reconstruction. I visited Suai, a southern district, in the wake of the heavy flooding which took place there at the end of May. What I saw was truly depressing. The district is now cut off from Dili by land and is likely to remain so for at least six more months. The people, already traumatized by the violence of last September, of which they bore the brunt, must now also face the reality that even their temporary homes and remaining few possessions have been destroyed, washed away by the floodwaters.

We must accelerate our rate of reconstruction, and I will continue to depend on the generosity of the international community in this area while at the same time seeking to develop East Timorese capacity to address the problem. Much of the problem, though, has not been due to a lack of generosity on the part of the donors but rather to a relatively slow rate of disbursement into the World Bank Trust Fund and indeed on our part. I believe that this problem is now being rectified.

The Lisbon donor conference, held last week, came as a major fillip to us all, particularly through the clear vote of confidence we received for the East Timor consolidated budget. Once again, I thank all those who attended for recommitting themselves to supporting the ongoing needs of East Timor. Under this budget, quarterly performance information will be provided to the donors. Further, we are moving towards establishing a committee-based process — with full East Timorese participation — which will plan, prioritize and approve development proposals from all sources.

Let me now turn to the establishment of an East Timorese administration. In virtually all areas the sheer lack of qualified human resources is acute. To address this problem, capacity-building in East Timor has focused on two areas. First, general training requires a functioning educational system, which, while still in its infancy, is rapidly being rebuilt. We hope to resume the normal school calendar from this coming October. Furthermore, bilateral funding is being sought for a human resources development centre which would offer training in a range of skills. UNTAET has also placed considerable emphasis on the training of civil servants. This is a particularly steep challenge as, hitherto, virtually all management positions in the administration had been held by Indonesian officials. The Civil Service Academy has commenced language training and will soon increase the range of courses on offer, and the United Nations Development Programme presented to donors in Lisbon an ambitious programme, which we fully endorse, to provide

training for management positions in the new administration.

Finally, it is worth highlighting the considerable amount of on-the-job training that exists within the mission. UNTAET staff work side by side with East Timorese civil servants in all fields, from human resources management personnel to water workers, and from health specialists to payroll officers, with East Timorese representation in the Administration scheduled to increase dramatically through an active recruitment drive that will begin in the next couple of weeks. Training is bearing fruit as independence approaches.

Let me conclude by referring to the political transition. An effective political transition has two components. The first is a constitutional process culminating in democratic elections. The second is the development of a culture in which the political leadership makes transparent decisions for which it is willing to take responsibility.

The ground rules for both the constitutional process and the elections are simple: the final say in both cases will lie with the East Timorese; human rights must be adequately protected; and the system adopted must be democratic. Following discussions with Xanana Gusmão and other East Timorese political leaders, I feel safe in predicting, as announced at the Lisbon conference last week, that elections — and, possibly, independence — will take place next year, at some point between 30 August and December 2001. The final decision will no doubt largely depend on how fast progress is being made in attaining the key benchmarks to which I have just briefly alluded and which the Secretary-General requested us to develop when he visited Dili last February. The elections will, in all likelihood, be for a constituent assembly. Prior to that, the political coalition known as the National Resistance Council of East Timor (CNRT) is likely to recommend the establishment, following its congress in August this year, of a broad-based constitutional commission which will, together with UNTAET, engage in a wide consultative process with the East Timorese on the drafting of a Constitution.

Increasingly, we and the East Timorese have come to the realization that the transition will require much more than UNTAET's simply assisting in designing institutions and in recruiting and training administrators. Capacity-building should not be restricted to the technical level but, rather, should also embrace the level of political leadership. In short, it has been our thinking in recent weeks — and the subject of widespread discussion — that the East Timorese should not only staff the Administration and Government but also take political responsibility for it.

At the end of May, in a former military barracks outside Dili, a week-long conference was held on the reconstruction and development of East Timor. At that gathering, I presented two options as to how UNTAET could proceed: the technocratic and the political. The first was basically a continuation of the current strategy, namely, to steadily "Timorize" the Administration at all levels so that a fully national civil service would be in place at the point of independence when an elected East Timorese Government assumed power. The political model would continue the "Timorization" of the civil service but would also share governmental responsibility with the East Timorese. In short, I proposed a coalition Government of sorts, in which several portfolios would be held by East Timorese political figures who would also, for the first time ever, enjoy political responsibility for their decisions. I also pointed out that this would be a mixed blessing, in that the East Timorese leadership would, from then on, have to join UNTAET in a kind of coalition "punching bag" in sharing the blows delivered by our critics for the decisions we take.

The CNRT leadership accepted this concept — in fact, it welcomed it enthusiastically — with the portfolios to be shared equally between UNTAET and the East Timorese. Consequently, internal administration, infrastructure, economic affairs and social affairs would be managed by East Timorese appointees, taking into account the dominant role of the CNRT, whereas finance, justice and security and political, constitutional and electoral affairs would remain with UNTAET. Furthermore, a new national legislative council will be constituted to replace the old quasi-cabinet/legislative hybrid National Consultative Council. It will be expanded to render it more representative and will comprise only East Timorese. There will be 33 members: one from each of the districts, seven from parties within the CNRT, three from other political parties, and one each representing youth and students, local non-governmental organizations, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church, the Muslim community, the professions, farmers, labour and business.

Nothing in this proposal will alter the fundamental tenet of resolution 1272 (1999), namely, that UNTAET is endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor. Indeed, this proposal will further advance one of the priority tasks set by resolution 1272 (1999): to support capacity-building for self-government. The structure has been agreed upon — an organigram has been distributed to you, Mr. President — and it is our hope to implement it as from next month, July. This will afford the East Timorese the opportunity to benefit from a period of co-government with UNTAET, just as the civil service is currently benefiting from working side by side with international personnel. It will render the transition to independence less sudden and help the concept of governmental responsibility assert itself in East Timor.

In conclusion, may I invite all Council members to visit us in East Timor and see for themselves the unique nature of the task with which the Council has entrusted us. We would be able to benefit from their experience and advice, and they would have the opportunity to appreciate the complexity of our work. I can assure the Council that such a visit would be extraordinarily stimulating for us. Members would see both that which is uplifting and that which is truly depressing. Above all, however, they would see up close the enthusiasm of the East Timorese for determining their own future, and they would see how the United Nations is helping them to realize that goal: not perfectly, perhaps — far from it — but in a committed and pragmatic manner.

The President (*spoke in French*): I warmly thank Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello for his outstanding briefing, which was full of information and very clear on the current situation and on the progress achieved. The briefing was full of concrete proposals. Mr. Vieira de Mello has given us an outlook that is both realistic and ambitious.

Mr. Holbrooke (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to begin this important discussion. This is the first time in four months that Sergio Vieira de Mello has graced us with his presence. As you, Sir, have just said — I echo your comments — he has once again given us an informative and encouraging briefing. This has been an extraordinarily busy month in the Security Council. This will be the last time I will be able to be here this month, because I am leaving for London and Geneva this evening. So I want to thank you, Mr. President, for your extraordinary stewardship in a month which rivalled China's month of presidency in terms of the number of crises confronted, and which equalled China's achievement in steering us through these difficult times.

I want to thank the Special Representative for his briefing, as well as for his leadership at the Lisbon conference last week. You are, Sergio, a testament to the talent and capabilities of the United Nations at its best. I saw in the quarterly *Foreign Affairs* recently that the United Nations had sent out the A-team of international technocrats to East Timor. I am not sure technocrat is always a compliment, but I think that you and your colleagues in Kosovo, Bosnia and elsewhere really are in that category, although maybe you do not appreciate being compared to Mr. T. — you have got fewer gold chains on and so on. I think your job is tougher than anything that people can imagine, and I think you are doing a great job. And I have to say that you are still better dressed than I am, to my eternal embarrassment.

It is now 10 months since we had our historic open meeting in this Chamber to deplore the violence then raging in Dili. On the one hand, I am struck by how much progress has been made — as we heard this morning — particularly as the focus has shifted from emergency needs to developing consultative mechanisms for interaction with the people of East Timor. This is what the United Nations should be doing. In the midst of our enormous difficulties in other parts of the world, I think we should note here that — as in an earlier era, in Cambodia, Mozambique and Namibia — the United Nations is doing its job. While it is not cheap, let the world see that it is worth it. On the other hand, I am deeply frustrated at the situation with the refugees, to which I wish to return in a moment.

First I want to comment on two absolutely critical operational issues. Despite the outrageous events in the camps — and I will mention those in a minute — I want to say how pleased our Government is to note that Mr. Vieira de Mello has reported that the overall security situation is stabilizing and that the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) can downgrade its security classification. We strongly support the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to downsize the peacekeeping elements — the troops — in UNTAET. It is very

important that these plans be codified and made precise, and made public early.

I would like to ask Mr. Vieira de Mello if he would, in the response period, be able to inform us as to when the first major downsizings will occur and what his planned projections and recommendations are. I want to state that the earlier and more visibly he can do this, the better. I would further like to state that my own Government hopes that he can drawdown as quickly as he can, and at the same time, taking into account the very legitimate question of a resurgence of violence by the militia, that the United Nations reserve a capability to reinforce on short notice if a crisis should hit. But he now has over 10,000 personnel in East Timor. While that is entirely appropriate up to now, it is equally important and imperative, given the tremendous demands we are facing — and all of us in this Chamber know that we are about to meet to receive a new request for Ethiopia and Eritrea, on top of southern Lebanon, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo — that we try to plan long-term for a drawdown. I hope he will be able to inform us about how he intends to do this.

We applaud the Special Representative's increasing shifting of responsibility from peacekeepers to civilian police, and then from civilian police to the newly trained East Timorese police and, at some future date, I assume, an East Timorese defence force. This would allow an even faster and deeper reduction in size.

Let me now turn to the question of a date for independence. Last month, José Ramos-Horta visited us, and we had an opportunity to hear from him about how the East Timorese are feeling about the pace of reconstruction and transition. Many more people had the opportunity to hear directly from the East Timorese during last week's important donors' conference in Lisbon.

We have just heard from Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello about a possible timetable for independence, to take place between 31 August and December of next year — dates proposed by Mr. Gusmão and Mr. Ramos-Horta in Lisbon. I want to associate our Government in the strongest possible terms with that timetable, as proposed, and assuming that the United Nations believes it is appropriate. This would be a historic event, a signal achievement for the United Nations and for the world community. I believe that it is very important to set the date publicly, clearly and early so that the people of East Timor can adjust to it, so that the challenges to it from West Timor can be dealt with swiftly and appropriately by the Indonesian Government — and in this matter we are not satisfied at this point — and so that everyone can be prepared to work on this issue.

But I want to state again, and I know that Sergio agrees with me on this, that the independence date is not the day on which the United Nations leaves. It is the day on which the United Nations continues a transition, but continues to assist the people of East Timor in a different way. The world should not expect a date on which the United Nations just disappears. That would be highly against the interests of stability in all of the South Pacific and the region of the Association of South-East Asian Nations.

The United Nations, however, should not overstay its role as a governing power. It should turn into an advisory power — in other words, the kind of role it is playing in places like Bosnia. This is entirely appropriate. The United States should, and I hope will, support that. I say "I hope" because these decisions will take place under a different Administration. While I cannot commit a future Administration, I can certainly speak for the current one in the strongest possible terms.

Let me now turn to the question of the refugees. I have spoken in the Council many times about this since I returned from East Timor last December. I have described the climate of fear, and I have expressed my Government's outrage. Last February, when Sergio was last here, every member of the Council said that we had to put an end to these militia incursions across the border. We all agreed that full and lasting reconciliation would not be possible until that was done. Yet — and I say this with a combination of sorrow and anger — the climate of fear is still a reality in these camps.

Just last week, one of the most serious of all incidents of the last nine months took place. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had to cease its operations temporarily in the Noelbaki camp after 70 militia members attacked the brave UNHCR staff in that camp. This is inexcusable. Although we support fully the Government in Jakarta, we must again ask whether the Indonesian Government

can control the military officers on West Timor, who are certainly capable of preventing this.

With regard to the resettling of East Timorese, we have heard plan after plan from Jakarta. We support the new plan, which would resettle militia members, former East Timorese members of the Indonesian armed forces and former East Timorese civil servants outside of the island of Timor, as participants in the transmigration programme. But let us get on with it. Jakarta's approval of this plan is a positive sign that the Government of Indonesia is taking the international community seriously and, more importantly, that it wishes to bring stability to West Timor. This is essential if the project that we have been discussing today is to succeed.

While we are encouraged by these decisions on resettlement, we are also deeply shocked by the continuing militia activities along and across the border in East Timor. The Indonesian Government and its military have failed to disarm and disband these militia. But some militia members are now armed with sophisticated weapons — grenades and automatic weapons — that they did not have before. They used them, for example, against an UNTAET outpost in the Bobonaro district on 21 June, just a few days ago. This attack followed a reported increase in cross-border militia actions during the previous two weeks, including an incident in which a United Nations peacekeeper was injured at a bridge on the border.

We strongly believe that the United Nations forces should use force pre-emptively to make clear to the militia that this will not be tolerated. We do not believe that a drawdown in forces is inconsistent with restoring order, because the forces that can be withdrawn are way to the east, in the eastern part of East Timor, where the situation is calm. The areas of difficulty are small, and the people causing the difficulties are well known to the local authorities. I feel very frustrated on this point because I know that everyone in the Council agrees on this, and no one quite understands why the Indonesian Government, which is making such a tremendous effort to grapple with an immense panoply of issues, has been unable to get this particular problem under control. But we need to do it urgently.

Mr. Fowler (Canada)(*spoke in French*): Canada would like to express its gratitude to the Special Representative, Mr. Vieira de Mello, for his efforts. We take great pleasure in seeing him again at this table.

Mr. Vieira de Mello deserves praise for having involved the Timorese very closely in the work of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and for having endeavoured to develop local capacity in matters of security and administration, especially through the creation of the National Consultative Council. In this regard, we welcome the fact that East Timor will soon be administered by a Government made up of the Transitional Administration and the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) during the period of transition to complete independence of the territory.

(*spoke in English*)

Canada shares the concern of many in this room that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has felt compelled to suspend activities in three of the largest refugee camps in West Timor because of increasing violence and intimidation. Attacks such as those perpetrated against UNHCR staff last week are, as both Mr. Vieira de Mello and Ambassador Holbrooke just said, nothing less than unacceptable. We agree that militia leaders must honour their commitments not to interfere with the safe return of refugees.

In this regard, I would be grateful if Mr. Vieira de Mello might comment on the extent to which progress is being made in separating militia elements from the general population in these camps and, more specifically, on what additional security guarantees we might anticipate that could usefully be agreed so as to reduce the level of violence and intimidation in the camps and along the border.

As I have pointed out on many occasions in this Chamber and next door, Canada believes that it is essential for the Council to receive advice from military experts before taking important decisions on security matters affecting the operations we have dispatched abroad. I would therefore like to support the request made last month by Ambassador van Walsum for a briefing, perhaps by the Force Commander, before any decision is taken with regard to downsizing UNTAET's military component.

I would like very much to thank Ambassador Greenstock for allowing me to switch speaking positions with him, so as to allow me to catch a one

o'clock plane. While I must speak and run, I assure you, Mr. President, that my delegation will follow this debate on the points I have raised this morning closely. I thank you for your flexibility in allowing me to switch.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom): I was delighted to oblige the Canadian Ambassador, and we are very grateful to him for speaking before running.

I too would like to thank the Special Representative for being with us today. We are all delighted to see him in New York, and that was an informative and very thought-provoking briefing. I would like to express my country's warm appreciation for his, and his team's, efforts, because despite the difficulties — and he has talked of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) being the "punching bag" — it is responding impressively to the challenge of building an Administration from the bottom up. They deserve the fullest international support.

When we discussed East Timor in March, I referred to the continuing reports of militia activity as more serious than the problems of increasing criminality. Yet disturbing reports of militia incidents in East and West Timor continue to hit us. Clearly, UNTAET contingents remain at considerable risk, despite the improvements that have been noted. The United Kingdom has urged the Government of Indonesia to get a grip on the situation. That message must go out from the whole Council, and any downsizing of UNTAET must take account of that continuing risk.

We are equally concerned about the refugee situation, and I fully endorse what the Ambassadors of the United States and Canada have said. For all our support for the Government of Indonesia, it has to do more to allow those refugees who still wish to return to East Timor to do so swiftly and speedily. Action has to be taken both to provide pensions for former civil servants wishing to return and to curb the malignant and vicious influence of pro-integration extremists in the refugee camps.

I put those two points first — the militias and the refugees — because they are outside United Nations control, and we have to send a very resounding and collective message on both of them.

What I am going to say now is more within the United Nations capability and needs attention. Last week's East Timor donor conference in Lisbon was an important milestone in the international community's efforts in East Timor. It approved the World Bank and UNTAET Trust Fund work programmes for 2000-2001. It set up specific output measures for implementation of sectoral programmes, UNTAET staffing and the political process over the next six months.

When we discussed East Timor in March, I drew attention to the slow rate of disbursements from the United Nations Trust Fund. Much has been achieved since the Tokyo Conference, six months ago, agreed that simple, flexible, effective and sensitive procedures were needed to maximize the impact of international support for East Timor. But we still do not seem to have achieved the straightforward disbursement we were seeking. UNTAET's efforts to simplify bureaucratic procedures is encouraging. But there are still problems and bottlenecks. All donors have to work to create a comprehensive, coherent development effort rather than a multitude of unconnected bilateral projects. It would help a great deal if UNTAET and the World Bank could set out clear, measurable performance indicators of progress for the coming months and provide regular progress reports.

In the same vein, the UNTAET mission would benefit from an even greater level of autonomy. This would improve efficiency and allow for greater flexibility in the decision-making process. Clarity within the donor community about UNTAET's mandate, both in the field and in New York, and clarity within UNTAET about its own political and financial responsibilities, is also essential. In this continuing search for administrative improvements, we look to the United Nations Development Programme to take the lead in developing capacity-building for the East Timorese public administration, in line with Security Council resolution 1272 (1999).

The United Kingdom welcomes the proposals for sharing power between the East Timorese leaders and UNTAET — what Sergio Vieira de Mello has called "timorization". These proposals will lay the accent on sound governance and open communication, bring the Timorese people closer to the decision-making process and prepare them for assuming democratic government after the elections foreshadowed for the second half of next year. We fully support UNTAET's engagement on East Timorese strategic defence options and on the

status of Falintil. As the Special Representative has indicated, an independent study is set to begin on 7 July on this subject. The United Kingdom will take a detailed view on this once the study is complete. The final decision on security arrangements for an independent East Timor is of course for the East Timorese themselves. In the meantime, we would encourage UNTAET to address Falintil's immediate humanitarian needs.

The United Kingdom pays tribute not just to UNTAET's persistence and fortitude, but also to the East Timorese people, who have shown remarkable patience and understanding in facing these continuing hardships and in suffering conditions that are below the standard of acceptability. The United Kingdom remains committed to helping the people of East Timor at a crucial point in the development of their nation. The international community must continue to do all in its power to bring them comprehensive and coherent support.

Mr. van Walsum (Netherlands): We too would like to thank Mr. Vieira de Mello for his informative briefing, but especially also for everything he and his people are doing in East Timor.

Later in the debate the representative of Portugal will make a statement on behalf of the European Union; it goes without saying that my delegation fully subscribes to that statement. I will therefore raise only a few matters that are not dealt with in the European Union intervention. We subscribe to Mr. Vieira de Mello's positive assessment of the Lisbon conference. It was in Lisbon that Xanana Gusmão observed that participation by the East Timorese was increasing. The Netherlands welcomes that development. We have consistently emphasized that this was essential both as a way to give the East Timorese people a sense of ownership of the reconstruction process and as a necessary ingredient of the preparation for independence.

We are also pleased about the broadening of participation in the National Consultative Council with the inclusion of women, youth representatives and others. It is important to do what we can so that no important group will feel it has been left out. In that respect, Mr. Vieira de Mello mentioned one important group with a strong and acute feeling of frustration; the same group was also referred to at Lisbon by Mr. Gusmão: the Falintil fighters. Mr. Gusmão said that they were living under difficult circumstances and were "almost in a state of revolt". Mr. Vieira de Mello said in his statement that some short-term provisional measures were required to address this problem, but it goes without saying that if the dissatisfaction of the Falintil fighters should ever boil over, we would experience a radical change of scenery in East Timor. It is clear that everything should be done to keep that from happening.

This brings me to the question of a self-defence force for East Timor. We have stated before that the establishment of such a force cannot be the only measure to strengthen the security of East Timor; but it is a necessary one, if only because the United Nations cannot indefinitely provide for East Timor's security. Moreover, it is clear that such a force will be established whether we like it or not. East Timor wants it, and has the right of self-defence under the United Nations Charter. We should not resist this; we should manage it. United Nations involvement will provide the opportunity to ensure that an East Timorese force will conform to the standards of civilian oversight, democratic accountability and international human rights norms and standards.

It would also go a long way towards solving the Falintil issue. Their participation in such a force should be possible. Their background points in the direction of a military career. I would like to point out that, obviously, it is not our idea that we would establish a self-defence force precisely in order to solve the problem of the Falintil; these are two separate problems. But we do not see any reason why it should not be possible to make the solution of one problem coincide with the solution of the other. It is clear that if we manage to absorb the Falintil into a self-defence force it would considerably lessen the risk of some of them taking a different path. And considering that we are dealing with frustrated armed men, anyone can imagine what path I have in mind.

Finally, the security situation: we believe that it still gives rise to concern. The suspension by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of activities in three camps is worrisome. Incidents in Noelbaki, Tua Pukan and Naibonat probably involved militia members. The question is, what are the effects of these incidents on the return of refugees? We would be grateful to have information on that.

Also, the armed attack on a post of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) last week, reportedly with rifles and hand grenades, is a matter for concern. We understand that UNTAET has conducted an investigation, and we are interested in the latest information.

Our question is, what does this mean for UNTAET's analysis of the security situation in East Timor? We agree with what was said by Ambassador Fowler and Ambassador Greenstock, implicitly in reply to Ambassador Holbrooke, when they said that any downsizing of UNTAET's military component must take account of the risks inherent in the West Timor situation. There should be no pressure on UNTAET to downsize its military component on account of the many other crises in the world. There are few instances in the world where the United Nations has assumed such total responsibility for a territory. We should not withdraw prematurely.

Mr. Vieira de Mello described East Timor as a "country at peace". But how safe is East Timor? Because the question may be asked, how safe is West Timor? It cannot be denied that in the vast territory of the Republic of Indonesia there are instances where the authority appear unable to check spontaneous – or less than spontaneous – violence. Ambassador Holbrooke has elaborated enough on this matter, so I will simply state that I agree with everything he has said.

As Ambassador Fowler supported my request, I will now support Ambassador Fowler by stating that the Netherlands expects a serious briefing to the Council on the security situation in East Timor before final decisions on downsizing the military component of UNTAET are taken.

I have one more question, concerning the elections. If the period of August to December 2001 is meant to be the period for elections, I would like to ask Mr. Vieira de Mello if that also means that independence will then immediately have to follow. Let me put it this way: does Mr. Vieira de Mello feel that the elections are the final stage to be followed immediately by independence?

Mr. Hasmy (Malaysia): I wish to thank you, Sir, for organizing this open briefing of the Council on East Timor. We would also like warmly to welcome once again Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello and to thank him for his most enlightening briefing on the situation in East Timor.

My delegation is pleased that, overall, the United Nations operation is working quite well and credit must be given to the leadership of the Special Representative and the dedication of all those serving the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Due credit must also be given to the East Timorese leadership for its commitment to working with the United Nations in the rebuilding of its homeland. It deserves the continuing support of the international community and this Council.

UNTAET has now begun to move beyond the pressing security aspects of the interim stage to the challenges and post-conflict reintegration, reconstruction and development. In this regard, we note the very positive response of the international community to the donor's conference held in Lisbon last week, which surpassed our expectations. We note that the commitments undertaken in Lisbon will be followed up. The Lisbon meeting highlighted the fact that dynamic and interactive cooperation among Member States, the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions can yield positive results. Malaysia commends Portugal for its stewardship of that successful meeting. We believe that the Lisbon meeting marked a turning point in international assistance for East Timor, from providing humanitarian assistance to implementing reconstruction programmes in key sectors, such as education, health and agriculture. On its part, as a neighbour, Malaysia will continue to participate in the various activities of UNTAET and is ready to support East Timor through its technical cooperation programme.

We note that the National Consultative Council has approved a budget of $59.23 million to help rebuild East Timor. We also note with satisfaction that UNTAET and the World Bank have signed a $12.7 million grant to help revamp the East Timorese health sector. This first instalment is part of a three-year project that is expected to have a total budget of $37 million.

We wish to commend Special Representative Vieira de Mello for his decision to accelerate the "Timorization" of the East Timor Administration, under which East Timorese ministers would serve together with United Nations officials in a cabinet expected to begin its work next July. We are pleased that the East Timorese independence leaders Xanana Gusmão and José Ramos-Horta have reacted positively to this proposal. We think this decision is a step in the

right direction and that Security Council resolution 1272 (1999) gives the Secretary-General sufficient latitude to make the necessary changes in East Timor's Administration. With this change, there will be a real partnership between the United Nations and the East Timorese leadership, thereby giving the East Timorese early hands-on experience in administering their country.

My delegation also notes with satisfaction the decision of the Special Representative to expand more than two-fold the size of the National Consultative Council and to make it more Timorese. We believe that this decision represents a positive response by UNTAET to the increasing expectation of the East Timorese leaders that they will have greater involvement in shaping the territory's future in the lead-up to independence.

We are also pleased with the efforts being made by the Special Representative to improve and consolidate relations with East Timor's nearest and most important neighbour: Indonesia. We commend President Abdurrahman Wahid for the prompt and positive steps he has taken towards reconciliation between his country and East Timor, including his important visit to Dili and the ongoing contacts between his Government and UNTAET. We look forward to even closer and more concrete cooperation between Indonesia and the United Nations, especially in respect of the activities of the militias.

We regret the slow pace of the return of refugees from West Timor. We urge the militias to put the past behind them, to work towards national reconciliation and to facilitate the return of up to 100,000 refugees from West Timor. We recognize that, in the context of the recent past, this will be a difficult undertaking, but the future of East Timor can be guaranteed only by the prospect of early reconciliation between the two sides, thereby enabling all East Timorese to participate fully in the political, economic and social life of the country upon independence. In this regard, we welcome the establishment of the National Reconciliation Council.

We think that the dissemination of information has an important role to play, especially in countering the misinformation and active propaganda that are circulating in the refugee camps. Like others, we believe that measures to promote the repatriation of refugees need to be intensified, including more border reunion meetings between families. We also hope that there will be an amicable resolution with the Indonesian authorities on the question of pensions for former civil servants in the Indonesian administration who are no living in West Timorese camps. We believe that the early resolution of this issue will expedite the return of the refugees to East Timor.

Finally, we believe that practical measures have to be worked out to open a corridor between East Timor and the Oecussi enclave in West Timor. We take note of the recent proposal by the Indonesian Foreign Minister relocate up to 10,000 pro-Indonesian militia members and their families to about 20 kilometres from the border in an attempt to ease tensions. We wish to know whether there has been progress in this area.

We deplore the attack that occurred last Wednesday, presumably by the pro-integration militias, in which grenades were thrown at an Australian-manned military post north of Maliana. We are equally perturbed at the extremely worrisome security incidents that occurred on 16 and 17 June, all pointing to a pattern of increased tensions, which prompted humanitarian agencies to halt their work in Noelbaki and nearby Tua Pukan and Naibonat camps near Kupang.

Malaysia also condemns the ransacking of an East Timor support organization in Jakarta in late May as a brutal and cowardly act which runs counter to the efforts towards the normalization of relations between Indonesia and East Timor. This is a sign of frustration on the part of the militias, which have been denied their aim of conducting acts of violence against the emerging leadership in East Timor during the transition. We are confident that UNTAET and the local authorities are capable of dealing with the incident appropriately.

My delegation acknowledges that there are many remaining challenges for East Timor, but that remarkable progress has been achieved in so short a period. While the process is a gradual one, as it should be, the progression towards independence, which is well in sight, has been sure and steady under the tutelage of the United Nations and with the continuing support of the international community.

On the question of the timing of independence for East Timor, Malaysia supports the early granting of independence, but at a date and time when the East Timorese are ready and able to assume responsibility for governing themselves.

Mr. Shen Guofang (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Like other delegations, the Chinese delegation would like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, for his detailed and informative briefing. We appreciate the enormous work done by Mr. Vieira de Mello and his team in extremely conditions.

Although there continue to be occasional violent incidents, we are pleased to note that, since Mr. Vieira de Mello last came to brief the Council, UNTAET has made notable progress in the reconstruction of housing and infrastructure, the maintenance of law and order, the promotion of human rights, the drafting of legislation and the creation of local job opportunities and training programmes. We are also pleased to note that Mr. Vieira de Mello has maintained good and cooperative relations with the Indonesian Government and the parties in East Timor.

We welcome the positive results of the Lisbon donor conference. We believe that they will provide sufficient resources for the reconstruction in East Timor and lay a solid financial basis for East Timor to make its transition to independence.

China supports the work of UNTAET and is ready to continue to contribute civilian police and experts. Within our capabilities, we will continue to provide assistance to East Timor through bilateral channels.

We are concerned about the problem of the refugees remaining in West Timor, and we hope that UNTAET will resolve this problem as soon as possible, through continued consultation with the Government of Indonesia.

China is also very concerned about the security status of the minorities in East Timor, and we hope that UNTAET will continue its work to encourage harmonious relations among all the ethnic groups.

The people of East Timor have attach hopes to the United Nations. At the same time, the United Nations still faces arduous tasks in the country and should carry them out with a sense of urgency. In our view, what is important is the principle of putting the interest of the East Timorese above all else.

We fully support the work of the National Consultative Council. It is a very good way to encourage local participation. We endorse UNTAET's intention to take further steps to achieve greater and more effective local participation in the work of this transitional period, especially the decision-making process, so that the East Timorese can stand on their own as soon as possible.

Mr. Theron (Namibia): I wish to join other delegations in thanking Special Representative Vieira de Mello for his interesting and comprehensive briefing on the situation in East Timor and the work of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). I also want at the outset to commend Mr. Vieira de Mello and his staff for the skill and dedication with which they are performing their work. The notable progress and successes of UNTAET are testimony of this.

Today's briefing, in our assessment, has shown that, despite obstacles, considerable progress has been achieved in East Timor. This progress began with the relief efforts last year after the large-scale destruction of the territory and led to where we are today, with solid plans for major reconstruction and development programmes. It has to be admitted, though, that serious challenges remain for the implementation of the reconstruction programmes. We have noted and support Mr. Vieira de Mello's proposals on how to address these challenges.

However, with the excellent support pledged at the donor conference hosted by the Government of Portugal last week, as well as the endorsement of the work programme for the territory's development, my delegation is confident that these programmes will be implemented in a successful and timely fashion. My delegation is particularly gratified to learn today that many of the earlier obstacles that hampered rehabilitation work — such as the slow disbursement of funds — are being overcome.

In rebuilding societies and nations it is always important that the groundwork be properly laid. East Timor is certainly on the right track, and we welcome the continuing efforts to achieve reconciliation and nation-building. In this regard, we strongly support the establishment of a national reconciliation commission. We also support the work of the National Consultative Council in its work to bring East Timorese together.

Also of great significance to my delegation was the recent convening in Dili of the first congress on women's issues. It was a commendable early start to women's efforts to ensure that their views are fully taken into consideration during the development of the territory.

While welcoming the overall stability in the security situation, my delegation deplores the recent attacks on peacekeeping forces. We furthermore share the concerns expressed by other delegations about the assaults on personnel of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which resulted in the withdrawal of personnel from three major refugee camps in the Kupang area. We trust that concrete steps will be taken to ensure the safety and security of relief workers. My delegation also remains concerned about the reports of continuing militia activities in the refugee camps in West Timor.

With regard to the return of refugees, my delegation has noted that repatriation continues, although the rate of return has slowed over the past two months. We agree with Mr. Vieira de Mello that Indonesia should be assisted by the international community in resettling refugees that wish to remain in West Timor. On this point, I wonder if it is possible for Mr. Vieira de Mello at this stage to tell us with what degree of certainty we can determine the number of refugees that may wish to stay in West Timor.

Finally, my delegation again wishes to reiterate its support and encouragement for Mr. Vieira de Mello and all the staff of UNTAET in their difficult work ahead.

Mr. Ahmed (Bangladesh): Let me begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for scheduling this open debate on East Timor. We are grateful to the Special Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello, whom we heartily welcome in our midst, for the comprehensive and informative briefing on the latest developments in East Timor.

After his last appearance here, in early February, it was indeed time we heard from Mr. Vieira de Mello. We greatly appreciate the commendable efforts that the Special Representative and his team in the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) are making in East Timor. It is no mean achievement that initial obstacles delaying the rehabilitation work have been overcome.

The situation in East Timor presents us with a range of issues that are germane to a nation in the making. Some of the issues were born out of the violence and destruction that marked the initial phase after the landmark referendum last year.

We refer here to the issues of security, the repatriation of refugees, the financial situation, poverty and unemployment, health and education, investigation of human rights violations, reconstruction of infrastructure and restoration of civil and judicial administration. This list, however, is not exhaustive.

On earlier occasions we raised some of these issues and took note of the progress thus far made. Today we heard Mr. Vieira de Mello update us on some of these aspects. We would nevertheless like to make a few points.

Since early May we have noticed a drag on the process of repatriation. There appears to be some difficulty in determining the number of refugees in the camps in West Timor. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was to have conducted a registration, which would have given a clear idea of the number of refugees. We are also concerned at the reports of intimidation of the refugees, with the ulterior objective of dissuading them from returning. On the other hand, there is also the issue of the emotions that are prevalent among the population of East Timor regarding the returnees.

All these issues adversely affect the repatriation process. We therefore remain concerned at the sluggish repatriation of refugees and urge all concerned to redouble their efforts to achieve a speedy solution.

We note with appreciation the encouraging results of the various income generation projects. We commend the contribution of the Quick Impact Projects and the transitional employment projects to the improvement of the unemployment and poverty situation. But all of these are short- to medium-term issues. For a long-term perspective, issues of investment and trade need to be addressed. Small enterprise and private business are keys to substantial progress in this area. We urge the investment promotion unit of UNTAET to take a more innovative approach to addressing the situation.

We have all along emphasized the need to focus on the role of women in peace and development in East Timor. We commend the organizers of the first National Women's Congress, held recently in Dili, and hope that the overarching theme of equitable development and national reconstruction will provide the opportunity for future discourse on women's role in education, health, development and reconciliation. We

hope the outcome will be regularly and systematically followed up at appropriate stages.

We are heartened by the increasing cooperation between UNTAET and the Indonesian authorities in various areas of activity in times of peace as well as in times of distress. The floods that devastated West Timor last month were one such occasion. UNTAET played a timely and brave role, which we deeply appreciate.

The ongoing cooperation with respect to judicial issues, investigation of human rights violations, cultural artifacts, archives, pension assets and border issues augurs well for the future of cooperation and cohabitation between the territory and its next-door neighbour.

This brings us to an issue which I believe is of profound concern to everyone. It pertains to the protection and security of the ethnic minority in East Timor. Notwithstanding the efforts that the East Timor leadership and UNTAET have made, we have seen disturbing evidence of a clear rise in intolerance for the ethnic minorities. There are reports also of religious intolerance, which manifested in some recent incidents. These are disquieting signs that must be taken very seriously.

We strongly urge the East Timorese leadership and UNTAET officials to investigate thoroughly every such incident and take the necessary measures to prevent their recurrence. We welcome the efforts to develop the national reconciliation commission, which we believe is an important step.

The international community in turn has to support all of these ongoing efforts in East Timor. We are very encouraged by the result of the two-day donor meeting held in Lisbon, which is a manifestation of the trust and confidence of the international community in the work done so far in East Timor. We believe this confidence was critically important for UNTAET and the East Timorese population. We would urge that in the coming months the policy of imparting to the East Timorese people a sense of ownership of development efforts be given more visibility.

Mr. Sergeev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We are grateful to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Vieira de Mello, for his briefing, which has given us a clear idea of the difficult and large-scale work which is being carried out by the mission he heads, and for the in-depth analysis he has just given us of what has to be done in future.

The dynamics on the island are positive, although the situation is not without problems. In his statement, Mr. Vieira de Mello gave us a clear idea of the challenges faced by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

We are pleased with reports that contacts between UNTAET and Indonesia continue to be strengthened, as this promotes the overall trend towards stabilization on the island. Positive examples of cooperation in various areas include Indonesia's agreement to grant 162 scholarships to East Timorese students and also to enable students who earlier had been forced to interrupt their studies in Indonesian educational institutions to complete their education.

Also important is the agreement with the Office of the Indonesian Attorney-General to go forward with inquiries on the five most infamous crimes committed in East Timor in the fall of 1999, presumably by the Indonesian military.

All of these are positive indicators. However, we remain concerned at the fact that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was forced to take a decision to put an end to its activities in the three largest refugee camps in West Timor in response to hostile actions committed by opponents of East Timorese independence. We believe that the local authorities should take all of the necessary measures to prevent a repetition of such incidents in future. This would help to resolve the refugee problem, which in turn would be in keeping with the interests of both Indonesia and East Timor.

Needless to say, one of UNTAET's major areas of activity remains the promotion of national reconciliation in East Timor. We believe that the steps taken to that end, including the establishment of a dialogue with integrationist political figures and the agreement on a new structure for the National Consultative Council, should be commended and supported by the Security Council. Naturally, we believe this to be to the credit of the head of UNTAET, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Vieira de Mello.

M. Durrant (Jamaica): My delegation joins previous speakers in welcoming the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Sergio

Vieira de Mello, and in thanking him for his usual lucid briefing and his frank yet optimistic assessment of the situation in East Timor and on the mission of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in his presentation, addressed the central objectives that must be achieved by UNTAET in the process leading up to independence, in relation in particular to the security situation, refugees, the humanitarian situation, the judicial situation, reconstruction, the establishment of an East Timorese administration and a political transition.

As my delegation has emphasized in previous briefings, the participation of the East Timorese in creating and building institutions of governance and public administration is of fundamental importance if they are to have a sense of ownership of the process leading up to independence.

We are therefore heartened by UNTAET's decision to respond to the East Timorese by sharing governmental responsibility and having East Timorese political figures given political responsibility for their decisions.

We also agree with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General that the process of co-government is in keeping with resolution 1272 (1999), which mandates UNTAET to support capacity-building for self-government. The expansion of the National Consultative Council from 15 to 33 members, with wide representation from throughout the territory and from a wide range of civil society, is an important development. Arrangements for the East Timorese to participate in planning, prioritizing and approval of development proposals and projects is an important part of this capacity-building.

There have been other positive developments which my delegation applauds. These include the conference on reconstruction held at the end of May and the focus on health, education, infrastructure, community empowerment, agriculture and education, as these will provide the foundation for future sustainable development in East Timor.

The grant of $12.7 million from the World Bank to rehabilitate hospitals and clinics should lay the foundation for an efficient health system. The recent donor meeting in Lisbon is also another welcome development, and my delegation notes the positive response of the donor community. We hope that these commitments will be followed by the early disbursement of funds for reconstruction and rehabilitation.

One area of concern to my delegation continues to be the unemployment situation. Although we recognize that efforts have been made to create short-term employment, we believe that long-term solutions must be found by involving job creation through the development of private enterprises, and we would wish to ascertain from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General the actions taken by UNTAET in this regard.

My delegation's optimism is tempered by the recent reports relating to the status of refugees and to the actions of the militias. We are deeply disturbed by the news that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has had to suspend operations to repatriate East Timorese from three camps in West Timor because of security concerns, and we believe that security guarantees must be provided to allow the UNHCR staff to continue their work unhindered. Equally, my delegation regards as unacceptable the reported attacks by suspected militias on United Nations peacekeepers. The sporadic incidents of violence, particularly along the border between East Timor and West Timor, continue to be of concern. We have noted the cooperation that has been developed between UNTAET and the Government of Indonesia, and we hope that these issues relating to the activities of the militias and to the status of refugees will be addressed with a sense of urgency.

The status of minorities is also of concern to my delegation, and in this regard the establishment of a national reconciliation council could act as an important catalyst.

In conclusion, my delegation wishes to commend the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the men and women of UNTAET for their dedicated and dynamic service, which has seen the transformation of East Timor over the past 10 months. We also commend the people of East Timor and their leaders and wish to assure them of our continued support as they move towards independence. The East Timorese have high expectations of the international community and of the United Nations. We must not let them down.

Mr. Krokhmal (Ukraine): I would like to join previous speakers in thanking Mr. Vieira de Mello for his comprehensive briefing, which provided us with a clear and objective picture of the situation in East Timor and of the activities of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

Let me begin by focusing on the matter of involving East Timorese in the reconstruction and administration of the territory. My delegation fully supports UNTAET's activities in this respect, which are very important. UNTAET has made significant progress in establishing key elements of the civil administration. It is clear that the active involvement of the East Timorese in local governance is essential for the transition of East Timor to independence. It should remain among the main priority tasks of UNTAET. We think that the National Consultative Council, through which the East Timorese participate in the decision-making process, should play a very important role in this field. We note with satisfaction that UNTAET and the National Council of Timorese Resistance have agreed on a new composition and structure of the National Consultative Council. This will certainly help to improve the activities of the main decision-making body in East Timor and will enhance its transparency.

Despite the fact that the general security situation has been improved, a number of serious incidents, including those taking place across the border, have been reported from East Timor. We are pleased to note that the deployment of the main part of UNTAET's civilian police component has been completed and we would also like to underline the fact that the civilian police have contributed enormously to ensuring relative security in East Timor as well as to developing the police force. Ukraine will continue its support for the efforts of UNTAET's civilian police aimed at fulfilling the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council.

We believe that the question of refugees is central to the reconciliation process. The safe return of refugees from West Timor to East Timor remains one of the main problems faced by UNTAET. We continue to be concerned about conditions for the refugees in the camps in West Timor and about the decreasing number of returnees.

Turning to economic matters, poverty and unemployment are posing serious threats to internal stability in East Timor. The prompt implementation of various employment-generating projects and programmes, as well as reconstruction of the local economic and financial sectors, are of critical importance in terms of regaining normality in East Timor. We would like to underline the need for improved coordination among UNTAET, the World Bank and all the agencies involved in the field of the practical implementation of the reconstruction projects and programmes.

My delegation also welcomes the East Timor donor's meeting in Lisbon, and we are encouraged by the conclusion of grant agreements between the World Bank and UNTAET in the educational and agricultural sectors.

In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to the efforts made by Mr. Vieira de Mello and his team, especially in the current circumstances in which they are carrying out their tasks.

Mr. Cappagli (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): I should like first of all to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, for the complete and useful information he has given us. I also want to thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this important meeting. My delegation has always emphasized the value of having as many open meetings of the Security Council as possible, in which all the Members of the Organization, and not just the members of the Council, can participate and exchange views about a given issue.

More than eight months have gone by since the Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and it is therefore timely to observe what has been achieved so far and to assess the main challenges that the future holds.

From the standpoint of what has already been accomplished, the magnitude of UNTAET's task is worthy of note. Humanitarian assistance initiatives were able to prevent the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, which might have occurred as a result of the wave of violence of 1999 or the natural disasters that have taken place since then. Furthermore, action in this field has also made it possible for more than 164,000 people to return to the territory and to their homes. Likewise, we must praise the initiatives of the United Nations in establishing political and social institutions that will serve as a basis for the future independent state. It is particularly positive that the

East Timorese leaders represented in the National Consultative Council have always been consulted and that their views have been taken into account in the establishment of those institutions.

From the standpoint of future challenges, the task of the United Nations is equally daunting. First of all, in the hope that we have already seen the worst of the humanitarian crisis, we must adopt an approach that focuses more on economic and social development than on emergency assistance. Likewise, we must continue with the task of consolidating the institutions that have already been created and adapt them to the new realities. Bearing this in mind, the donor conference recently held in Lisbon demonstrated that the commitment of the international community to East Timor remains intact. We believe this will make it possible to continue reconstruction efforts in such key sectors as health, education, basic infrastructure, community development and agriculture. The World Bank projects in this connection are extremely useful.

In a different context, the initiative of East Timorese leaders to provide a new structure and functions for the National Consultative Council is of vital importance, since that body will make it possible for the local population to increasingly assume responsibilities in preparation for independent life.

All of this does not mean that there are no longer humanitarian questions that require attention. First and perhaps most urgent among those questions is the need to put an end to the suffering of the thousands of refugees still in West Timor. Doing this will require the cooperation of all the parties concerned. In this regard, I wish to point out that my delegation is deeply concerned at the gravity of the current situation, particularly in the three camps where the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has had to suspend its activities. On the other hand, I would like to express the confidence of my delegation that the Indonesian authorities will continue to display a constructive approach that will make it possible to overcome the current impasse.

Security conditions in the border areas and in the interior of the territory have also proved to be precarious. There is also a need for the cooperation of all the parties in order to improve the situation in this regard. In connection with these issues — while we appreciate the readiness of the Indonesian authorities and the efforts they have made thus far — we call for a continued fulfilment of the commitments that have been undertaken.

In conclusion, allow me to associate myself with the remarks of speakers who preceded me regarding the excellent work being done by Mr. Vieira de Mello and the rest of the personnel of UNTAET. I wish to convey the gratitude of the Government of Argentina to Mr. Vieira de Mello and the UNTAET staff for their tireless efforts, courage and dedication.

Mr. Jerandi (Tunisia) (*spoke in French*): We join other members of the Security Council in thanking Mr. Vieira de Mello for his comprehensive and clear statement on the development of the situation in East Timor since his last visit, on 2 February. We are pleased to note that, thanks to the efforts of Mr. Vieira de Mello and his team, the situation on the ground since the last meeting has greatly evolved in a positive direction. Their efforts deserve to be acknowledged here.

The concrete results achieved, and the strengthening of relations between the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the Indonesian Government, on the one hand, and among the Timorese themselves, on the other, is but further proof of the favourable overall climate prevailing on the ground.

Attacks against United Nations personnel and sites continue, a factor that disrupts UNTAET's efforts to guarantee stability and re-establish confidence among all the parties.

We have emphasized on many occasions the important role of humanitarian organizations in East Timor. We have also called for their capacity to be strengthened and for them to be assured of favourable conditions to carry out their duties. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organizations have suspended their activities in three East Timorese refugee camps.

It must be recognized that Mr. Vieira de Mello's efforts, and the determination of the Government of Indonesia to cooperate with UNTAET, continue to be consolidated. The visit of the Governor of West Timor to East Timor and Mr. Vieira de Mello's talks with the Indonesian President in Jakarta are evidence of the goodwill of the parties to speed up the return of refugees to East Timor. In this connection, we are

gratified by the decision taken by UNTAET in cooperation with the Government of West Timor and the Consultative Council of East Timor to begin a new repatriation operation for the 120,000 refugees still in camps in West Timor.

The donors' conference held in Lisbon last week was a very important event for the East Timorese. In this context, we welcome the international community's financial support for East Timor, which has once again been renewed and strengthens the political support that has already been extended. We believe this support can be a catalyst for all the parties in East Timor to begin a new phase that will lead to the establishment of a Timorese administration and ensure lasting development for that country.

Finally, it is our hope that the forthcoming talks to be held on 28 and 29 June between UNTAET and the Indonesian Government will make it possible for the two parties to find solutions to various outstanding issues and consolidate the results that have been achieved.

Mr. Keita (Mali) (*spoke in French*): I would first like to say how greatly I appreciate the holding of this briefing on East Timor. Like other delegations, I would like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for his very exhaustive briefing and to assure him of my delegation's support for his efforts on behalf of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

The progress achieved in East Timor is a source of satisfaction and motivation for the entire international community. This was far from certain a few months ago because of the daily changes in the situation, and in large part it has been due to the great skill and positive action of the Special Representative. Life is re-emerging from the ruins. Public services are increasingly opening their doors to Timorese. The reopening of schools and health centres, reconstruction, the collection of taxes, economic recovery and the return of refugees are also positive developments under way.

In spite of this generally positive overview, some issues remain sources of concern. Economically speaking, the establishment of microcredit systems, the increase in the number of businesses and the collection of taxes and customs duties are encouraging developments. The contributions announced at the end of the Lisbon donors' conference and the commitment of international financial institutions will undoubtedly make it possible to begin projects and to integrate the economy of East Timor into the international economic network. That economic recovery will make it possible to increase stability and security in the country.

With regard to refugee returns, my delegation would like to see further developments in the gradual neutralization of militia activities on the borders and in the camps. We also encourage Indonesia to strengthen its presence on the border as part of the implementation of the agreement of 11 April and to become involved with humanitarian organizations and UNTAET to enable the definitive return of all those who wish to return to East Timor.

Attacks on the camps of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in West Timor are a source of concern for us. We condemn those attacks and believe that UNHCR should have all the necessary support to achieve its objectives.

My delegation also welcomes the gradual establishment of a climate of security in East Timor and firmly condemns attacks against various posts. We also ask that UNTAET continue its training of local police so as to deal with persistent criminality and to maintain public order so that the Timorese are better prepared for independence. Attacks against these posts in many ways illustrate the challenges that must still be overcome.

On the political front, my delegation welcomes the intensification of political activity in East Timor. UNTAET has achieved notable progress in the establishment of a United Nations civil administration. It should now see to it that the participation of the East Timorese people in the elections scheduled for next year takes place actively, calmly, transparently and democratically.

The briefing given to us by the Special Representative enables us to observe that the remaining challenges are still enormous, despite the considerable progress we have achieved. It is therefore up to us to provide the necessary support so that the people of East Timor can gradually come to terms with one another in the near future.

The President (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a brief statement in my capacity as representative of France. I shall limit myself to just a few comments.

In the course of our discussion, the representative of Portugal will in the course of our discussion, make a statement on behalf of the European Union, to which my delegation subscribes fully.

My comments will bear on three points. Firstly, I would like to recall France's extremely positive assessment of the considerable work carried out by Mr. Vieira de Mello and his team in East Timor since the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Thanks to the United Nations, the situation in East Timor is now stable; progress has been made in the building of the Timorese administration; the national reconciliation process has begun. France unreservedly supports the continuation of these activities.

In this otherwise positive context, the main cause for concern, which is not directly linked to UNTAET activities, is the refugee populations in West Timor. We must allow those who wish to return to East Timor to do so in full freedom. For that reason, it is vital that the Indonesian authorities put an end, as they have committed themselves to do so, to militia activity and perhaps make it possible for those who do not wish to return to East Timor to be able to settle in other parts of Indonesia.

Secondly, I wish to point out how important it is to involve the Timorese as much as possible in the ongoing transition process. Steps have already been taken to this end, including the establishment of a National Consultative Committee. Now we must go even further. We welcome the fact that Mr. Vieira de Mello has been able to continue negotiations with all Timorese political leaders so as to establish in the near future an exemplary transition towards a normal system of government. The establishment of a coalition Government and of a genuine legislative body, as well as the organization of elections before the end of next year, will be milestones in that transition.

In that context, Mr. Vieira de Mello could perhaps inform us, having had consultations with Timorese political officials, of the choice of a target date for independence. Like others, I wish to emphasize that independence will in no way mean the end of the United Nations family's presence in Timor. It will mean that this will be maintained in other forms. In this spirit, we welcome the initial reduction of personnel in UNTAET, confirmed by Mr. Vieira de Mello. We believe the calming of the local situation allows a substantial and gradual reduction of military personnel by the end of the year, and then in the first half of the year 2001 — without, of course, jeopardizing the security arrangements on the border.

We believe the speedy training and the strengthening of an effective and competent local police force is a matter of priority in order to ensure a smooth transition. UNTAET's abrupt departure at the end of its mandate could be a major destabilizing factor for the newly independent country. We must plan and organize a downsizing of the force over time.

The third and last point, but not the least one, is to ensure that East Timor, by the end of the current transition process, can be a viable State, capable, *inter alia*, of achieving self-sufficiency in agriculture and of developing a number of exports, such as coffee and oil. In this regard, I would like to ask Mr. Vieira de Mello about the state of discussions under way between UNTAET and Australia on the treaty on the Timor Gap.

I would also like to ask him about assistance measures to develop the private sector. Does he believe that these measures are adequate? Has specific financing for small and medium-sized enterprises and industries been set up by the major development banks, in particular the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank?

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

The next speaker on my list is the Permanent Representative of Japan. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Satoh (Japan): Eight months have passed since the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established. We welcome the progress made throughout East Timor during that time, thanks in no small measure to the dedicated efforts of the UNTAET staff under the able leadership of Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, who was mandated with the enormous task of rehabilitating and reconstructing East Timor virtually from scratch.

This is not to say, however, that the problems confronting East Timor have been resolved. Indeed, UNTAET's continuing role in guiding East Timor on its path to independence will not be an easy one. Continuous efforts are needed on various fronts, including national reconciliation and the creation of

employment. The fate of East Timorese refugees in West Timor, too, still remains a matter of great concern. In that regard, we commend and support the efforts made by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

As we reiterated at the second donor's conference, held in Lisbon last week, Japan remains determined to extend assistance to the best of its ability to UNTAET and to the people of East Timor, and hopes that the international community will likewise continue to provide support to them.

I would like to add in this context that today's meeting is extremely important as a means of maintaining international interest in East Timor. I therefore pay tribute to you, Mr. President, for inviting non-Council members to present their views.

Japan, for its part, is also striving to ensure that East Timor remains on the international agenda. In December of last year, for example, Japan hosted the first international donors' meeting, and our Foreign Minister, Mr. Yohei Kono, who visited Dili in April, intends to take up the subject of East Timor at the G-8 Foreign Ministers meeting to be held in Japan in July.

Today I would like to comment on a number of points to which Japan attaches particular importance as East Timor continues its nation-building efforts.

First, it is essential that East Timor build a relationship of friendship and cooperation with interested countries, including its neighbours, in order to lay the ground for its future independence and prosperity. In the belief that East Timor's reconstruction and development efforts could benefit from the active involvement of countries in the region, the Foreign Ministers of Japan and of Singapore recently agreed to collaborate in providing assistance for human resources development in East Timor. We also believe that it would be worthwhile for East Timor to engage in dialogue with its neighbouring countries, including the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), on regional cooperation.

Secondly, it is important for UNTAET to improve its public information efforts among the East Timorese population. It is reported that in the face of massive unemployment and the slow pace of economic development, the people of East Timor are feeling increasingly frustrated. Because that frustration is sometimes expressed in the form of criticism of UNTAET, greater efforts are necessary, particularly at the grass-roots level, to help the people correctly understand the nature and the limits of the role which the United Nations can play.

In an effort to bridge that communication gap, the Japanese Government recently provided funding to UNTAET to cover the cost of distributing 8,500 radio sets among the local population.

At the same time, the people of East Timor must recognize that the nation-building process depends much on their own self-help efforts. It is up to the United Nations and the international community to foster a culture of self-help by involving the local population directly in their country's nation-building efforts, with the goal of eventually turning over the process to the East Timorese. In this regard, we support UNTAET's policy to seek greater participation by the local population in the administration and in the decision-making process.

As we all know, nation-building is a painstakingly slow and long process, and will have to continue long after East Timor becomes independent. I would therefore like to caution against setting the benchmarks for the attainment of independence unrealistically high. We must not harbour the illusion that all of East Timor's problems will be resolved during UNTAET's time there.

On the other hand, it goes without saying that donor countries are likewise expected to continue their efforts. In this respect, we welcome the reaffirmation of pledges made by donors at the second donor's conference, held in Lisbon last week. We also welcome the commitment demonstrated by the donors at the conference to the timely disbursement of their pledges. I would also like to stress that it is very important for donors to give priority to those projects that address the immediate needs of the East Timorese and that may be expected to show quick results. Needless to say, the restructuring of UNTAET which is now being considered will have to focus on strengthening UNTAET's aid-coordination function in order to avoid duplication and to ensure that the assistance extended by donors is put to the best possible use.

Finally, we must not forget the security requirements in East Timor. Unless its security is constantly maintained, efforts for the nation-building of East Timor cannot proceed smoothly. Fundamental to ensuring East Timor's security is, indeed, national

reconciliation, and further efforts towards that end are essential. We were relieved that incidents by former pro-integration militia members in the border areas decreased, thanks to efforts by the Indonesian Government, but certain more recent incidents near the border raise some concern. We hope that the Indonesian Government will continue its efforts to eliminate the security threats posed by these elements.

As East Timor proceeds towards independence, the local population, donor countries and agencies, as well as the United Nations and UNTAET, all have essential roles to play. The Government of Japan, for its part, will continue to cooperate to the best of its ability.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker is the Permanent Representative of Portugal. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Monteiro (Portugal) (*spoke in French*): Permit me at the outset, Mr. President, to say how grateful I am to you and to the other members of the Security Council for having convened this public debate, making it possible for all Members of the United Nations to hear a very important briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

(*spoke in English*)

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union — Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia — and the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the European Free Trade Association country member of the European Economic Area Iceland, align themselves with this statement.

On behalf of the European Union, I would like to welcome Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello and to thank him for the briefing he delivered today. We are grateful for the positive work done so far by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his team and for their determination to implement the mandate of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

As reiterated this month by the Council of Ministers of the European Union, the European Union reaffirms its policy of solidarity with the people of East Timor and its support for UNTAET in its effort to meet one of the greatest challenges facing the United Nations: leading East Timor towards independence.

Eight months ago, the Security Council established UNTAET with the responsibility for the administration of a territory that had been vastly devastated by those unwilling to accept the results of the popular consultation. The mandate embraces a number of tasks: security and maintenance of law and order, the development of civil and social services, humanitarian assistance, support of capacity-building for self-government, rehabilitation and development assistance, among other areas of responsibility. In fact, the scale of this challenge should not be underestimated, in particular given the legitimately high expectations the East Timorese have about their future; their future depends greatly upon the United Nations.

Therefore, the support and assistance of the international community for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the territory will be essential. UNTAET needs funding to be effective. It also needs to manage carefully the resources that have already been allocated. The European Union stresses the urgent need for pledges made at the December 1999 donors conference in Tokyo to be delivered and disbursed quickly, and considers that the donor community should give full support to the East Timor consolidated budget for the fiscal year 2000-2001. We urge the Secretariat and UNTAET swiftly to take concrete steps to overcome any barriers to disbursement.

Bureaucracy should not be allowed to become a major obstacle to getting things done in the field. The European Union stresses the need to reinforce coordination efforts within the United Nations system, with UNTAET, with the World Bank and also with non-governmental organizations working in the field.

The European Union reiterates its commitment to assistance to the territory's reconstruction process. The European Union is contributing through its financing proposal of 39 million euros — 19 million euros in 2000 and 20 million in 2001 — with a total contribution of 60 million euros envisaged over the next three years. These funds are intended to support the programme for rehabilitation and reconstruction in East Timor, through the trust fund set up by the World Bank. Overall, European Union aid amounts to 162 million euros already paid. That figure does not include

the significant contribution that European Union member States are providing on a national basis to the existing trust funds and through other mechanisms.

In this first phase of the transitional administration, East Timor has faced serious obstacles: the total lack of infrastructure as a result of the massive destruction, extremely high levels of unemployment; the continuing crisis of the refugees, and the threatening militia incursions from West Timor. Despite many improvements, there are still reasons to be concerned.

The situation of the tens of thousands of East Timorese refugees in West Timor needs an urgent solution. The European Union commends the efforts being made by UNTAET, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations working in the field in this regard.

The initiatives of the East Timorese leadership, particularly through Xanana Gusmão, in supporting assessment visits to East Timor in a spirit of reconciliation, and those of the Church — namely, the recent visit of Bishop Basílio do Nascimento to West Timor — are welcome. The overwhelming reception in all the refugee camps visited by Bishop Nascimento has made clear the desire of thousands of East Timorese to return to their own country.

The European Union understands that, after continuous harassment of its personnel, UNHCR has decided to suspend its humanitarian work in three camps located in the area of Kupang, housing more than 24,000 East Timorese refugees. Once again, this clearly shows the pressing need for decisive measures. The unacceptable campaign of misinformation and intimidation in refugee camps where militias continue to hold influence must come to an end.

The European Union urges Indonesia to make good its commitment to assist those who want to return. We welcome the assurances given by the Indonesian authorities to the international community. To that end, we consider of the utmost importance the immediate removal from the refugee camps of the military and the militia, the isolation of all militia leadership and assurances that those who obstruct repatriation operations will be held accountable. The response regarding the pensions issue is also a major element to be considered as part of the overall solution of the refugee problem.

For those Timorese who would like to stay in Indonesia and become Indonesian citizens, the European Union stresses the importance of a balanced and responsible resettlement programme. We believe that any attempt to resettle those who decide to stay in Indonesia near the border of East Timor can pose serious threats and could become an unnecessary source of conflict in the near future. These matters were discussed in constructive meetings early this month in Jakarta between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Mr. Jaime Gama, in his capacity as President-in-Office of the Council of the European Union, and the Indonesia President, Mr. Abdurrahman Wahid, its Foreign Minister, Mr. Shihab, and the Attorney-General of Indonesia. The European Union welcomes the cooperation that has been shown by Indonesian high-level authorities and hopes that it will continue.

The efforts being made by the Indonesian Attorney-General concerning the investigation of human rights violations in East Timor, as well as the spirit of cooperation with UNTAET under the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the United Nations transitional authority, are highly appreciated by the European Union, but the investigation process and the bringing to account of all those involved in the atrocities that followed the popular consultation must not be delayed. In this context, the European Union also encourages the Indonesian judicial authorities to continue their cooperation with the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The efforts to accelerate the "Timorization" of the Transitional Administration are strongly supported by the European Union. It is essential to involve the East Timorese in a broad representative manner, including women and youth, in the policy-making and administrative structure at a higher-level during the transition period.

It is legitimate, as Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello has said, that the East Timorese should seek gradually to acquire ownership of their future independent country. In this context, we urge UNTAET to improve its policy of information and transparency with a view to involving all sectors of the population in the construction of their future independent State in order to avoid undesirable misunderstandings between the transitional authority and the local population. The European Union encourages UNTAET to accelerate the training process of the East Timorese civilian police in

order to guarantee a gradual increase in local ownership in the area of security that would enable the reduction of UNTAET's military component.

The European Union takes note of the decision announced here today by the Secretary-General's Special Representative to establish benchmarks for the Transitional Administration to achieve before transferring power to the East Timorese. As we stated at the donor's conference in Lisbon, the European Union considers that certain objectives should be attained before independence and that a roadmap should be defined in such areas as the pace of reconstruction, the setting-up of mechanisms that are indispensable for the management of a modern and democratic State, the evolution of the political process and the safeguarding and security of the borders.

Considering the need for a swift transition, we also deem it convenient that, at an appropriate moment and after consultations with the parties concerned, a tentative date for the independence of East Timor should be fixed. Therefore, we fully support the indicative period announced here today by Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello.

There is now a more stable situation in East Timor. Conditions are in place for East Timorese to pursue a strong and true national reconciliation process that will enhance the rehabilitation of East Timor. It is also vital that the international community continue to show its commitment to supporting East Timor's recovery and development. The European Union believes that the transitional period is entering a crucial phase. The United Nations mission, together with the East Timorese, must play a critical role in the development of a new democratic State, in which the rule of law will be one of its main foundations, as well as in the creation of an independent State fully integrated into its region and in peace with all its neighbours.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker on my list is the representative of Indonesia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Thayeb (Indonesia): At the outset, my delegation would like to extend its congratulations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June. We have every confidence that, under your wise and able guidance, the issues before the Council will be brought to a successful conclusion. Allow me also to extend felicitations to your predecessor, Ambassador Wang Yingfan, Permanent Representative of China, for his skilful stewardship of the Council's activities last month.

We would also like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, for his comprehensive briefing regarding developments on the ground. Let me also, on this occasion, express my Government's satisfaction for having established a satisfactory practice of cooperation with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in the common interest of the development of East Timor.

As has been alluded to by previous speakers, my delegation is dismayed at the recent incident at the Noelbaki refugee camp which led to the decision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to suspend its activities at three refugee camps. However, we must acknowledge the fact that this incident was contained and that there were no injuries to any United Nations personnel. For Indonesia, such incidents are more disconcerting, particularly considering the fact that an atmosphere of calm had prevailed preceding the adverse events, which seem to occur on the eve of every Council meeting convened to consider the developments on the ground.

Time and again, my Government has expressed its strong commitment to taking the necessary steps to ensure security and to prevent such incidents from reoccurring. We share with others the view that threats of violence cannot be condoned under any circumstances, but we must not forget that the refugee problem is a complex, complicated and multidimensional one. Let us also not ignore the fact that a sense of frustration on the part of the refugees is heightened by the fact that they are still awaiting their return to East Timor. Despite the tireless efforts of the Government of Indonesia, the provincial governmental authorities in East Nusa Tenggara, UNHCR and other relevant humanitarian relief organizations, the pace and progress of the much-needed assistance have not met the expectations of the refugees and have thus had a demoralizing effect on them. Understandably, their profound concerns — especially over job opportunities, food shortages and the lack of other basic necessities — offer a bleak picture of what the future holds for them in East Timor. In addition, the heavy rains and flooding in East Nusa Tenggara in May 2000

worsened the conditions of the refugees. As a result, many lives were lost, with extensive damage to the infrastructure of the province. Faced with this emergency situation, the Indonesian Government took swift action by declaring a state of emergency in the area, while the local provincial government set up a task force. It was the concerted efforts of the Indonesian Government, along with the assistance rendered by various agencies of the United Nations, that succeeded in alleviating the hardships caused to the refugees by the floods.

There is no easy resolution to this problem. The Indonesian Government and the provincial government of East Nusa Tenggara have consistently called for the return of East Timorese refugees. As the most underdeveloped province of Indonesia, East Nusa Tenggara finds the additional economic burden a heavy one to bear. It has stretched its meagre resources to the limit. Compounding this situation is the fact that the numbers of refugees are equal to or even greater than the local Indonesian population, which does not constitute an ideal environment for security and harmony.

We acknowledge the role played by the local non-governmental organizations, as well as other international non-governmental organizations, that have often undertaken difficult tasks in providing a variety of services to the refugees, including basic services, food supplementation, advocacy and counselling and attending to the needs of women and children. We are also mindful of the contribution of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in dealing with the refugee issue, and in this context we would like to underline the importance of the full resumption of its activities. At this critical juncture, therefore, it is also hoped that the international community will be forthcoming in providing the necessary assistance to those refugees who wish to remain in Indonesia, thereby contributing to the resolution of this complex problem.

Indonesia remains steadfast in its commitment to the East Timorese people as they embark on the path to a society of peace, democracy and reconciliation, as well as to prosperity and sustainable development. Indonesia looks forward to a new era and to building the foundations for bilateral relations between the two countries.

In this respect, it is pertinent to note the close cooperation between the Government of Indonesia and UNTAET in dealing with various issues that stem from the transfer of authority over East Timor from Indonesia to the United Nations. These include the questions of borders, assets, East Timorese students in Indonesian institutions of higher learning, East Timorese who were Indonesian civil servants, archives and cultural artefacts. Our capacity to contribute to the development of East Timor is limited by resource constraints. We are, however, able to adopt policies and undertake initiatives that are helpful to East Timor's development. The Indonesian Government will do its utmost to reach arrangements on issues arising from the transfer of authority that are most beneficial to East Timor, subject to existing Indonesian laws and regulations.

Undeniably, the road ahead is strewn with obstacles and challenges, some of which have been voiced in this debate. Nonetheless, Indonesia is determined to fulfil its long-standing commitment. We are also determined to provide support for the well-being of the people of East Timor, including by addressing the urgent need to promote genuine reconciliation among East Timorese of all political persuasions. It is therefore imperative — indeed, a prerequisite — that such an endeavour be initiated by the United Nations as a matter of priority if East Timor is to become a viable and democratic State.

The President *(spoke in French)*: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker on my list is the representative of Brazil. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Moura (Brazil): Thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this open debate. I also thank Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello for his updating of the situation in East Timor, and I ask you, Mr. President, to convey the Brazilian Government's appreciation of the efforts undertaken by Mr. Vieira de Mello and his team in discharging the mandate of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

We are all aware that UNTAET has very innovative features as a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. The scope of its mandate makes it comparable only to those initiatives that embody all the efforts of the international community

to restore peace and security. Some analysts have stressed that East Timor is a test case for the United Nations, to the extent that the Organization is confronted with the complex challenge of building a new nation.

The destruction and violence unleashed last September add to the complexity of the situation. The plight of an entire population and the devastation of its territory are the backdrop against which we should gauge the effectiveness of our efforts and of our resolve. East Timor came to the fore in the United Nations, and it is in our best interest to turn a test case into a success story.

The first steps have already been taken, although much remains to be done. UNTAET managed to halt political violence, and the embryo of the future State is already in place. But the signs of impatience and frustration cannot be overlooked. The positive aspects notwithstanding, it seems that for the regular Timorese the changes have not kept pace with the expectations.

Let me single out four areas of problems that should be tackled as a matter of priority: economy and employment, education and training, security and political participation.

In the area of economy and employment, the main challenge is the transition from relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation to long-term development. International agencies are starting to focus on long-term development and job creation, which is essential for the integration of East Timor into the global economy. It is important to create an enabling environment for business as well as to help develop those sectors that have good prospects for sustainability, such as coffee and seafood exports, to name just two.

It is most welcome that UNTAET and the Timorese leadership are engaged in negotiations with Australia to define a new Timor Gap Treaty that will allow the new country to benefit from the exploitation of the deposits of oil and gas lying in the Timor seabed.

The goal of establishing a modern market economy and efficient State institutions leads us to the second area of concern: education and training. Renewed efforts are necessary to eradicate illiteracy, provide basic education, train the workforce and prepare the Timorese people to take the helm of the private and public sectors.

The third area is security, in its broader sense. It is not only political violence that we must ward off, but also the violence of regular crimes. If sustainable economic growth is combined with increasing employment rates and the provision of basic public services, the social instability and public unrest will certainly diminish. Moreover, the independent East Timor will need institutions capable of upholding the rule of law and of settling controversies that may arise from social relations.

The law-abiding citizen is not created by decree. The emergence of such citizens hinges very much on the perception that judicial remedies are available and that everyone is equal before the law.

The fourth area is political participation. We must instil in all Timorese the enthusiasm for taking their destiny in their own hands. In this context, the National Consultative Council has played a key role in the decision-making process under the aegis of UNTAET. The participation of East Timorese in the administration is also important and must be increased.

Besides the "Timorization" of UNTAET, participation also implies the setting up of a checks-and-balances system, one that ensures accountability and transparency in all matters pertaining to public affairs and lays the basis for a functioning democratic State.

As an expression of the solidarity of Brazilian society with the cause of East Timor, Brazil, during its tenure as a non-permanent member of this Council, took an active role in the reintroduction of the item on East Timor into the active agenda of the Council and in the follow-up actions that led to the referendum and its choice for independence.

That same solidarity is reflected in our participation in the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) and in our presence in UNTAET. We in Brazil were proud to receive Xanana Gusmão and other members of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), who went to Brazil to examine the possibility of establishing a mechanism of cooperation.

Despite our budgetary constraints, Brazil is committed to supporting in a concrete manner the development of East Timor. Last May Brazil established a representation office in Dili that is intended to lay the foundations for bilateral cooperation. The Brazilian Agency for Cooperation is

sending a mission to East Timor in order to start the implementation of projects in education, capacity-building and public health. For a developing country such as Brazil, these initiatives represent a sizeable effort that should be understood in the context of the cultural and historical bonds that unite the Brazilian and the Timorese people.

The process of reconstruction of East Timor goes beyond UNTAET. The future independent state of East Timor needs international cooperation to consolidate the rule of law and its incipient economic system. We know that the mobilization of attention and resources is far more difficult when a particular case is no longer a flashpoint. It is imperative, however, to maintain the momentum of this cooperation.

In this regard, it is important to continue cutting through the red tape to enable the disbursement of funds through the United Nations and international financial institutions. It is also important that the resources pledged during the donor conferences that took place in Tokyo last year and Lisbon last week are delivered in due time.

In East Timor the United Nations and the international community have embarked on a sort of unprecedented exercise in political theory and practice. We are bearing witness to the birth of a nation-State that is supposed to embody the universal values whose proclamation is to a large extent a product of United Nations-sponsored multilateral negotiations. The success of the exercise depends, though, on giving a palpable meaning to the lofty principles enshrined in international documents. In other words, these principles will make sense for East Timor only if they are shored up by the improvement of day-to-day realities on the ground, at the very grass-roots level.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker on my list is the representative of Australia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Stuart (Australia): Mr. President, I applaud your decision to conduct this open meeting of the Council, which provides non-members with an opportunity to participate in the discussion on an issue which for my Government remains of particular importance.

Through you, Sir, I wish to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Vieira de Mello, for his comprehensive briefing to the Council on the continuing work of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

Australia strongly supports UNTAET's role in guiding East Timor through the transition process. So far UNTAET has made creditable progress in developing a transitional administration and laying the foundations for an independent East Timor. It has done so in the face of enormous challenges and limited resources. We commend Mr. Vieira de Mello's leadership, and we commend the effort and commitment of all UNTAET's personnel, both international and East Timorese.

It is important to the long-term success of the transition that the people of East Timor take an active and constructive role in governance from an early stage. Australia welcomes the steps which UNTAET has taken to promote increased East Timorese participation in decision-making processes, including through an expanded National Consultative Council.

We encourage UNTAET to continue to work on strategies which will facilitate the effective involvement of the East Timorese in the transition to independence. We welcome Mr. Vieira de Mello's account of further thinking within UNTAET and in discussion with East Timorese representatives about how this might be achieved.

A successful transition to independence in East Timor will require careful and effective planning. Hence we attach great importance to the development of a considered exit strategy for UNTAET. Among other elements, this strategy should lay down a set of realistic benchmarks which reflect the basic conditions required for East Timor to function effectively as an independent State. An exit strategy incorporating benchmarks should be a mutually reinforcing aspect of continuing efforts to expand East Timorese involvement in the transition process.

We consider that such a strategy should not be so detailed as to set the bar unrealistically high for what can be achieved, yet be specific enough to provide some focus for the path to independence and an adequate basis for measuring the progress and effectiveness of ongoing reconstruction efforts.

A stable security environment will be a key benchmark and an essential element of a smooth progression to independence. While improvements

have taken place in the last six months, security problems remain. Australia was seriously concerned by the two recent militia attacks on UNTAET peacekeeping operation forces along the border with West Timor. These attacks have highlighted the need for greater action to disarm the militia and curtail their activities in West Timor as well as the need for the peacekeeping operation to maintain vigilance, particularly in the border regions.

Australia also continues to be concerned at the situation of refugees in West Timor, in particular at the recent security incidents which have led to the suspension of the activities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. We urge the Indonesian authorities to enhance efforts to accelerate resettlement and repatriation, including separating militias from refugees, ensuring that international agencies have unimpeded access to refugees to determine their preferences and to supervise repatriation, and, together with the international community, plan for permanent resettlement for those who do not wish to return.

Despite these concerns, improvement in the security situation, notably in the eastern part of East Timor, has provided a sound basis on which to commence a downsizing of the peacekeeping operation over the coming months. Australia supports UNTAET's decision to commence a gradual but steady decrease of troops in the eastern sector.

As for East Timor's future security needs, we remain committed to engaging fully with all key players in this important issue, and we welcome in this respect the commissioning by UNTAET of an independent study on East Timor's future security needs and options.

UNTAET's continuing effective operation in East Timor will rely heavily on the ability of the United Nations system to deliver the resources needed to implement all aspects of UNTAET's mandate. We encourage the United Nations to continue its efforts to streamline recruitment, procurement and approval procedures in order to overcome delays in implementing vital development activities.

As a close neighbour, Australia is a committed long-term partner in East Timor's reconstruction and development. The Australian Government has made a major financial commitment to East Timor last year and this. Our financial assistance in the financial year ending at the end of this month will total over $81 million (Australian) through the Australian Aid Programme.

In recognition of East Timor's continuing development needs, the Australian Government announced in May a commitment of $150 million (Australian) over the four years beginning this July through to 2003-2004. This multiyear commitment will provide East Timor with increased certainty in budgetary planning over the medium term.

In this context, the results of the Lisbon donor conference were very positive, especially the very strong support given to further work to establish an integrated budgetary framework for East Timor which coordinates recurrent costs and capital inputs as well as revenue and contributions from multilateral and bilateral donors.

While a good start has been made in identifying domestic sources of revenue, this needs to be pursued much more actively over the next few months. In the meantime, it is important for the international community to continue to provide assistance, not just for reconstruction efforts but also for the recurrent costs of the East Timorese administration so that it can keep basic services running in such areas as health, education and infrastructure.

Much remains to be done in East Timor. A successful transition to independence depends heavily on continuing support from the international community. Security Council resolution 1272 (1999) recognized that, in order to fulfil its mandate, UNTAET would need to draw on the expertise and capacity of Member States, United Nations agencies and other international organizations, including the international financial institutions. Australia urges the international community to continue its engagement in the progress, to fulfil the pledges made at the Tokyo conference, to build on the progress made last week in Lisbon and to consider contributions to the long-term recurrent financial and in-kind support UNTAET needs if it is to be able to deliver its services and to support East Timor's smooth and timely transition to independence.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker on my list is the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Sun (Republic of Korea): At the outset, Mr. President, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation for your initiative to hold an open debate to allow interested countries non-members of the Security Council to express their views on the situation in East Timor.

I would like also to join previous speakers in thanking Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello for his comprehensive and informative briefing.

It was only 13 months ago, with the conclusion of the 5 May agreement, that the long-cherished historic aspirations of the East Timorese people began to be fulfilled. Indeed, there have been many uncertainties, untold sacrifices and unexpected tragedies along the way. Yet the overall security situation in East Timor is now stable, and nation-building, including reconstruction and development, is taking place.

In this regard, no one deserves more credit than the East Timorese themselves, who have shown their strong will to overcome severe hardship in their struggle for independence. The Secretary-General has also played a crucial role in this historic endeavour with his bold and timely initiatives. Certainly, without the Indonesian Government's cooperation with the United Nations and the international community's generous contributions of funds and personnel, this progress would not have been possible.

Although I agree with the evaluation of many people that the work of the United Nations in East Timor has been a success, there are still challenges before us. Let me take this opportunity to comment on a few tasks that my delegation believes are of primary importance. First, we should put economic development and employment at the top of our agenda. We cannot deny the difficulty of making and implementing reconstruction projects with limited resources in a country that has very limited and little infrastructure, but we still need to try to make social and economic stability a reality. Although some progress has been made, more efforts should be undertaken to accelerate the disbursement of the World Bank's trust fund.

Secondly, I believe that there must be greater participation by the East Timorese in the decision-making process with regard to both UNTAET and World Bank projects. Without a sense of ownership, even the most well-designed programme will not be sustainable.

Thirdly, with regard to Mr. Vieira de Mello's reference to political benchmarks, such long-term benchmarks for UNTAET's project for nation-building in East Timor should be suggested as soon as possible, after consultation with the East Timorese people.

Fourthly, UNTAET and the Indonesian Government must take more decisive steps to implement repatriation and to ensure the safety of the refugees. This is especially important in the light of the heavy casualties among East Timorese refugees in West Timor during recent floods.

Finally, contributions from the international community should be continued if the dream of a new, independent and viable country is to be realized. It is especially imperative that contributing States fulfil their pledges; in this regard, we welcome the results of the donors' meeting in Lisbon.

The Republic of Korea has actively participated in the efforts of the international community to help East Timor, sending more than 400 peacekeepers and other personnel. My Government has also provided $250,000 in humanitarian assistance and $400,000 to the UNTAET Trust Fund, and we will contribute $600,000 for the training of East Timorese, in close consultation with UNTAET, for the next two years, beginning in 2001. The Republic of Korea remains committed to supporting the important objectives of the United Nations in East Timor.

The President (*spoke in French*): The next speaker on my list is the Permanent Representative of New Zealand. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Powles (New Zealand): I shall try — not least because of the lateness of the hour — to be very brief.

May I first of all express through you, Mr. President, my appreciation to Mr. Vieira de Mello for the excellent briefing he has given today and, indeed, to thank you, Sir, for the opportunity provided to non-members to participate in a public meeting of the Council under your presidency on this important issue.

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) has made very considerable progress on the security and humanitarian aspects of its mandate since its establishment. We must, however, express our concern at the recent incursions by militias and attacks on United Nations peacekeepers, including

the wounding of an Australian peacekeeper. New Zealand currently has over 600 of its defence force personnel patrolling the western border of East Timor under the United Nations flag, so our interest is real and direct. We are also concerned about the deteriorating security situation in some refugee camps in West Timor, which has led to the suspension of United Nations relief assistance. We acknowledge the actions taken by Indonesia to date, but call for renewed efforts by the Indonesian Government to rein in the militias in West Timor. My delegation therefore agrees strongly with the unequivocal comments made in this regard at this meeting by several members of the Council.

My Government very much welcomes the proposal by UNTAET and the National Council of Timorese Resistance for co-government in East Timor, which was foreshadowed at the very successful donors' meeting in Lisbon last week. It represents a significant step towards greater participation by East Timorese in government and shared political responsibility. We would want to encourage UNTAET and the East Timorese people to develop further the necessary constitutional and political frameworks to prepare East Timor for full independence. This process must have East Timorese ownership and be driven by the East Timorese, but it will obviously also require active input by UNTAET, drawing on the best constitutional advice available. Both these aspects will be critical for the unique United Nations task of preparing the territory of East Timor for independence.

Those are the main points I wish to make today.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now call on the last speaker on my list, the Permanent Representative of Norway. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Kolby (Norway): I would like to join the two previous speakers in commending you, Mr. President, for allowing non-members of the Council to participate in this debate. I also wish to thank Mr. Vieira de Mello for his interesting presentation.

The Government of Norway is pleased to note the very positive developments in East Timor since the establishment of an interim Administration under United Nations leadership less than a year ago. Remarkable progress has been made in recent months in establishing the basis for a new central administration, in building up the social sectors and in the training of civil servants, as well as in rebuilding infrastructure. However, the challenges are formidable.

East Timor will emerge as an independent country within a few years. But it will carry a heavy burden of development needs. The leadership of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) has our confidence and support in laying the foundation for a new democratic and prosperous nation. We realize the difficulties and recognize the need for appropriate planning and coordination. We also share the frustration of East Timorese over a process that has at times been slow. At this juncture, all parties involved must focus on a speedy implementation of programmes that facilitate a rapid recovery of the economy and create employment activity, so that the people of East Timor can participate directly in the recovery of their country.

We must never lose sight of the primary goal, namely, that the East Timorese themselves, within a short period of time, will be able to govern their own country and lead their own administration. Norway urges the United Nations to make every effort to increase the participation of East Timorese in the building of this new nation. We feel that the transfer of competencies, investment in human resources and training of personnel for the public sector could be even more concentrated and efficient. We would again like to request, as we stated at last week's donors' meeting in Lisbon, that the greatest possible effort be made with regard to these processes.

Coordination of aid in support of reconstruction and development in East Timor is essential. We are particularly pleased in this context with the cooperation between the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank in establishing the Trust Fund for East Timor jointly. Aid coordination also implies that we as donors effectively design our own respective projects and programmes in such a manner that they meet the priorities of the East Timorese and that they do not overlap or leave any gaps. Projects can be sustainable only if they are in accordance with the future resources of an independent East Timor.

Progress on implementing decisions from the Tokyo donors' meeting in December last year has been uneven and, in some cases, too slow. We urge the donor community to ensure that pledges and commitments are translated into disbursements. At the same time, we urge UNTAET and international organizations to

review their operational procedures to speed up the implementation of programmes on the ground.

Norway has provided strong support for East Timor since long before the crisis of 1999. My Government has supported the East Timorese right to self-determination and has assisted in the humanitarian efforts to bring relief after the devastation left behind last autumn. Norway remains firmly committed to continuing to assist in the reconstruction and development of East Timor. We will continue to provide humanitarian assistance and to deal with the urgent needs. At the same time, Norway is increasingly addressing the reconstruction and longer-term development needs through contributions to the World Bank Trust Fund and the UNTAET Trust Fund, and through United Nations agencies and international organizations.

An especially complex and important issue is addressing East Timor's future security needs. This is a legitimate concern of all sovereign States. We would like to see these matters addressed as soon as possible by the Security Council in order to prepare the ground well for the establishment of appropriate security mechanisms before independence.

The President (*spoke in French*): The hour is late, but I think we should give the Special Representative, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, the opportunity to respond to the many questions put to him. I give him the floor.

Mr. Vieira de Mello (*spoke in French*): I would like to express my gratitude for your support, Mr. President, and for the support expressed by all speakers for the efforts we are making in Timor. This is a great source of encouragement to us all.

First of all, allow me to express my satisfaction and that of my associates at the unanimous endorsement of the initiatives we have undertaken in recent weeks to expand and deepen the participation of Timorese leaders in the Transitional Administration in East Timor until the time of independence.

As the President has suggested, I will now confine my remarks to answering the questions put to me. I have taken very careful notes of all the comments, suggestions, recommendations and advice that has been offered to us in the course of this debate. I can assure the Council that we will take them fully into account.

Let me begin with the question concerning reducing the size of the military force of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). I am thinking in particular of the statements made by the representatives of the United States, the Netherlands and Canada, as well as that made by the President.

The representative of the United States asked me whether we had a plan, and when the reduction would begin. Yes, we do have a plan, which we presented to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and which we will of course submit to the Secretary-General. Although I would like to emphasize that it has not yet been endorsed, that plan provides for a reduction of 487 troops between now and October, 1,050 between now and February, and 1,405 between now and April. This includes both men and women. It is only a provisional plan. As I said in my presentation, we shall be reviewing the situation at regular intervals. We are aware of what the Security Council resolution asks us to do, namely, to bring the security situation under control so as to permit a reduction of United Nations military forces in East Timor.

Apart from questions of security in the field, we also need to be sure of the capacity of our civilian police to take over the functions of maintaining public order that are now provided in East Timor by military personnel.

I would also point out that we have identified some additional needs, particularly in the areas of engineering capacity for road repairs — as I mentioned in my presentation — and patrolling Timorese territorial waters. This is a need that concerns me greatly, and it is possible that the figures I have just given the Council are not definitive.

I have taken note of the statements made by the Permanent Representatives of the Netherlands and Canada. I shall convey to the Secretary-General their requests that the Council be given a detailed briefing by our military colleagues before any final decision is taken on the reduction of the military force.

I turn now to other issues in the political domain. The Ambassador of the Netherlands asked me if independence will immediately follow the elections. I can only speculate now, but as we see things — and when I say "we", I mean the Timorese leaders, we in UNTAET and I think my colleagues here in New York also — the elections that will take place next year will

be elections for a constituent assembly. That assembly, once elected, will be able to consider the text of a draft Constitution, to debate it and to adopt it. So that makes me think that independence would not immediately follow the elections.

Another question, which I believe was put to me by the Ambassador of the Netherlands, concerns the measures taken or to be taken in order to improve the security situation in the refugee camps and along the border. In my presentation, I said that our cooperation with the Indonesian armed forces has been improving, notwithstanding recent incidents. We were informed by General Kiki Syahrakri, who commands the military district that covers the western portion of the island, that a large number of weapons were confiscated in the refugee camps. We were given the figure of 600 weapons, and were informed that the pro-integrationist militias could no longer be trained at these camps. Of course, we welcome these measures, and they have been confirmed through other sources. Regarding the additional measures that could be taken, I will repeat what some representatives have stated here, which has also been noted on other occasions — that the Timorese elements in the Indonesian armed forces and in the Indonesian police need to be transferred. I know that this process has begun. They need to transferred from the refugee camps and even from the western portion of the island to other Indonesian islands.

It also seems very important to identify, which should not be very difficult, and transfer from the camps the extremist elements that regularly carry out acts of violence and intimidation directed at the refugees or at the personnel of humanitarian agencies. Finally, it is clear that the acceleration of repatriation — or of reintegration for those refugees wishing to remain in Indonesia — would greatly facilitate things. When I gave my statement, I stated that we intend to take a number of measures with Xanana Gusmão and with Indonesian authorities to overcome obstacles in the current situation.

(*spoke in English*)

Regarding a number of questions that were put to me by Ambassador Greenstock and by Ambassador van Walsum, which are related to security, yes, we have been attempting to pay attention to the humanitarian needs of the Falantil, especially of those who are cantoned in Aileu, despite the problems that humanitarian agencies have, as is known, in assisting uniformed and armed personnel. We are trying to find an imaginative solution, and we have noted the interest of some Governments, in particular of Portugal, of providing direct bilateral assistance to them.

As far as the new security force is concerned, as I indicated, we are awaiting the outcome of the Kings College study that will make recommendations and, I hope, will propose different options regarding the configuration, the size and the doctrine of a possible future East Timorese defence force. I have taken note of what Ambassador van Walsum said about the role of Falintil in the creation of this new security force, a role that we recognize. What we need to do after decisions have been made on this future security force is to determine which of the Falintil members can be or should be retrained to form part of that force and which should be demobilized and retrained to occupy their place in East Timor civil society. The plan exists, but, as members may be aware, the Falintil commanders do not wish to treat this problem piecemeal and are therefore awaiting a decision on the future security force before they agree to the retirement or demobilization of some of the Falintil subgroups.

Finally, Ambassador van Walsum asked me if we had the results of the investigation into the latest grenade attack against the Australian contingent of the peacekeeping force. No, the answer is that I do not have it yet. I know that those who were arrested were being interrogated, and this information could be made available to the Council as soon as it is made available to me.

Moving now to other questions put to me by Ambassador Greenstock, the question of the slow rate of disbursement is one that has preoccupied us, as I said in my presentation. I indicated in Lisbon last week that we had two main reasons for this pattern of slow disbursement in the first semester of the year 2000.

First of all, we did not have a government procurement capacity in Dili. This is one of the lessons we can learn from UNTAET, and I believe also from the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, namely, that when governance-building and nation-building, efforts are deployed by the Security Council, a capacity in different areas for which we do not necessarily have resources in the United Nations system, and in particular procurement for the Government as distinct from the peacekeeping mission as such, should be deployed in the very early stages of

the operation. We now have such a capacity with the help of the United Nations Office for Project Services.

The second reason was that we did not, until three weeks ago, have a consolidated budget for East Timor. So it was extremely difficult for us to decide on priorities. We were bombarded, as can be imagined, with requests from different central and district transitional administration services, all of them justified. But it was impossible to prioritize in the absence of a consolidated budget, which we now have and which, as members know, was approved last week in Lisbon. We can now, therefore, begin implementing the budget for East Timor for the fiscal year 2000-2001, and I can assure members that the rate of disbursements will increase rapidly.

I have also taken note of Ambassador Greenstock's comments, which I will share with my colleagues here in the Secretariat, regarding measurable achievements, as well as a greater level of autonomy for UNTAET in the performance of its governance functions.

I move now to the question of refugees. The representative of Namibia asked me if we had estimates of how many out of the roughly 120,000 would be prepared to go back and how many would prefer to remain in Indonesia. The long-awaited census of the refugee population in West Timor has not been completed yet. It has been suspended, in fact, as a result of the incidents in the camps around Kupang. Therefore, the total figure of 120,000 is only an estimate. Our sense is that at least half, if not two thirds, of the refugee population in West Timor would be prepared to return if given the possibility of choosing freely and if a number of conditions were met, some of which I outlined and others of which were alluded to by the representative of Indonesia in his presentation. I will not list those, but this is our rough estimate.

The representative of Malaysia asked me whether there had been progress on the proposed relocation of integrationists and their families away from the border. The answer is no; we have not yet had confirmation that this is happening. Incidentally, 20 kilometres away from the border may be an insufficient distance. As I said, we would prefer that the most extreme elements among the pro-integration forces — particularly those who were previously members of the militia — be relocated at a safe distance from our border, and preferably away from West Timor, or the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur as it is known in Bahasa Indonesia.

Moving now to the last few questions, the representative of Jamaica, supported by Brazil, asked me what measures were being taken to tackle my "nightmare", which is unemployment in East Timor. In addition to, obviously, recruitment of East Timorese by international organizations, be they intergovernmental or non-governmental, recruitment into the new civil service of East Timor — that is, approximately 10,000 new civil servants in the coming fiscal year — should provide employment. But obviously, we should not look to the public sector to solve the problems of unemployment. Bilateral programmes funded by countries represented in this Chamber, for which I am most thankful, have helped us bridge the gap between the Tokyo conference, the appraisal of reconstruction programmes, and the impending implementation of large-scale reconstruction programmes. But it is these reconstruction programmes in the fields of health, education, infrastructure and agriculture that will provide employment opportunities in sufficient numbers in the months to come.

The private sector, though, in the longer term — and you alluded to this, Mr. President — will be the employment-generation sector. Therefore, the promotion of investment in East Timor, from both foreign and smaller local sources, is essential. And in order for that to happen, we also need to resolve the question of land and property, which is another of our many nightmares, given the fact that there are no records left in East Timor: East Timor has no memory; there are no archives; there is nothing left. And as can be imagined, we receive many competing claims regarding property. Unless these can be resolved, probably by an independent tribunal, in the near future, very few investors will be prepared to come and risk their money in East Timor. We are very conscious of that.

(*spoke in French*)

The President asked where we stood with regard to loans to small and medium-sized enterprises and whether we had sufficient funds. No, they are not sufficient. We have some $4 million from a small-scale World Bank project; yet requests received as of just before I left amounted to more than $30 million. This is very encouraging; it means that there is a great deal

of initiative and much interest on the part of Timorese enterprises in setting themselves up. But clearly, the $4 million at hand is not enough. Our plan is to encourage local enterprises that will be working with us to implement major reconstruction plans financed by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and to set up joint ventures involving Timorese in order to create Timorese capacity in the private sector.

(*spoke in English*)

I shall conclude by addressing two further questions. The first is from Ambassador Satoh of Japan, on mass information. He is absolutely right: that is one of our greatest weaknesses, which explains some of the frustration expressed by the Timorese population. The problem is that we have no television; the coverage of our own UNTAET radio is very limited. It will take time to repair repeaters, antennas and the generators for those antennas. It will take time to procure radio sets and distribute them to the Timorese population. We are very conscious of this, and we are enthusiastically proceeding with the reconstruction of the telecommunications infrastructure in East Timor, not least for that reason.

We also have a fortnightly magazine, which is broadly distributed but which is grossly insufficient as well. We are trying to use other means, such as video, town hall meetings — I myself participate in those — and I have recently written to the two bishops of East Timor requesting the help of the Church infrastructure in disseminating information on our activities.

(*spoke in French*)

Finally, Mr. President, let me reply to your question about progress with respect to the exploitation of natural resources, especially oil and natural gas. Timorese leaders told us a few months ago that they would like the terms of the agreement on the exploitation of these resources in the deep waters between Timor and Australia, in the cooperation zone defined by the pre-existing treaty between Indonesia and Australia, to be renegotiated by UNTAET — with Timorese participation to be sure — during the transitional phase. Talks have taken place in Adelaide, Canberra, Dili and, just last weekend, Darwin. The Australian Government has evinced understanding. They are open-minded and flexible, for which I am grateful to them. I am therefore optimistic about the conclusion of these negotiations before independence day.

I thank you, Sir, and all the other members of the Council for this opportunity to address the Council and for your support.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for his useful clarifications after a long debate that, I am happy to say, has been exemplary in that both the questions and the answers were very precise and informative. I believe that reflects the Security Council's interest in this unprecedented endeavour under way in East Timor under United Nations auspices. I think it was exemplary also because of the common ground that was apparent in the comments, and because of the Security Council's unanimous support for the Special Representative.

I thank Mr. Vieira de Mello and hope that he will be able to meet with us in a few months' time and to tell us of fresh progress in every area of his endeavours.

The meeting rose at 2.10 p.m.